EPITOME
OF
MILITARY EVENTS,
October, 1799.

THE diſcovery of the new world, and of a new
te to the Eaſt Indies, by doubling the Cape of
od Hope, while it has changed the direction of
merce, has alſo increaſed its elements, and pro-
ed the inhabitants of Europe enjoyments to
n heretofore unknown. But theſe advantages
e been dearly purchaſed by the torrents of blood
ch ambition and avarice have cauſed to be ſhed,
rder to ſecure the poſſeſſion of the treaſures or
ductions of the new hemiſphere.

ommerce, by its nature, the friend of peace,
ch protects it, and favours its extenſion, has
the ſource of almoſt all the wars that, for
laſt three centuries, have embrued the world
blood; and what ſhould have multiplied and

cemented the bonds which aſſimilate and unite nations, is become the almoſt habitual cauſe of their diviſions and quarrels.

The European governments, perſuaded that commercial ſuperiority muſt enſure political ſupremacy at a time, when war having become ſo expenſive, the conditions of peace depended upon the power which could longeſt pay and maintain armies, have almoſt, without exception, directed their attention towards every object that could favour the improvement or the extenſion of their trade.

America and the Eaſt Indies, producing commodities ſo valuable for conſumption, or materials ſo important for manufactures, muſt neceſſarily have attracted the entire attention of thoſe nations whoſe geographical ſituation invited them to navigate the ocean.

Colonies have been formed in every part of the known world. It was not, as among the ancients, the ſurplus of the inhabitants that went to foreign parts, to ſeek for a ſettlement, and found an independent city, which preſerved with the mother-country only an intercourſe of friendſhip and affection, ariſing from their common origin.

It is generally under the auſpices of governments, and with their aſſiſtance, that almoſt all the modern colonies have been eſtabliſhed; or, if a few fortunate adventurers have ſucceeded in forming ſettlements of ſome importance, they have felt the neceſſity of throwing themſelves into the arms of a power

power that could protect them, and ſecure them from an invaſion which their very ſucceſs provoked.

But theſe colonies, far from being independent, have not been allowed the enjoyment of the common laws which governed their parent ſtates. The immenſity of the expenſes, entailed by their preſervation, has forced them to ſubmit to a fiſcal government, which, by retarding their advancement, has often diminiſhed their attachment to the mother-country, and has ſometimes led them to wiſh to withdraw themſelves from her domination.

Without here retracing the hiſtory of the ſettlements of the Europeans in the two Indies, we ſhall confine ourſelves to fixing the attention of our readers upon one of the moſt remarkable epochs of this century, in which we have ſeen a portion of the Engliſh colonies all at once elevated to the rank of the moſt reſpectable powers; a revolution, the principles and the conſequences of which, have had no ſmall influence upon the extraordinary events that have ſince paſſed under our eyes.

A multiplicity of circumſtances, which it would be too tedious to enumerate, and which, beſides, do not belong to the particular hiſtory of the preſent war, having brought about this grand criſis, which, in every point of view, has changed the political ſituation of France, the Britiſh government, who could not forget the loſs of their colo-

nies in North America, who could not forgive France for the aſſiſtance which ſhe had given them, and which had ſo effectually contributed to their independence, muſt have hoped that the troubles inſeparable from a revolution, would afford them favourable opportunities of retaliating and increaſing their power at the expenſe of a rival nation.

In fact, the imprudence, with which a few members of the French legiſlature cauſed war to be declared firſt againſt Auſtria, and ſucceſſively againſt all Europe, favoured the views which England had formed upon the French colonies in the Weſt Indies.

The two moſt conſiderable of theſe, Martinico and St. Domingo, were attacked; the former fell, and the latter became a prey to diſorders, which deprived France of the immenſe reſources ſhe annually drew from that iſland.

The unexpected victories of the French armies ſoon diſſolved a coalition, the elements of which were too heterogeneous for it to be of long duration; but the depoſitaries of power in France then committed a great fault in requiring, as a pledge of peace, that ſtates, naturally amicable, ſhould take an active part in the diſpute between the Republic and Great Britain.

Spain and Holland, by declaring war againſt England, have offered her, on every ſide, poſſeſſions to invade, which, at a future period, will ſerve as compenſations for the conqueſts made upon

upon the continent, or indemnifications for the expenſes of the war, which ſhe has ſupported almoſt excluſively.

This fault of the government of France, which, in weakening her new allies, has deſtroyed her commerce, and has abandoned that of all Europe to her enemies, was no ſooner committed, than a part of the Dutch treaſures and ſhips was ſequeſtrated, and the important anchorage of *Ceylon*, and the rich colony of the *Cape of Good Hope*, became the prey of the Britiſh ſquadrons.

Such was the ſtate of affairs, when the Directory carried into execution the project, ſo generally condemned, of the expedition to Egypt. The reputation of the generals, and of the troops employed, the capture of Malta, the debarkation upon the banks of the Nile, the ſucceſſes againſt the Mamalûks, fixed the public attention, which was beſides awakened by the recollection of the priſtine ſplendour of *Thebes* and *Memphis*, and ſtill more, perhaps, by the idea that the ancient route of the commerce of India might be reopened, and that a few enterpriſing men, whoſe courage, talents, and even patience, had been put to the teſt, were not perhaps incapable of accompliſhing a new revolution in Aſia.

The Engliſh miniſtry felt all the importance of a danger, which might be only chimerical, but which, if realized, threatened to undermine the proſperity of the commerce, and the ſource of the wealth

wealth of the nation. There can be no doubt, that from this moment they formed the plan, not only of counteracting the arrival of the French in the Eaſt Indies, but that they thought of henceforth ſecuring their power there, by the deſtruction of that, which was inceſſantly oppoſing their aggrandizement, and which ſhewed itſelf upon all occaſions diſpoſed to ſerve as an auxiliary to their enemies.

The importance that had at the time been attached to the embaſſy ſent by *Tippoo Saib*, the projects that might have been concerted between him and the old government of France; the certainty that officers had been ſent to inſtruct the troops of *Tippoo* in the European exerciſe; laſtly, the propoſitions made by the Sultaun of *Myſore* to the commander of the Iſles of France and of Bourbon; every thing forewarned the Engliſh, that it was in India that the moſt deciſive blows againſt them would be ſtruck.

Accordingly we ſee, that, notwithſtanding the ſecurity which the Britiſh government muſt have felt at the increaſe of their power in the Peninſula of India, and the weakneſs of the means which the French could employ there, they ſeized this opportunity of making conſiderable preparations for war. They diſplayed in them as much activity both in Aſia and in Europe, as if Egypt had been already ſubdued, and as if *Buonaparte* having already formed a navy upon the Red Sea, had ſur-

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mounted the obſtacles of the perilous navigation from *Suez* to *Coſſeir*, and from *Coſſeir* to the Straits of *Babelmandel*; or, after having conquered Syria, he had opened for himſelf through the deſerts the route of *Baſſora*. The object of the firſt orders given by the Engliſh miniſtry was to ſecure a communication between the Red Sea and the Indian ocean; a ſquadron, which left Bombay with troops for debarkation on board, ſet ſail for the Straits of *Babelmandel*, and was to take poſſeſſion of the iſland of *Socotora*, ſo happily ſituated at the mouth of the Straits, on the coaſt of the Indian ocean, and ſo important as a ſtation, on account of the harbours and anchorages which it affords on the northern ſide.

A report was ſpread that the French had endeavoured to anticipate the Engliſh in the Straits of *Babelmandel*, and that Admiral *Richery* had been charged with this expedition.

In the month of July 1798, Commodore *Blanket* ſailed from England with a few ſhips; he received orders to take on board at Liſbon the 2d battalion of Royals, and at Gibraltar the 2d and the 70th regiments; and to direct his courſe to the Cape of Good Hope, where he embarked the 84th and 86th regiments.

We ſhould be much inclined to examine what was, before this laſt epoch, the political ſituation of the Engliſh with reſpect to the different powers in India; we ſhould wiſh to be able to preſent to our

our readers a picture that would bring back to their recollection the reſources of which the government could diſpoſe by means of the tributary princes, and to enable them to form a better idea of the nature of this war, and of the operations that preceded the ſiege and capture of *Seringapatam*. But, in engaging in theſe inquiries, we ſhould leave too great an interval between the operations, which are, more than ever, connected with each other upon the theatre of war in Europe. We have even diveſted this ſketch of the expedition againſt *Tippoo Saib*, of every thing that refers to the tranſactions which have led to this rupture. In a note ſubjoined to this Number, will be found the recapitulation of that ſort of manifeſto contained in the official accounts ſent to the Court of Directors of the Eaſt India Company, by Lord *Mornington*, the Governor-general.

The firſt intelligence of the conqueſt of Egypt by *Buonaparte*, reached Lord *Mornington* in the courſe of the month of October 1798, and determined him to attack *Tippoo* in his dominions with all the forces that he could collect to the eaſt and to the weſt, upon the coaſt of Coromandel, and upon that of Malabar. It is well known that the Engliſh have on both theſe coaſts a great military eſtabliſhment; Fort St. George, or Madras, upon the eaſt coaſt, and Bombay upon the weſt coaſt, are two places of arms ſeparated by the whole breadth of the Peninſula, an interval of about

about twenty-two leagues from north-weſt to ſouth-weſt. The armies, to which each of theſe fortreſſes ſerves as a point of ſupport, and the aſſembling of which it favours, being always able to act in concert, and having their retreat ſecured, keep in ſubjection thoſe vaſt provinces, whoſe princes, weakened and divided, could not attempt to join each other without expoſing themſelves to a double attack, which they would be unable to ſuſtain. Almoſt all of them had ſubmitted to the yoke of the maſters of Hindoſtan, who will ſhortly be maſters of the commerce of the world. They thought it an honour to preſerve, under the empty name of ſovereignty, the title of allies of the Engliſh, and, as it but too frequently happens, they conſoled themſelves for the loſs of their independence, by aſſiſting the conquerors to complete their conqueſt.

In order to ſubdue the laſt of theſe princes, who had preſerved a political independence, and who was the heir of the famous *Hyder Ally*, the moſt powerful and the moſt victorious ſince the days of *Nadir Shah*, Lord *Mornington* on the 3d of February gave orders to General *Harris*, who commanded the forces on the coaſt of Coromandel, to march towards the frontiers of the *Carnatic*, and to penetrate into the dominions of *Tippoo Saib*: at the ſame time General *Stuart*, with the troops on the Malabar coaſt, was directed to march and join General *Harris*.

The Engliſh army was increaſed by the contin-

gent of the Nizam, in which were compriſed 6000 of the Company's troops in the pay of that prince, and of the ſepoys commanded by Engliſh officers.

General *Harris* paſſed the frontier on the 9th of March, and proceeded towards *Seringapatam*; and, on the other ſide, hoſtilities commenced at *Sedaſeer*, on the 6th of March, between a conſiderable corps of *Tippoo*'s army, which he had himſelf aſſembled at *Periapatam*, ſeven miles from *Sedaſeer*, and General *Stuart*'s advanced guard, which he had detached from his camp at *Seedapore* to *Sedaſeer*, in order to more ſpeedily eſtabliſh his communication with General *Harris*.

Sedaſeer is an elevated poſition, from whence is to be ſeen at a diſtance the *Myſore* country, and the courſe of the *Cavery*, almoſt as far as *Seringapatam*, which is built upon an iſland formed by that river.

This firſt attack of *Tippoo Saib* was impetuous; he ſucceeded in turning Colonel *Montreſor*'s brigade, which occupied *Sedaſeer*, and in cutting off its communication with *Seedapore*. This advanced guard was ſurrounded, when General *Stuart* marched to its relief with the 77th regiment, attacked the column, which had turned *Sedaſeer*, diſengaged Colonel *Montreſor*, and, in conjunction with him and Major-general *Hartley*, entirely defeated the troops of the *Sultaun*, who re-entered his camp at *Periapatam*. This prince had hoped to beat General *Stuart*, and intended afterwards to attack Gene-

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ral *Harris*. As ſoon as he was informed of the entrance of the Madras army into the *Myſore* country, he broke up his camp at *Periapatam*, and marched with a great deal of celerity to meet General *Harris* with all the troops and artillery that he was able to collect. He came up with him at the moment when his troops were entering the camp of *Malavely*. There ſpeedily enſued a general action, in which Colonel *Welleſley*'s diviſion turned the right flank of the Indian army. *Tippoo* was not here more ſucceſsful than he had been in his attack upon General *Stuart*; he was completely beaten, and driven from all the poſitions which he tried to maintain.

As early as the 30th of March, General *Harris*, after having croſſed the *Cavery*, had encamped within two miles to the ſouth-weſt of *Seringapatam*, in a poſition which General *Abercromby* had occupied in 1792. He there ſtrengthened himſelf by driving in the enemy's out-poſts, and cloſing upon the place.

General *Stuart* marched in order to effect a junction between the two armies; on the 6th of April he met at *Periapatam* Major-general *Floyd*, whom General *Harris* had detached with a corps of troops from the Madras army to join him, and ſecure his laſt marches to the approaches of the fortreſs.

Tippoo Saib made no freſh efforts in the field to counteract this junction; he merely con-

tented himſelf with defending, againſt General *Stuart*, the out-works of his capital to the north of the *Cavery*, from his laſt retreat, as he had done againſt General *Harris*. But this defence of the out-works was equally ſhort and ineffectual. General *Stuart* drove the *Sultaun*'s troops to within eight hundred yards of the weſtern angle of the fort, and carried an intrenchment which ſeparated him from the attacks made by General *Harris*. The place was inveſted, and the firſt parallel was immediately opened. We ſhall neither here report the details of the ſiege, nor General *Floyd*'s movements to cover it againſt the enemy's parties that were ſtill in the field.

On the 30th of April the beſiegers had begun to batter in breach; on the 3d of May the breach was reported practicable, and the arrangement was made for aſſaulting the place; the 12th, 33d, 73d, and 74th regiments, were particularly deſtined for that ſervice; and, in order more ſurely to take the *Sultaun* by ſurpriſe, General *Harris* ordered the ſignal not to be given till about the middle of the day, at the time of the greateſt heat.

The Engliſh troops and the ſepoy grenadiers moved from the trenches, croſſed the rocky bed of the *Cavery* under an extremely heavy fire, paſſed the glacis and ditch, and, led on by Colonel *Sherbrooke* and Lieutenant-colonel *Dunlop*, who was there wounded, aſcended the breaches in the ſauſſe braye and rampart of the fort. The battle

was obſtinate and bloody: *Tippoo*, taken by ſurpriſe, and deſperate, braved death wherever the danger was the greateſt; he fell in the conflict, as well as his principal officers. All the fortifications were carried, and the ſons of the *Sultaun* ſtill defended themſelves in the palace which contained his family, his wives, and his treaſures: General *Harris* promiſing ſafety and protection to the inhabitants of the palace, they ſurrendered.

A ſtrict ſearch was immediately made for the body of *Tippoo Sultaun*, and it was, after much difficulty, found under a heap of ſlain near one of the gates; it was carried to the palace, recogniſed by his family, and interred with the honours due to his rank in the tomb of his father. This magnificent mauſoleum of *Hyder Ally* is ſituated on the ſouth ſide of the iſland, and ſurrounded by a grove of cypreſs-trees.

The treaſure found in the palace of *Tippoo* has been valued at three millions ſterling; it belongs to the army which has made this rich conqueſt.

The ſituation of *Seringapatam* is ſaid to be delightful; the city is large, and ornamented with ſquares and handſome buildings; the works are extenſive, and in ſuch good condition, that the *Sultaun* could not have expected to ſee them ſo ſoon carried by aſſault; four hundred pieces of cannon were planted round the iſland.

After the capture of *Seringapatam*, and the death of *Tippoo Saib*, his children, his relations, and the princes

princes engaged in alliance with him, ſubmitted to the conqueror.

By this brilliant operation the Engliſh remain abſolute maſters of the peninſula of India; their ſhips alone can approach it: they poſſeſs all the ſtations, all the anchorages, the *Cape of Good Hope*, the *Iſland of St. Helena*, and the bay of *Trincomale*. The French, whoſe arms were, a few years ago, ſtill dreaded in India, and whoſe ſquadrons, under the command of Admiral *Suffrein*, ſucceſſfully contended againſt thoſe of Great Britain at the end of the laſt war, have now loſt their weak ſettlements upon the coaſt of Coromandel; have ſeen thoſe of their allies conquered, and cannot again appear in force in the ſeas of India, whoſe ſo lucrative commerce remains excluſively in the hands of their rivals.

And if to this we add the deſtruction of the greater part of the French navy, the total annihilation of that of the Batavian republic, and the loſſes which theſe two governments have ſuſtained, and will perhaps, ere long, again ſuſtain in the Weſt Indies, we cannot but be of opinion, that their navigation being, if not deſtroyed, at leaſt materially diminiſhed, their merchant-ſhips will no longer be able to furniſh with ſailors their marine, the repairs of which would, beſides, require ſums that do not appear likely to be, for a long time to come, at the diſpoſal of the two republics.

We may therefore conclude, from this ſtatement,

ment, that, with reſpect to maritime commerce, the Engliſh have ſucceeded in bringing under their dependence all the continental powers. No one will henceforth be able to diſpute with them the empire of the ſeas, unleſs at the peace a part of the conqueſts of the republic be exchanged for thoſe made by England in the colonies; and that, by this medium of compenſations, there be re-eſtabliſhed a ſtate of things nearly ſimilar to that which exiſted before the war, and with it the true baſis of the balance of naval force, ſo important to the general proſperity of the nations of Europe.

Here only can be found the poſſibility of a ſolid peace; and if ſuch be the period to ſo many calamities, after we have ſeen periſh the moſt valuable part of this generation, thoſe promiſing youths, who ſhould have been employed in agriculture, and all the labours of ſociety; after we have witneſſed the loſs of ſo many millions of men; we muſt be convinced that, although the exiſtence of nations be leſs limited than that of individuals, they do not, on that account, attain a higher degree of maturity and wiſdom; and that among the former, as well as the latter, the *experience of the fathers is loſt upon the children.* Nothing leſs than an event ſo conſiderable as the capture of *Seringapatam* was neceſſary to diſpel, in London, the recent fears which the conqueſt of Egypt had inſpired. All the foreſight of the government, all that had been ſaid and written, to demonſtrate the impoſſibility

impoſſibility of the execution of the projects aſcribed to *Buonaparte*, by no means reaſſured the commercial world againſt the enterpriſing genius of the French general, and the irreconcilable hatred which the Sultaun of *Myſore* bore to the maſters of Bengal; the deſtruction of one of the two could alone cauſe to be conſidered as chimerical the great revolution which it was imagined had been concerted between them, and reſpecting the poſſibility of which, travellers, men informed of the preſent ſtate of thoſe vaſt regions, are far from being agreed.

This would be the place for a picture of the laſt operations of *Buonaparte* in Syria and Egypt, and our readers perhaps expected it; but we are compelled to defer fulfilling our engagements on that head till our next Number. Preſſed by the rapidity of the events of the war in Europe, we ſhould be afraid of curtailing this great epiſode of the wars in Aſia, which will be one of the moſt intereſting in the hiſtory of the age of revolutions. We would wiſh alſo, before we compreſs in a few pages ſuch a variety of objects ſo intereſting, and of a nature ſo new, to have before us the materials, the accounts which as yet are too incomplete; we muſt hear the actors, we muſt have from themſelves not only the ſeries of the facts, but alſo the details of that ſingular aſſemblage of French, Greeks, Arabs, Jews, and Copts, forming, as it were, a new nation. It is not only his projects

and his plans of war, of which we ſhould now give too ſlight a ſketch, but it is alſo the internal policy of the conqueror of Egypt that excites curioſity and deſerves to fix attention. It is that medley of arms, manners, cuſtoms, and languages ſo various, under a military authority, apparently tempered by ſome forms of democratical government. It is that tranſplantation of the arts, of the moſt improved practices of induſtry, of the reſults of the higheſt degree of civilization in the midſt of deſerts, and of barbarous hordes, that it would be intereſting to obſerve. Thus, therefore, in the hope of being able to preſent to our readers, at a ſubſequent period, notions leſs vague, let us dwell no longer upon the ſubject; but let us try to find again, and to diſplay upon that theatre already too extenſive, from the *North Sea* to the Gulf of *Genoa*, the unexpected combinations, the movements more and more rapid, and the actions more and more frequent, of all the forces which both parties have been able to bring forward.

At the three principal epochs of this campaign, we have ſucceſſively developed the conception, the execution, and the iſſue of three different plans of offenſive operations, both general and combined; all three marked by great events which formed the *dénouement* of each of thoſe acts.

Firſt epoch *(March* and *April)*—Firſt offenſive operations of the French under the old Directory, who renewed hoſtilities—Conqueſt of the Griſons

by *Maſſena*, and of the frontiers of the Tyrol by *Lecourbe*—Battle of *Stockach* gained by the *Archduke*—Battle of *Magnano* in Italy, gained by General *Kray* — The French forced to retreat in every quarter.

Second epoch *(May, June,* and *July)*—Second offenſive operations of the Allies in Italy—Paſſage of the Adda—Battle of *Caſſano* gained by Marſhal *Suwarrow*—Recapture of Lombardy and of part of Piedmont—Recapture of the Griſons—Paſſage of the Rhine—Attack of the lines, and capture of *Zurich* by the *Archduke*.

Active defence of the French—State of obſervation—Forces balanced in Switzerland—Beſieging war in Italy—Advantages gained by *Moreau* near Aleſſandria—Battle of *San Giuliano*, near Piacenza, gained by *Suwarrow* — Defence of the ſtate of Genoa — Junction of *Macdonald* — Recapture of Tuſcany—Capture of Mantua.

Third epoch *(Auguſt* and *September)* — Second offenſive operations of the French—Attempt of General *Joubert* to relieve *Tortona*—Battle of *Novi* gained by Marſhal *Suwarrow*—Attack of all the poſts of the Alps, and of Piedmont, by General *Championnet*—Attack of the poſition of *Zurich* by General *Maſſena*—Advantages gained by Generals *Chabran* and *Lecourbe* againſt the *Archduke*'s left wing—Paſſage of the Rhine by the corps under the French general *Muller*—Invaſion of the *Palatinate*—Bombardment of *Philipſburg*.

We again place this picture under the eyes of our readers; we distinguish these epochs, in order to enable them better to comprehend past events, and to facilitate the application of the new system of war to future occurrences.

It has been frequently observed, that some modern historians had established between isolated facts connexions which had not, perhaps, at all existed; and that they had imagined an order of things correspondent to their conjectures, for the purpose of giving to the too uniform recitals of human miseries the point and attraction of the inquiry into first causes, *rerum cognoscere causas*. We fear not this reproach, and we think we have prevented it by shewing, how, by dint of extending and multiplying the combinations, they are so connected, that at this terrible game a blow can no longer be struck, nor a movement made, without the whole system being deranged. It seems that the progress of this new kind of war leads statesmen and generals beyond their sphere; there is no longer any rule or known limit for the conception of their plans and the direction of their operations.

The better to explain this assertion, which might appear paradoxical, we shall give a clear idea of the situation of the armies at the fourth epoch of the campaign; and the recent events by which it is distinguished, will be brought forward and put in

their place by the obſervation even of the cauſes that have produced them.

The too numerous armies, and the too great proportion of artillery in the French armies, and of cavalry in the Imperial armies, had indeed made it neceſſary to enlarge the theatre; and had, as we have before demonſtrated, thus changed almoſt all the old data reſpecting the importance of ſuch and ſuch a part of the frontier between Germany and the Low Countries, or between France and Italy, and reſpecting the nature of the military operations of which theſe countries were ſuſceptible. But the combinations of attack and defence had not yet, before this laſt campaign, extended beyond the great limits which ſeparate the theatre of war in Flanders from that of the Rhine, and the latter from Italy. Was it not already wonderful, that the ſpaces which had ſufficed for the *Condés*, the *Eugenes*, the *Montecuculis*, the *Turennes*, and the *Luxembourgs*, to diſplay with great forces ſo much genius and activity; that the fortreſſes, the poſts, the obſtacles which had ſtopped or favoured theſe great generals, during ſeveral campaigns, were, in a manner, effaced from the new military topography? Were we alſo to have expected greater efforts than thoſe which had been neceſſary for taking up poſitions, and fighting battles upon the whole ſurface of a country, without paying any regard to the ground, to the intermediate poſitions,

but

but ſolely to the importance of the points occupied at great diſtances without being connected, and as if it had been agreed to mark only by the occupation of the principal poſts the ideal delineation of theſe immenſe lines. Nevertheleſs, theſe deployments, theſe marches in columns of manœuvre, for the purpoſe of reciprocally endeavouring to ſurround each other at the extremities of a line which the eye could not meaſure, were not yet the laſt period of the progreſſion.

The great barriers placed by nature between the different countries having been opened, and paſſed through, as had been the particular limits, the lines, the connexions of poſts, and the courſes of rivers; means have been found to move the great bodies of armies, and to march them from one frontier to another, in like manner as corps were marched to different points of a frontier, in order to form a ſingle line.

The object of theſe vaſt operations is no longer merely to carry a poſition, to reduce an important fortreſs by puſhing on beyond the country which it covers, and the communications which it confines; but to force the enemy to at once evacuate a whole country, by alſo running the riſk of loſing an entire frontier by a ſingle chance, by a ſingle event of war.

In theſe general actions, the movements of the troops are no longer merely manœuvres of the line, no longer merely forced marches, but expe-

ditions

ditions of fifty and ſixty leagues performed by large armies, undertaken with as little heſitation, and executed with as much rapidity, as if the queſtion was only to detach a ſimple advanced guard.

The French armies had for the firſt time, and with ſo much ſucceſs, put in practice this kind of offenſive war, that the Allies were forced to adopt it in their turn: never were ſuch large bodies of troops rendered ſo moveable.

In proportion as the means increaſe and combine, the object becomes enlarged and ſimplified, as is always the caſe in the improvement of the arts and ſciences. The generals on both ſides now ſeek only to outflank and deſtroy one of the great ſupports of the wings, in order to force the enemy to an abſolute retreat.

We do not here allude ſolely to a common rule applicable to war, from the attack of the ſmalleſt poſt to that of the beſt flanked and moſt important poſition; but we wiſh to make our readers obſerve, that this epoch which we deſcribe, is attended with this remarkable circumſtance, that the moſt bloody pitched battles, fought in determined poſitions, thoſe great victories, which would formerly have decided the fate of the campaign, or perhaps the fate of the war, are of no importance, except when they are connected with the whole of a general attack.

The *Archduke* and Marſhal *Suwarrow* had experienced,

perienced, the former at the recapture of *Lucienſteig*, and at the paſſage of the *Rhine*, the latter at the paſſage of the *Adda*, that decided ſucceſſes alone in this kind of war, could be only the reſult of grand movements, of a multiplicity of affairs of poſts combined, connected, and ſupported by forces ſufficiently ſuperior to penetrate, in ſpite of the moſt vigorous reſiſtance, in ſpite of all the obſtacles of nature and art, and to invade all at once, either the whole, or, at leaſt, a conſiderable part of the theatre of war.

But, if this theatre of war had in 1794 been found too confined for the numerous French battalions, it was now too extenſive for the two allied armies of Switzerland and of Italy, which being both ſtopped by formidable poſitions, that of *Maſſena* before *Zurich*, and that of *Moreau* in the *Apennines*, could not before the arrival of freſh reinforcements purſue farther an offenſive war.

In fact, after the battle of *Novi*, General *Suwarrow* had too great a ſuperiority to remain in obſervation, and leave the French all the advantage of their capital defence of the ſtate of Genoa; and nevertheleſs this ſuperiority was not yet ſufficient for forcing the head of their intrenchments, or for detaching corps capable of penetrating through the different paſſes of the Apennines, in order to take them in the rear, and oblige them to quit the fortreſs and the *Riviera* of Genoa.

On the other hand, the *Archduke*, who (as we have

have ſeveral times repeated, becauſe it is a capital point in the diſcuſſion of the general operations of this campaign) had not been able to ſupport his left wing, already too much weakened, againſt the attacks of General *Lecourbe*, found it, at the moment of the arrival of the 26,000 Ruſſians, commanded by Prince *Korſakow*, impoſſible to collect all his forces for the purpoſe of retaking his firſt poſition, and reopening his communications with Italy by Mount *St. Gothard*. The ſuccour of the Ruſſians had been too long delayed, the march of this auxiliary army was too well known, for the French generals not to have been prepared for profiting by the laſt favourable moments, which they had remaining, previous to the junction of the Ruſſians and Auſtrians upon the Rhine, in order to interrupt beforehand, by the vigour of their attacks, the concert of operations which this junction was to produce.

The *Archduke*, who had been aware of this effort of the French armies, and had made diſpoſitions for covering Swabia, was in the preſence of *Maſſena*, and almoſt in the middle of the battles which the latter haſtened to bring on with him, in order to detain him, obliged to accompliſh the march of the Ruſſian troops which were entering Switzerland, and that of the Auſtrian troops which he was leading to the right bank of the Rhine.

We have mentioned the incurſion of General *Muller* into the Palatinate, and we have remarked the

the aſtoniſhing celerity of the marches of the *Archduke*, who hardly arrived in time to ſave *Philipſburg*. The reverſes experienced by the Allies in Switzerland will, perhaps, one day be attributed to this movement of the *Archduke*, which may appear ill-judged and precipitate, at the moment when the arrival of General *Suwarrow* was about to re-eſtabliſh the balance of the forces, and give him even a ſuperiority ſufficiently great, to be able to purſue the courſe of his former operations.

But in reaſoning thus, we ſhould loſe ſight of the general plan, and of the importance of the formation of an army of the Empire; we ſhould forget, that if the French had ſtrengthened themſelves upon the right bank of the Rhine, they would have threatened the rear of the allied army, and the communications, without which the proviſions and forage collected at ſo great an expenſe in the environs of *Ulm* and upon the *Upper Danube*, could not reach the allied army in Switzerland, which was entirely deſtitute of them. Undoubtedly there never were motives more urgent for detaching the right wing of an army, and for placing it, eſpecially a cavalry too numerous for the nature of the Swiſs territory, in a ſituation to act.

We ſee, that, both in Italy and in Germany, notwithſtanding their junction ſince the capture of Mantua, notwithſtanding the reinforcements they had received, the coaleſced powers had not yet, at the end of September, troops ſufficient to accom-

pliſh their firſt deſigns, and to execute the two grand attacks, which were to diſconcert and to counteract the plan of defence of the eaſtern frontiers of France. They divided the main body of each of their armies, and tried to fill up the intervals which they were forced to leave between them; almoſt as if, in the ſimple order of battle, before coming to a diſpoſition for an attack, the front of a ſpot, or of a line too extenſive, is occupied by marches to the flank, and by manœuvres which appear to have no particular object.

The French on their ſide, whether they remained in a paſſive ſtate of defence, or whether they wiſhed to repel or anticipate attacks, by acting themſelves, were inſufficient for covering every part of their frontier, except by movements, undoubtedly leſs apparent, ſince their general poſition was more confined, but not leſs rapid than thoſe of the Allies. Of this, the reader will have been able to form an opinion from the battles of *Moreau*'s army, from the marches and attacks of General *Championnet*, againſt the chain of the poſts of the Allies in all the vallies of the frontiers of Piedmont; from the frequent actions of the columns of *Maſſena*'s army, from the paſſages of the Rhine, the incurſions of the garriſons of *Mentz* and *Ehrenbreitſtein*, and the reinforcements drawn from the coaſts and from the interior, in order to ſupport the Batavian army.

Thus, then, in every quarter, both parties having con-

conſumed beforehand, either by battles or fatigue, a greater number of men than they had hoped to aſſemble, for ſtriking at each other the final blows, they endeavoured, by marches and countermarches, to compenſate for this want of force, for this deficiency of proportion between the object and the means, in order to be able, before the end of the campaign, to attempt upon a ſingle point a deciſive irruption.

Such ſeem to us to be the cauſes of that prodigious activity of the armies, which continues increaſing from day to day, and which unfortunately extends afar the ravages of war, and too frequently forces them to abandon nations, whoſe cauſe they have taken up, or whom they have induced to eſpouſe theirs, and who remain expoſed to the vengeance, or dependant on the generoſity of the conqueror.

It is under this general point of view that we have juſt examined what opinion ſhould be formed of the events which we have to relate, and we ſhall compare their developments according to this concluſion.

Since the eventual reduction of *Tortona*, Marſhal *Suwarrow* had unfolded his projects. General *Kray*, who, after the battle of *Novi*, had marched by *Novara* towards the frontier of the Valais with fourteen battalions and two regiments of cavalry, had received orders to bring back this corps to *Aleſſandria*; and to confine himſelf to ſupport-

ing Colonel *Strauch* and the Prince *de Rohan*, on the frontiers of the Valais, with General *Laudon*'s brigade.

The new plan determined upon by the two Imperial courts, conſiſted in forming, 1. In the centre, in Switzerland, a Ruſſian grand army, under the orders of General *Suwarrow*. 2. Upon the left, in Italy, an Auſtrian army commanded by Generals *Kray* and *Melas*. 3. To the right, upon the Lower Rhine, the Imperial army reinforced by the contingents of the Empire, under the command of the *Archduke*.

We have ſufficiently explained the general motive, and we ought likewiſe to make known the particular motives of this unexpected change in the arrangement and diſtribution of the forces of the Allies.

It is certain that this new formation was preferable to the mixture of the troops of different nations, in the ſame army, which, even ſuppoſing the moſt perfect harmony to exiſt between them, neceſſarily impedes the ſervice by the difference of language, regulation, and diſcipline. For one advantage accruing from the rivality of courage and talent, how many ſerious inconveniences are not riſked!

Each of the three armies was therefore to gain by this new arrangement; the Ruſſians drew nearer to the ſhorteſt and beſt route for receiving their recruits; the inevitable confuſion in the depots, hoſpitals,

hoſpitals, and magazines, became leſs; each army was likewiſe to receive different auxiliaries in Italy, in Switzerland, and in Germany; and it was a very wiſe precaution not to add the mixture of nations in the armies to that of the people, whom they excited to take up arms.

The Piedmonteſe troops, which were to be reorganized without delay, and thoſe of the confederation of the princes of Italy, were to augment the forces under General *Kray*.

The new levies in the Griſons, and in the little Cantons, the troops formed by old Swiſs officers, the Prince *de Condé*'s corps, and a diviſion of Bavarian troops, were to join the Ruſſian army.

Laſtly, the different contingents of the Empire, the levies of militia, newly organized in the Electorates, were to reinforce the *Archduke*'s army.

It may not be unneceſſary here to mention, that, according to calculations as correct as in ſuch circumſtances we have been enabled to make, that is, in continuing to eſtimate the loſſes and the ſuccours, we have reckoned that each of theſe three armies ſeparate, and formed, would be found to be from 60 to 70,000 ſtrong, at the period of the 1ſt of October. A conſiderable corps belonging to the *Archduke*'s army was to remain in Switzerland, under the command of General *Hotze*.

Let us now follow the movement of General *Suwarrow* for the execution of this new diſpoſition of the forces, one of the boldeſt that has been dared

dared to be attempted before an active and enterprising enemy. In the beginning of September, the centre of his army was at *Aſti*. The left wing, which was firſt under the orders of General *Roſenberg*, occupied *Novi*, covered *Tortona*, and puſhed on its poſts by *Voltagio* to within ſight of the *Bocchetta*. The right wing, under the command of General *Lichtenſtein*, extended as far as the *Po*, towards Turin. Two Ruſſian diviſions were poſted in the environs of *Spigno* and *Acqui*; the poſts at the entrance of the vallies of the Piedmonteſe Alps had been reinforced.

General *Championnet* continued to carry on a very ſharp war of poſts; one of his columns had entered *Suſa*, a ſecond had taken poſſeſſion of the city of *Aouſta*, in the valley of that name, and had forced the Imperialiſts to retire near Fort *Bardo*. At the ſame time he made demonſtrations towards *Coni* and the *Col di Tenda*; he had forced ſome important poſts, and penetrated as far as *Pignerol*.

General *Moreau*, who, after having ſupported his poſts towards the river of the Levant againſt the enterpriſes of General *Klenau*, had concentrated his forces between *Savona* and *San Giacomo*, puſhed on his detachments as far as *Baſſaluzzo* and *Capriata*, and made diſpoſitions for moving forward.

On the 8th of September, General *Suwarrow* ordered the firſt column of the Ruſſian troops to march, under the command of General *Roſenberg*;

it directed its route towards *Novara*, to proceed afterwards by *Bellinzona* to Mount *St. Gothard*.

Whether General *Moreau* had diſcovered this movement by the manœuvres of General *Kray*, or that the eventual truce of *Tortona* not being yet expired, he hoped to be able ſtill to ſnatch from the Allies this trophy of the battle of *Novi*, he left his poſition, on the 9th of September, with a corps of from 20 to 25,000 men, forming three columns; the firſt marched againſt *Acqui*, and the two others againſt *Novi* and *Serravalle*.

General *Kray*, having marched to meet him with the left, and part of the centre of the Imperial army, there was a very warm engagement; the French columns were repulſed. After a pretty conſiderable loſs *Moreau* fell back, and reſumed his former poſitions.

On the 11th of September the citadel of *Tortona* was at length ſurrendered to General *Suwarrow*, who, after having publicly taken his leave, and expreſſed his acknowledgments to the Auſtrian generals and troops, ſet off for Switzerland with the rear guard of the Ruſſian army.

At firſt, after the reduction of *Tortona*, all that part of General *Kray*'s army which was encamped at *Bozzolo di Formigaro*, and at *Rivalta*, marched firſt to *Aleſſandria*, and then towards *Coni* by *Feliciano* and *Alba*.

The main body of the army, conſiſting of about thirty-five battalions, and five regiments of cavalry,

valry, under the command of General *Melas*, was aſſembled on the 16th of September, at *Bra* upon the *Stura*. This was a central poſition between the Alps and the Appennines, very well choſen for counteracting the progreſs of General *Championnet*, and the junction which he was endeavouring to execute in front of *Coni* with the army, of which General *Moreau* was about to leave him the command, in the country of *Genoa*.

Championnet was then near *Pignerol*; his head-quarters were at *Villa Valletta*; the corps, which he had detached in front of *Suſa*, and which was eſtimated at 6 or 7000 men, was advancing towards *Turin*, where commanded General *Bellegarde*, brother to the field-marſhal of that name, who had been ſent for to Vienna.

The left column of the French army of the Alps, commanded by General *Duheſme*, was advancing from *Aouſta* againſt *Ivrea*, which was occupied by General *Haddick*, whoſe diviſion formed the right wing of the Auſtrian army.

By means of theſe movements (by which, in penetrating by the two principal vallies, he threatened to ſurround the fortreſs of Turin, and the right flank of the Auſtrian army) General *Championnet* marched in force through the marquiſate of *Saluzzo*, at the entrance of the valley of the *Stura*, near the famous field of battle of *Staffarda*, where, in 1690, the Marſhal *de Catinat* beat the Duke of Savoy.

On the 14th and 15th of September there were ſome

ſome very warm actions in front of *Foſſano* and *Savigliano*, which General *Gottſheim* defended with an advanced guard of about 6000 men, in expectation of being ſupported by General *Melas*. He was, however, forced to give up theſe two important poſts. General *Championnet* made himſelf maſter of them, but they were ſoon retaken.

General *Kray* had, as we have before mentioned, aſſembled his forces at *Bra*; he loſt not a moment in attacking General *Championnet*'s corps, which was almoſt iſolated, and ſo far advanced, that it could in one day's march join the left wing of *Moreau*'s army.

The Auſtrian army left the camp at *Bra* on the 18th: it was divided into two columns. General *Kray*, in perſon, led on the left column, and directed it againſt *Foſſano*. General *Melas*, at the head of the other, marched to attack *Savigliano*. The action was firſt commenced by the latter: this right column, in which the regiments of *Fürſtenberg* and *Stuart* attacked, retook the poſt of *Savigliano*.

The French alſo evacuated in the night the poſt of *Foſſano*, and, after having ſuffered conſiderable loſs, fell back upon *Maria*, aſcending the little river of that name, one of thoſe which form and water the valley called *Château Dauphin*. The whole chain of poſts above *Turin* had been attacked at the ſame time; General *Bellegarde* being preſſed, and at firſt driven back towards *Rivoli*,

was ſupported by Generals *Kaim* and *Vukaſſowich*, who forced the French to retire to *Suſa*.

Nothing had happened on the ſide of *Genoa* ſince the laſt fruitleſs attempt made by *Moreau* to relieve *Tortona*, and ſince his retreat into his poſition of *Savona*. Two ſmall Auſtrian corps had remained in obſervation, one between *Gavi* and *Novi* upon the *Scrivia*, and the other in the environs of *Acqui* and *Spigno* upon the *Bormida*.

Such were the manœuvres and actions, by which General *Kray*, in going to meet the French, watching them cloſely on all ſides, and himſelf attacking them at the opening of the vallies, contrived to cover and to ſecure the march of the Ruſſians, who were haſtening to reach the paſſes of Mount *St. Gothard*. On recollecting the ſieges and the actions, which in former wars rendered famous the places that we have juſt mentioned, as ſimple poſts, taken and retaken in a few days, we might be aſtoniſhed that the paſſes of the *Aſſiette*, of *Exilles*, that *Mont-Melian*, *Château Dauphin*, and *Pignerol*, have not been of the ſame importance as formerly, even for bodies of troops nearly of the ſame force, if we did not ſeek for the motive of this difference in the very object of the operations, which can now no longer be thus circumſcribed.

After this attempt, General *Championnet*, having left the command of his troops to General *Duheſme*, who, in the courſe of the day of the 16th, had marched againſt *Saluzzo*, went to *Genoa* to receive

from

from the hands of General *Moreau* the command of the army of Italy; that of the Alps was to be henceforth compriſed under the ſame denomination. *Moreau* had juſt been ſent for to Paris: on taking leave of his army, at the head-quarters at *Cornegliano*, he congratulated it upon its fortitude in ſupporting every kind of privation. The new general alſo iſſued a proclamation, in which he conſidered as an inſult to the army, the reports that had been ſpread reſpecting the approaching evacuation of the Ligurian territory.

A few days before *Championnet*'s arrival at *Genoa*, that city had been put into a ſtate of ſiege, that is to ſay, the authority of the government as to public order and inferior police was ſuſpended, and ſubjected to the military power. Serious commotions had compelled the French to take this precaution, and the remembrance of the famous revolution of 1746 might juſtify it; for there are in the characters of nations, as well as in thoſe of individuals, traits which are ſuppoſed to be effaced, and which ſuddenly reappear when ſimilar circumſtances awaken the ſame ſentiments. In 1748, Genoa, terrified and confounded at the approach of 60,000 Auſtrians and Piedmonteſe, had opened its gates; they availed themſelves with ſo much rigour of what is, by general conſent, called the rights of victory, that the people, who obeyed murmuring, roſe and armed themſelves. The commandant at firſt took little notice of this frenzy,

which he thought momentary: it however increaſed; barricadoes were formed, and all the inhabitants of Genoa became a formidable army, which drove out the conquerors; a memorable inſtance of the energy which a ſpark may revive in the mind of a people, when even bordering upon the laſt degree of conſternation.

The effect which the French government had promiſed themſelves from this laſt movement of their army of the Alps, was, no doubt, to detain in Italy General *Suwarrow*, and the ſuccours which the *Archduke*, in his turn, demanded; or to profit by the weakneſs of the allied army, in order to unite the two French armies of the Alps and of Italy in the plains of Piedmont; and if they could not there reſume the offenſive, to at leaſt extend and facilitate the defence of the country of Genoa, where the French were ſuffering much from the difficulty of the communications.

This object was not accompliſhed, becauſe the army of the Alps was nothing more than a reinforced cordon of troops, whoſe activity and reiterated attacks upon the whole chain of poſts, which the Allies had puſhed into the upper vallies, could not at firſt ſufficiently attract their attention to divert them from the ſiege of *Tortona*, and make them quit the poſitions by which they were confining the ſtate of Genoa. When the aſſembling of the conſcripts had increaſed the diſpoſable forces under General *Championnet* to nearly 25,000 men,

men; and when about the epoch when the battle of Novi was fought, he could venture to penetrate farther, this diverſion did not check General *Suwarrow*, and it would have been of more advantage to the French, that theſe freſh troops had been ſent to the army of General *Joubert*. In ſhort, in this latter caſe, the movement of General *Championnet* was dilatory. It ſeems that his greateſt effort ſhould have been attempted on the 9th of September, at the very moment when *Moreau* left his poſition of *Savona*, and deſcended from the Apennines in order again to attack the corps of obſervation under General *Kray*. When it is intended, by the attacks of two ſeparate armies, to compel an enemy ſuperior in force to each of them, to give up the poſition which he occupies between them, it is neceſſary that theſe attacks ſhould be ſimultaneous, and that the enemy ſhould be obliged to divide his forces, or to loſe one of the ſupports of his wings.

The want of concert, which we have juſt remarked, muſt have been ſerviceable to General *Kray*; but he could not avail himſelf of it with more celerity and preciſion, nor better fulfil his object, which was to maintain his ground till the arrival of the reinforcements, that were to fill the vacant ſpace occaſioned by the departure of the Ruſſian troops.

There ſcarcely remained more than 18 or 20,000 men

men of the auxiliary army, which General *Suwarrow* had brought into Italy, and which, at the end of July, had received a reinforcement of 10 or 11,000 men by the route of Hungary.

On the 14th of September, the advanced guard of this army (one of thoſe which has fought ſo many and ſo bloody battles in the ſpace of four months) reached *Bellinzona*.

The columns defiled through *Agno*, and encamped at *Bironico*, *Faverna*, and *Bedano*, in the environs of Mount *Cenero*, a poſition which General *Lecourbe* had occupied three months before. On the 15th of September General *Suwarrow* arrived at *Lugano*, after having collected his troops at Mount *Cenero*. He made his diſpoſitions for the attacks of *St. Gothard*, and for his junction with the Auſtrian corps under Generals *Auffenberg* and *Jellachich*, which occupied, in front of General *Lecourbe*'s advanced guards, the frontiers of the Griſons and of the little cantons.

This diviſion of Auſtrian troops, which was ſtill to receive ſome reinforcements by the *Tyrol*, was deſtined to ſecond General *Suwarrow*, whoſe object was not only to repulſe General *Lecourbe*, and to re-eſtabliſh the left wing of the allied army of Switzerland in its former poſitions upon the *Reuſs*, but alſo to ſurround the right of the French army, to ſeparate it from the *Valais*, and croſſing, at once, both Mount *Furca* and the *Engelberg*, to march

march againſt *Lucerne* and *Berne*, in order to force *Maſſena* to quit his poſition, and paſs the *Aar* to ſecure his rear.

In proportion as the Ruſſians advanced towards the frontiers of South Switzerland, General *Strauch*'s corps, ſupported by General *Laudon*, moved forward, and reſumed its former poſts.

As early as the 23d of September, Marſhal *Suwarrow*, having aſcended the *Leventina*, or valley of the *Teſino*, took poſſeſſion of the poſt of *Airolo*, and the next day of that of *St. Gothard*; while General *Roſenberg* turned, by the ſources of the *Rhine*, the poſition of *Urſeren*. Farther on General *Auffenberg* deſcended, with his brigade, by the *Maderanthal* into the valley of the *Reuſs*, in order to join General *Suwarrow*'s columns in the poſition of the *Steig*.

Thus the recapture of *St. Gothard*, and of the poſitions upon the *Reuſs*, by General *Suwarrow*, was exactly the reverſe of the operation executed a month before by General *Lecourbe*, who was now forced to give up theſe important poſts. The topographical detail by which we have, in our *fifth* Number, endeavoured to explain this expedition, might here be repeated; it would be ſufficient to tranſpoſe the names of the vallies, and of the outlets by which General *Suwarrow*'s columns, iſſuing forth in front of each other, as thoſe of General *Lecourbe* had done, ſucceſſively cut off the retreat of the different French poſts eſtabliſhed upon

upon the courſe of the *Reuſs* from the *Devil's Bridge* as far as *Altorff*.

Marſhal *Suwarrow*'s entrance into Switzerland could not be more fortunate; and this expedition, perhaps of a new kind to this veteran general, was the more remarkable, as his officers and ſoldiers came out of the plains of Italy, and had ſcarcely any experience in this ſort of war.

If the capture of *St. Gothard* by the French had, a month before, given ſo favourable a change to the ſituation of their affairs in Switzerland, this key was no leſs important in the hands of the Ruſſians. We have mentioned how far General *Suwarrow* would have puſhed his progreſs, if the ſucceſſes of an attack, or merely the ſupport of the poſition of the right of the army upon the *Limmat*, had left him ſufficient time; we have even ſaid, that after a great reverſe, the occupation of the Upper Alps, and the communication with Italy, if they could not balance the fortune of arms, might, at leaſt, have enſured the means of re-eſtabliſhing the affairs of the Allies. However complete may have been the victory which General *Maſſena* has ſince gained, it ſeems that he ought to have rendered it more difficult to General *Suwarrow* to enter Switzerland by *St. Gothard*.

Since the army of Prince *Korſakow* had replaced the Auſtrian troops in the poſition of *Zurich*, and the *Archduke* had marched to the relief of *Philipſburg*, General *Hotze* commanded the part of the

Auſtrian army which had remained in Switzerland, and which conſiſted of twenty-nine battalions, and four regiments of cavalry. Compelled, by ſuperior forces, to abandon *Glaris* and *Næfels*, he had taken an advantageous poſition behind the *Linth*, between *Weſen* and *Utznach*; his head-quarters were at *Rattbrun*, and, with his left wing, he covered the entrance of the Griſons. The Ruſſians extended from *Utznach*, along the lake of *Zurich* and the *Limmat*, as far as *Baden*; they had a corps encamped upon the *Horn* before *Zurich*, and another upon the heights near the road which leads to *Walliſhofen*; General *Nauendorf*'s corps was oppoſite to *Baden*, and cloſed the right wing, which was protected by the Rhine.

The following was, from the beginning of September, the poſition of *Maſſena*'s army:

On the right, General *Thureau* occupied the *Valais* with a diviſion. *Lecourbe* occupied *St. Gothard* and the courſe of the *Reuſs*, as far as the lake of the four Cantons, and puſhed his advanced guards into the valley of the Griſons. The diviſion of General *Soult* was at *Glaris*, which was three times taken and retaken, and extended as far as *Adliſchweil*; the diviſion of General *Mortier* from *Adliſchweil* to *Dietikon*, and that of General *de Lorges* from *Dietikon* to *Baden*, formed the centre of the French army; that of General *Hendelt* from *Baden* to the Rhine, and the reſerve, which General *Klein* commanded in the *Frickthal*, formed the left; General *Chabran* commanded at *Baſle*.

Effective Force at which we think we may estimate the two Armies, before General Suwarrow's *Arrival in Switzerland.*

ALLIED ARMY.

	Men.
From the left to the right.	
General *Jellachich*'s corps - - -	8,000
Left wing, under the orders of General *Hotze* - - - - - - -	15,000
Russian army in the centre, under the command of Prince *Korsakow* -	26,000
Right wing or reserve, under General *Nauendorf* - - - - -	10,000
	59,000

FRENCH ARMY.

From the right to the left.	
Thureau's division in the *Valais* - -	8,000
Right wing, under the orders of General *Lecourbe* - - - - -	18,000
General *Soult*'s corps in the canton of *Glaris* - - - - - -	11,000
Divisions under the command of Generals *Mortier* and *de Lorges*, forming the centre - - - - - -	25,000
Left wing or reserve, under General *Klein*	10,000
In the intrenchments of *Basle* - -	6,000
	78,000

Inde-

Independently of the actions of *Glaris*, there had been between the two armies various engagements of little importance, although the war of posts, which commenced between the two positions, was warm and destructive; both parties reciprocally attempted to surprise each other, but always without any effect.

Since the success of General *Lecourbe*'s attacks, General *Massena* with his right hemmed in the left wing of the allied army, in order to attack the centre with more advantage. He had just pushed forward General *Lecourbe*; he endeavoured to penetrate, and entirely turn, by the valley of the Grisons, the positions which covered General *Hotze*'s line; he thus prepared by degrees for a general attack. The intelligence of the march and progress of General *Suwarrow*, who might, in a few days, attempt upon the rear of the right of the French, in the west of Switzerland, what *Massena* was meditating on the eastern frontiers against the left of the Allies, hastened his dispositions: he availed himself of the last moment which he had remaining to attack.

Prince *Korsakow*'s position at *Zurich* upon the heights, and upon the two banks of the *Limmat*, was the centre, or, to speak more correctly, the head of the general line, occupied by the three corps of the allied army, from the post of *Wesen*, between the lake of *Wallenstadt* and the *Linth* to the Rhine. It will be seen, that upon this inter-

val, of about ſeventeen leagues, the lake of *Zürich* and the *Linth*, which forms it, on iſſuing from the valley of *Glaris*, had permitted the Allies to extend, or rather to detach their left wing, to within near ten leagues of the head of the central poſition, which, till then, had appeared impregnable.

Although this interval appears too conſiderable, General *Hotze* had nevertheleſs had reaſon to have advanced as far as the backs of the heights which ſeparate the courſe of the *Linth* from that of the *Thur*. His head-quarters were at *Kaltbrunn*, and by this concentrated poſition between thoſe heights and the *Linth*, he could defend inch by inch the entrance of the two vallies of the *Glatt*, and of the *Töſs*, the courſe of which, from the ſouth-eaſt to the north-weſt, parallel to that of the *Limmat*, cut off, in the ſhorteſt direction, the rears of the centre, and of the right of the allied army.

Such was the evident advantage of *Hotze*'s poſition; and the object of *Maſſena*'s firſt manœuvres was, if poſſible, to diſlodge him from it, from the beginning of the general action. 1. In order to completely ſeparate him from General *Jellachich*, and to render impoſſible all junction with *Suwarrow* by the cantons of *Schweitz* and *Glaris*. 2. To attack the centre with more confidence, when the rears ſhould be threatened.

In order to attain this important object, the French general made, upon his left, in the *Frickthal* and upon the *Aar*, ſeveral demonſtrations. At length,

length, on the 24th of September, after having attracted attention, by a false attack directed against *Bruck*, and conducted by General *Ménard*, he gave orders to General *de Lorges* to cross the *Limmat* above *Baden* with his division, and to attack the camp of the Russians on the opposite bank.

General *Mortier*'s division, and the reserve commanded by General *Klein*, marched to get possession of the heights to the west of *Zurich*, and attacked in front.

General *Massena* had also ordered General *Soult* to cross the *Linth* at the moment when the action should begin, and warmly attack the advanced posts of the Austrians in that quarter.

General *Hotze*, surprised by this impetuous attack, and informed that the French had already crossed the *Linth*, mounted his horse, and rode away with a few officers to the out-posts, in order to reconnoitre between *Schœnnis* and *Kalten-Brunn*. He advanced rashly; the party was surrounded and attacked, and General *Hotze* was left dead upon the field of battle. He was as much regretted by the Allies, as General *Joubert*, who was killed at the battle of *Novi*, had been by the French.

The Imperial army of Switzerland could not sustain a greater loss than that of the defender of *Feldkirch*, nor at a moment when the talents of that general, and his particular knowledge of the difficult country he was in, were more necessary; the Russian generals thus lost their guide. *Hotze*, born at

at *Zurich*, received his death-wound almoſt at his own home.

The French vigorouſly followed up their firſt advantage; they firſt carried the bridge of *Grynau*, at the foot of the *Brun-Berg*, ſituated at the influx of the *Linth* into the lake of *Zurich*; the Prince of *Wurtemberg*, haſtening from *Rapperſchweil* with three Ruſſian battalions, retook this poſt, but was unable to maintain it againſt a freſh attack; the bridge remained in the poſſeſſion of the French, and from that moment the Auſtrian troops, among whom the loſs of their general had already created ſome confuſion, could not maintain the poſition of *Utznach*, the right flank of which was upon the point of being turned. General *Soult* having defeated General *Hotze*'s diviſions, forced them, by continuing the actions the next day, to retreat in diſorder by the *Goldinerthal* towards *Leichtenſteig*, in the *Toggenburg*.

This left wing, of which General *Petraſch* took the command, after the death of General *Hotze*, was therefore, in this manner, from the 25th to the 26th, entirely ſeparated from the centre of the army, the left flank and the rear of which remained expoſed.

The attacks againſt *Zurich* had been attended with equal ſucceſs; *de Lorges*' diviſion had carried all the poſts which were oppoſed to it, forced the camp, and driven the Ruſſians as far as the walls of

of *Zurich*. The heights to the weſt had been carried by Generals *Mortier* and *Klein*.

The French attacked with ſo much reſolution, the Ruſſians, almoſt ſurrounded, defended themſelves with ſo much valour, kept their poſts and their ranks with ſo much firmneſs, that the ſlaughter was as dreadful as the defeat was complete; the artillery and baggage were loſt.

A ſtrong rear guard, ſhut up in *Zurich*, would not ſurrender; and the town, being ſummoned in vain, was carried ſword in hand.

Prince *Korſakow* retreated by *Bulach* and *Winterthur*, upon *Egliſau* and *Schaffhauſen*, too late, no doubt, if he was timely apprized of what was paſſing on his left, between the two lakes.

The French, maſters of the poſition of *Zurich*, of the two banks of the lake, and of the courſe of the *Glatt*, purſued in the two directions of *St. Gall* and *Schaffhauſen* the ſeparated Ruſſians and Auſtrians, who, not being able either to join, or to take up good poſitions upon the *Thur*, were compelled to croſs the *Rhine*, and to place between them the lake of *Conſtance*.

The towns even of *Conſtance* and *Peterſhauſen* were occupied by the advanced guards of the French, who could not there a firſt maintain their ground.

Before we ſhew the reſemblance there was between this poſition, and that which the *Archduke* occupied, at the beginning of the campaign, above

above and below the lake of *Conſtance*, we muſt give an account of the poſition and of the manœuvres of General *Suwarrow* in Upper Switzerland, and of his efforts to break the right wing of the French army; to penetrate, by the valley of the *Linth*, into the canton of *Zurich*, and forcing General *Maſſena* to fall back with his left, extricate and rally before him the two corps which had been beaten. We may judge of the importance that General *Suwarrow* attached to this ſecond project by the letters which he wrote to the commanders of the Ruſſian troops diſlodged from *Zurich*:—"You will anſwer with your heads for "one more ſtep that you retreat; I am coming to "repair your faults."

After having driven General *Gudin*'s brigade along the *Reuſs*, as far as *Altorff*, he was ſtopped by the diviſions which General *Lecourbe* collected, and marched againſt him: among theſe was the diviſion of General *Loiſon*.

Maſſena, foreſeeing that General *Lecourbe*'s left wing would not be able to ſuſtain the attacks of General *Suwarrow*, joined by the diviſions of *Jellachich* and *Auffenberg*, marched to his relief with a corps of about 15,000 men. He directed the diviſion of General *Mortier* againſt *Schweitz*, that of General *Soult* againſt *Weſen*, and himſelf marched againſt *Altorff*.

After the affair of the 25th and 26th, General *Lincken* had had ſome advantage upon the left bank of

of the lake of *Wallenſtadt*; he had taken two French battalions, and endeavouring to favour, by the centre, the movement of General *Suwarrow*, had advanced on the 28th as far as *Glaris*; but not being able to communicate, either by his right or by his left, he was forced to retire into the Griſons.

In the mean time General *Suwarrow*, in ſpite of the moſt vigorous reſiſtance, at the expenſe of the bloody actions which he inceſſantly fought in the narrow vallies of the *Muttenthal* and of the *Linthal*, penetrated as far as *Mutten* and *Schweitz*; and a part of General *Roſenberg*'s corps, after having repulſed a French corps at the defile of *Mutten*, arrived at *Glaris*, from which General *Lincken* had juſt retired. It was, in particular, at the opening of the valley of the *Mutten*, in the environs of *Schweitz*, that General *Lecourbe* had to ſuſtain the greateſt effort of the Ruſſian troops in the affairs of the 3d and 4th of October: the bridge upon the *Mutten*, and the poſt of *Brunnen*, were carried by the Ruſſians after an obſtinate battle.

General *Suwarrow* did not penetrate farther; it was his buſineſs not to attempt it, nor to hazard a general action. On one ſide, the lower valley of *Glaris*, the paſſage between the lakes of *Zurich* and of *Wallenſtadt*, was barred againſt him; and on the other ſide, if he had advanced to the more open poſition of *Notre Dame des Hermites*, he would have fallen into the ſnare laid for him by *Maſſena*, who,

in a deciſive affair, by ſurrounding his left flank, might cut off his retreat to the Griſons.

The Ruſſians, and the corps of Generals *Auffenberg* and *Jellachich*, therefore, retired in good order, from the cantons of *Schweitz* and *Glaris*, by the *Flimſthal*, into the valley of the Griſons, where the principal column marched out between *Ilantz* and *Coire*. The rear guard was haraſſed by the French column which General *Maſſena* had directed againſt *Altorff*. Their wounded could not be carried off, and part of their artillery and baggage fell into the hands of the French.

It was to be expected that this laſt effort of General *Suwarrow* to effect the junction of the two armies, by marching them to their former poſition, would be ſeconded by the movement of Prince *Korſakow* againſt *Maſſena*'s left; and accordingly, while with part of the centre of the French army, he had ſo opportunely and ſo ſucceſsfully ſupported his left, the Allies had recroſſed the Rhine, and were advancing againſt *Winterthur*. The greater part of Prince *Korſakow*'s column had croſſed at the bridge of *Dieſenhoffen*; the corps of *Condé*, and the Bavarian troops, had entered the *Thurgau* by the bridge of *Conſtance*.

General *Maſſena* being informed of this movement, firſt detached General *Soult*'s diviſion towards *Rheineck*, at the head of the lake of *Conſtance*, in order to ſecure his right flank, and to keep in check the Auſtrian corps, which, under the command of

General *Petraſch*, had croſſed the *Rheinthal*, and had fallen back upon *Feldkirch* and *Bregentz*.

At the ſame time he paſſed from the right to the left of his army, and put himſelf at the head of the diviſions which were in front of *Zurich*, namely, thoſe of *de Lorges*, *Menard*, and *Gazan*; he fell in with the Allies on the 7th of September, between the *Thur* and the *Rhine*, charged them, and, dividing their columns, which had been ſcarcely joined by their out-poſts, forced them to recroſs the Rhine.

The bridge of *Dieſenhoffen* was broken down; the French made themſelves maſters of that of *Conſtance*, and purſued acroſs the town, as far as *Peterſhauſen*, the rear guard of the corps of *Condé* and of the Bavarians. The affair was very warm on the ſide of *Conſtance*; the left wing, commanded by the Duke *d'Enghien*, had at firſt had ſome advantage, but it was driven back into the town, by ſuperior forces. General *Bauer*, who commanded the right, was cut off with part of his cavalry; he fought his way through, re-entered the town, took poſſeſſion of the Rhine, and thus covered the remainder of the retreat.

Three times in this ſame day the town of Conſtance was taken and retaken; the French, on both ſides, fought with equal valour; but the republicans remained maſters of *Conſtance*.

Here ended the battle of *Zurich*, which from the firſt attacks of the advanced poſts on the 24th of September, had laſted a whole fortnight.

Half of Switzerland, all the eaſtern part compriſed between the courſe of the *Reuſs* and that of the *Rhine*, from *St. Gothard* to *Conſtance*, became one field of battle; and this vaſt encloſure, thickly interſected by natural difficulties, was occupied in ſuch a manner, that in this ſpace of from five and twenty to thirty leagues in length, from north to ſouth, by fifteen or eighteen leagues in breadth, there was not a ſingle valley, a ſingle path trodden in the high mountains, a ſingle communication between the lakes and the rivers that was not diſputed by battles, occupied as a poſt, and traverſed by troops, marching and manœuvring relatively to the ſame action.

It would be difficult to eſtimate correctly the loſs of the two armies, during this fortnight. That of the Allies has been reckoned above 25,000 men, and we think that if there were included in the calculation the loſſes ſuſtained on both ſides, in the battles fought by General *Thureau* upon the frontier of the *Valais*, in the valley of *Domo d'Oſſola*, we ſhould not be far from the exact truth in eſtimating at 40,000 men the loſs of the two armies in killed, wounded, and priſoners: this is more than a fourth of the effective force under arms.

As ſoon as the *Archduke*, at his head-quarters on the *Lower Rhine*, received intelligence of the battle of *Zurich*, and was informed that the generals of the French army of the Rhine were cauſing troops to defile towards *Straſburg* and *Baſle*, he ſet off with the

the greater part of thoſe which he had brought to *Manheim*, leaving, however, General Prince *de Schwartzemberg* a corps ſufficient to cover *Manheim* and *Philipſburg*. He performed this countermarch with as much diligence as he had exerted in relieving *Philipſburg:* he arrived on the 4th of October at *Donaueſchingen*, where he held a grand council of war. The Auſtrian troops arrived in Upper Swabia, and upon the frontiers of Switzerland, on the 7th and 8th.

A few days after the *Archduke* judged it neceſſary to collect and concentrate his forces; he drew nearer to him General *Nauendorf*, who was placed in obſervation towards the Briſgau, and took a ſtrong poſition in Upper Swabia.

Part of General *Korſakow*'s corps defiled, by his left, towards the lake of Conſtance; and on the other hand General *Suwarrow*, who had at firſt eſtabliſhed his head-quarters at *Coire*, after having received there a great part of his artillery by the lake of *Como* and the route of *Chiavenna*, proceeded to *Feldkirch*, viſited the cordon of troops along the right bank of the lake of *Conſtance*, and joined the Ruſſian generals at *Lindau*.

Thus was Switzerland almoſt entirely evacuated by the Allies; the French had retaken *St. Gothard*, and, notwithſtanding the ſeaſon was already very far advanced, they threatened to enter again into the Griſons, by the valley of *Diſentis* and *Sargans*.

Out

Out of Switzerland, and on the ſide of Italy, the principal communication with their right was covered; the attacks of General *Laudon* and of Colonel *Strauch*, and their efforts to re-enter the *Valais*, had no longer any object that was connected with the general operations. Upon the Lower Rhine, General *Muller*, recroſſing the river, advanced again upon *Francfort*, *Heidelberg*, and *Manheim*, and repulſed the militia, who were not now ſufficiently ſupported. Prince *de Schwartzemberg* confined himſelf to the covering of *Philipſburg*.

Such were the inevitable conſequences of the loſs of the battle of *Zurich*.

We ſhall revert to the new diſpoſitions of the *Archduke*, and of General *Suwarrow*, when we ſhall reſume, and always in the ſame order, that is, from the ſouth to the north of Italy, and to the Lower Rhine, the picture of the general operations. Our readers will, no doubt, have remarked, that we do not reſtrict ourſelves to follow, exactly, the order of dates and facts, but cloſely that of the epochs formed by great removals of forces, or by great battles. If we ſometimes appear to have neglected to relate operations or warlike feats, the date of which coincides with that of the events which we report, it is, undoubtedly, becauſe theſe particular operations, however intereſting they may be in themſelves, have already no longer any immediate connexion with the general whole; and

are,

are, in this point of view, to find their place in the following period. We have no occaſion to dwell upon the neceſſity and advantage of this method, without which we ſhould produce only a cold and dry compilation of military journals.

We ſhall therefore reſerve, for the next Number, the battles fought in Italy by General *Kray* with the corps of the army of obſervation before *Coni*, and the laſt movements of General *Championnet*; we ſhall, at a ſubſequent period, alſo ſpeak of the defence of the *Valais* by General *Thureau*, and of the bloody actions fought upon the back of the *Simplon*. In fact, the reiterated attacks of the column of Colonels *Strauch* and *Rohan*, ſupported at firſt by General *Laudon*, and afterwards by a corps of Ruſſian troops, were no longer of the ſame importance, ſince General *Suwarrow* had been forced to abandon *St. Gothard* and the valley of the *Reuſs*, and renounce his firſt plan of operation againſt the *Engelberg*, and the left bank of the lake of the Four Cantons.

On the other hand, as, ſince the battle of *Zurich*, the object of the movements of the French upon the right bank of the river, as well towards the *Briſgau* as upon the *Lower Rhine*, was not only to detain the forces which the *Archduke* was bringing back towards Switzerland; we ſhall wait till the new plan of the French government is ſufficiently developed before we recur to what has paſſed in that quarter. The almoſt entire evacuation of Swit-

Switzerland by the Allies, the reſpective ſituation of the two armies, the ſtrength of the defenſive poſition of the *Vorarlberg*, connected by the lake of Conſtance to that of Upper Swabia, forced both parties once more to ſuſpend their blows. The victors and the vanquiſhed, after efforts ſo prodigious, were almoſt equally exhauſted; they all demanded and expected reinforcements. During this latter period (to uſe an expreſſion, ſo true, that it was employed at the ſame time in the accounts of both parties), *Switzerland was now nothing but a ſea of fire*; the laſt reſources of the two armies had been entirely deſtroyed; the little that the inhabitants had been able to gather was conſumed; labour was every where ſuſpended; the *Archduke*, by ſolemn and urgent proclamations, ſummoned the inhabitants of the dutchy of Wurtemberg and of Upper Auſtria to concur, by voluntary contributions, in money or kind, in the ſupport of his army; and *Maſſena* was likewiſe reduced to exact from the Swiſs a heavy contribution, in order to be enabled to pay his troops.

The ſcourge of war, which during near three centuries had, at different periods, preyed upon Italy and Germany, had reſpected Switzerland; but at preſent, this torrent of calamities, which had been ſtopped by political barriers, as much as by thoſe placed by nature, having overthrown them all, carried into this unfortunate country its moſt dreadful ravages.

Let

Let us finiſh this picture, let us terminate this epoch by the iſſue of the expedition againſt Holland.

Since the battle of *Bergen*, which took place on the 19th of September, nothing important had happened between the two armies till the 1ſt of October. The army of the Duke of *York*, on reſuming its poſition on the *Zype*, had re-eſtabliſhed and reinforced its right, extending to the ſea, and occupied, with the extremity of its left, the towns of *Enckhuyſen* and *Medenblick*. The Engliſh flotilla put into theſe harbours, whence it continued to attack or moleſt different points of the coaſt of the Zuyder Zee. The Engliſh being maſters of the *Lemmer*, took poſt in Frieſland; they ſummoned *Harderwyck*, and attacked *Staveren*, without theſe attacks having the effect which they expected, relatively to the interior, or producing reſources which were daily becoming more ſcarce.

During this interval, the laſt Ruſſian diviſion arrived, and the combined army prepared to renew its attacks. It even appeared by the ſpeeches made in the Parliament of England, and by the bill propoſed for the employment of the militia out of the kingdom, that the miniſtry were decided in purſuing their plan, without ſuffering themſelves to be deterred by the difficulties which reſulted from the nature of the country, the unexpected efforts of the Batavian government, and the ſuccours from France, much more numerous than it had been

thought poſſible could be furniſhed at this epoch of the campaign.

General *Brune*, ſtill inferior in force, expected a diviſion which the Inſpector-general *Kellermann* had organized in Belgium, and the march of which he haſtened towards North Holland. The Batavian government, on their ſide, neglected nothing for completing and augmenting their battalions.

By the concurrence of the efforts of the two republics, the defenſive poſition of the Franco-Batavian army was every day becoming ſtronger. General *Brune* perfectionated the different intrenchments which covered his left, principally in front of the village of *Bergen:* the woods which ſurround it, the ſand-hills which cover and command it on the north ſide, in the direction of the avenue of *Schoreldam*, rendered this part of the poſition very reſpectable; and the ſame ground, interſected by ſand-hills as far as the ſea-ſide, was no leſs favourable for defence: the centre and the right were almoſt inacceſſible; the ſwelling of the waters had allowed of extending the great inundation of the *Huyger-Waard*; and if it was not entirely formed, at leaſt almoſt the whole country had been rendered marſhy and impaſſable, and all the roads and avenues between *Alkmaer* and *Medenblick* were cut in different directions.

Behind this line, the *Polder* of the *Beemſter* alſo almoſt entirely inundated, covering *Edam* and *Purmerend*, it may be ſaid that the front of action

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defence was reduced to two leagues and a half, or three leagues at most. This is the more important to observe, as the Anglo-Russian, which was the attacking army, passed all at once from a disposition of attack too divergent (as we have remarked in our last Number) to the contrary extreme; since, if it succeeded in getting beyond the position of *Alkmaer*, instead of being able to deploy, in order to profit by its superiority, it was obliged to double its lines, and to close the interval of its columns. The disadvantage of this kind of attack is obvious; and it is so much the greater, as, in case of retreat, the ground opens in the inverse sense, and counteracts, instead of favouring, a junction.

On the 2d of October, the Duke of *York*, with the whole of his forces, made a general attack. As he could not manœuvre with his left, on account of the inundations, nor venture to involve himself in difficult passes, in order to turn the *Waard*, he once more directed his principal effort against the French divisions, which formed General *Brune*'s left.

The advanced posts of this left wing, and of the centre of the Franco-Batavian army, were first attacked, and dislodged from *Groet*, *Camper*, *Schorel*, and *Schoreldam*, by the English and Russian troops. The disposition of the Duke of *York*'s attack was in four columns.

The right column, formed of three brigades of infantry, with nine squadrons of dragoons and a

detachment of horſe-artillery, was commanded by General *Abercromby*; it followed the ſea-ſide.

Two columns nearly of the ſame force, one formed of Ruſſian troops under the orders of General *D'Eſſen*, and the other of Engliſh troops under the command of General *Dundas*, marched againſt *Bergen*, and after having followed the road at the foot of the ſand-hills of *Camperdown*, deployed by the right, in order to crown the heights.

A fourth column, led by General Sir James *Pulteney*, and in which was the Prince of *Orange*, kept in check the diviſion under General *Daendels*. After the poſt of *Schoreldam* was carried, the battle became more ſerious in front of *Bergen*. The French General *Gouvion*, who commanded in this village, ſuſtained the attacks of General *Dundas*, and obſtinately maintained his ground, while General *Abercromby* had already got beyond *Bergen*, and, ſupported by the fire of the gun-boats, which ſwept the beach, was endeavouring to turn, by *Egmont-op-Zee*, the poſition of *Alkmaer*. He had made his column defile acroſs the ſand-hills; and availing himſelf of the advantage and the inequalities of the ground, in order to place his flying artillery, and protect his attacks, he had driven all that oppoſed him as far as *Egmont-op-Zee*. This laſt poſt, where General *Vandamme* commanded, was not leſs vigorouſly defended than *Bergen*; but both were evacuated by the French in the night between the 2d and 3d, after the moſt bloody bat-

tles that had yet been fought in Holland. Several generals were wounded; and whether in attacking or defending themſelves, both parties charged each other ſeveral times with the bayonet.

The centre of the Franco-Batavian army at *Langen-dyck* and *Coe-dyck* was attacked with the ſame ſucceſs; ſome boats armed with cannon, and placed along the canal of *Alkmaer*, had greatly contributed in this quarter to the capture of *Schoreldam*, and to the progreſs of the columns. Much courage and addreſs were diſplayed by the Scotch highlanders, who fought in the inundations, and ſurmounted, with agility, every obſtacle, in order to gain the flank of the troops that were oppoſed to them.

General *Brune*, ſeeing his left paſſed by the column under General *Abercromby*, and his centre broken, fell back in good order, and took a new poſition, very ſtrong, and more concentrated than the former, with his left at *Wyck-op-zee* upon the ſea-ſide, and his centre at *Crommenie-dyck* behind the pond. General *Daendels'* diviſion, although it had not been attacked, was obliged to follow the movement of the centre and left, and to quit the poſition of *Broeck*, *St. Pancras*, and *Ouds Carſpel*; it fell back upon *Purmerend* and *Monikendam*, behind the inundations of the *Schermer* and of the *Beemſter*. The advanced poſts were at *Lymmen*, *Bakkum*, *Ackerſloot*, and the head-quarters at *Beverwyck*, which is only three leagues from *Haerlem*.

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The Engliſh entered *Alkmaer* on the 3d of October, and moved their poſts forward, and in a parallel direction to thoſe of the Franco-Batavians. General *Brune*, after having ſent to *Haerlem* part of his baggage, ſtrengthened himſelf in this excellent poſition, and there received on the 3d and 4th a pretty conſiderable reinforcement of French troops.

During the days of the 4th and 5th of October, the two armies took ſome repoſe; but, on the 6th in the morning, the Duke of *York* again ordered an attack upon the whole front of the line. If he thought to carry by main force this concentrated poſition, he was juſtified in not ſuffering General *Brune* to ſettle himſelf in it; and the more the right of the Batavians was rendered inacceſſible by the inundations, the more urgent was the neceſſity to repulſe beyond *Haerlem*, the corps of troops which was intrenching itſelf at *Beverwyck*.

The Anglo-Ruſſians, in this ſecond attack, had at firſt ſome ſucceſs; they took poſſeſſion of *Ackerſloot*, and advanced as far as *Caſtricum*; but the action becoming general, the fate of arms ſuddenly changed. While his troops attacked in their turn, General *Brune* ſeized a favourable moment to charge at the head of his cavalry; he broke the line of the Anglo-Ruſſians, who could neither form again, nor maintain the ground which they had gained; they were repulſed beyond *Bakkum*, after having ſuffered a very conſiderable loſs. It appears, that

that this charge, executed by General *Brune*, who in this affair had two horſes killed under him, contributed not a little to the change of fortune.

The battle laſted till night, and the Franco-Batavian army reſumed its poſition of *Beverwyck*. The reſult of this ſecond batile, apparently not very deciſive, although it had coſt both parties a great deal of blood, was nevertheleſs entirely to the advantage of the Batavians; in fact, it was conquering to have occaſioned the failure of a deſperate attack, on the ſucceſs of which depended, not only the means of accompliſhing the moſt difficult of all enterpriſes, but alſo the means of finding ſubſiſtence for an army, which, not being able to ſpread, nor to draw its proviſions from the country in which it was acting, had to receive by ſea every thing that was neceſſary for its ſupport.

The military men who have not diſdained to occupy themſelves with the details ſo important and ſo difficult, of the daily ſubſiſtence of a great army; thoſe who have experienced, that this miracle of every day, requires all the attention, all the foreſight of the general, will here find a memorable example, a great leſſon. They will appreciate the motives, which determined the Duke of *York* to aſſemble a council of war, the unanimous opinion of which (to uſe the expreſſions of this Prince, in his official report) was, " that it would be for the benefit of the general cauſe to withdraw the troops

troops from their advanced position, in order to wait his Majesty's further instructions."

Although the position of the Duke of *York*'s army was no more than six or seven leagues from the points of debarkation, nevertheless the heavy rains, the roads broken up, the cuts of the dikes and of the small canals, rendered the communications impracticable, and the conveyance and distribution of provisions and forage impossible.

The final orders of the English government could not but be for the evacuation of North Holland; it was no longer time to change the plan of operations; no considerable and effectual diversion could be made without weakening, and running the risk of sacrificing the whole of the army; besides, the season was too far advanced, and the perilous navigation of the coast of the *Texel* did not admit of prolonging this movement of convoys; lastly, the immense expenses of this expedition could no longer be counterbalanced by the most fortunate results, that they might still have promised themselves.

After the affair of the 6th, General *Brune* soon perceived the retrograde movement of the Duke of *York*. On the 8th, the left and centre of the Franco-Batavians re entered *Alkmaer*, and resumed the positions which they had occupied before the battle of the 2d; their right, under the command of General *Daendels*, advanced against *Hoorn*, which it entered on the 9th.

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The Anglo-Ruſſian army ſucceſſively evacuated *Enckhuyſen* and *Medenblick*, where the docks, the naval ſtorehouſes, the ſhips belonging to the Eaſt India Company, and public property of every deſcription, were deſtroyed or injured. This retreat was effected in good order; and nevertheleſs the Duke of *York* was obliged to leave behind part of his wounded, for want of means of conveyance.

In proportion as the Anglo-Ruſſians concentrated themſelves in their intrenchments of the *Zype*, General *Daendels*' diviſion hemmed in their left, attacked their rear guards, and occupied the poſts which they were forced to evacuate, on account of the too great extent of their line; *Opmeer*, *Eerſwoud*, and *Winkel*, were thus occupied.

On the 11th, General *Dumonceau*'s diviſion, by getting poſſeſſion of the villages of *Dirkſhoorn* and *Haring Carſpel*, re-eſtabliſhed his communication with *Daendels*' column. The latter advanced to *Luthkwinkel*, and took poſſeſſion of the *Zee-dyck* ſluice, in which the Engliſh had already made a cut of nineteen feet; a too dreadful mean of defence!

On the 12th and 13th, the Franco-Batavian army occupied the poſition the neareſt to the *Zype*; the left before *Petten*, the centre at *Warmenhuyſen* and *Dirkſhoorn*, and the right in front of *Winkel*.

It was in this reſpective ſituation of the two armies, that the Duke of *York*, having ſent a flag of truce to General *Brune*, propoſed a capitulation, upon the

baſis of an armiſtice, and of the free retreat and reimbarkation of his army. General *Knox*, on the ſide of the Engliſh, and the General of Brigade *Roſtollan*, chief of the ſtaff of the Franco-Batavian army, were provided with powers to negotiate and draw up the articles of this capitulation, which was concluded at *Alkmaer* on the 18th of October.

The ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities and of all works offenſive and defenſive; the ſucceſſive reimbarkation of the allied army, which was to be effected by the 1ſt of November; the re-eſtabliſhment of the fortifications of the Helder, and the preſervation of the works erected by the *Anglo-Ruſſian* army; the reſtitution of 8000 French and Batavian priſoners, that of Admiral *De Winter* being particularly ſtipulated: ſuch were the articles of this capitulation. There was a talk of the reſtitution of the Batavian fleet, which had gone over to the Orange ſtandard, but there was undoubtedly nothing granted in this reſpect, or at leaſt the article remained ſecret.

The retreat of the Duke of *York*'s army was followed by the evacuation of the *Zuyder-Zee*, and of the iſlands and harbour of the *Lemmer* by Admiral *Mitchell*'s flotilla.

We have indicated in the preceding Number of this work the cauſes which had retarded the junction of the four Engliſh and Ruſſian diviſions ſucceſſively ſent to the *Helder*, and which had prevented the Duke of *York* from profiting by the ſucceſs of th

the firſt debarkation ſo well executed by General *Abercromby*.

We muſt alſo ſay, that the faults or misfortunes too little foreſeen; in ſhort, that the fate of arms did not alone occaſion all the ſucceſs of General *Brune*. His plan of defence was ſolid and well conceived, ſince he had no occaſion to change his principal diſpoſition, which, in defenſive war, is the proof of the beſt poſſible combination, with reſpect to the ground. This truth was demonſtrated by the little advantage which the Duke of *York* derived from the battle of *Bergen* and *Egmont-op-Zee*. The diſpoſitions before and during the action, the concert in the attacks, and the ſkilful manœuvres of Generals *Abercromby* and *Dundas*, prevailed over an obſtinate defence, on the ground, and in the poſitions the moſt difficult for every ſort of army.

And, nevertheleſs, at two leagues only from the field of battle, a poſition parallel to the firſt, and almoſt impregnable, ſtops the victorious army; the French general, who was already preparing the defences of his third line, being attacked upon a narrowed front, more favourable to his movements, gains in his turn a deciſive advantage over that army, forced to fight and to conquer every day, or to periſh for want of proviſions.

Thus has terminated this maritime expedition, the moſt conſiderable which has been attempted by the moderns, and which appeared likely not only to

change the form of government in Holland, but alſo to be attended with conſequences the moſt important, whether with reſpect to the continuation of the war, or the political balance which a general peace was to re-eſtabliſh in Europe.

At the moment when we are completing the picture of the great events which, during the laſt month, have ſo ſtrangely changed the face of affairs, a telegraphic diſpatch announces the arrival of *Buonaparte* upon the coaſt of Provence; and this incident divides the public attention, and ſeems to promiſe to the French government the accompliſhment of the return of fortune.

NOTE

NOTE I.

Upon the recent War in India.

It may have been ſeen by our preceding Numbers, that, faithful to our engagements, and to the title even of this Work, we have taken the greateſt care to omit no *military event*, either by land or by ſea; whether it has taken place in Europe, or in another quarter of the world. We have thought that beſides the intereſt claimed by theſe events themſelves, the influence of which is ſo deciſive upon the happineſs of individuals, or the fate of governments, our readers would be gratified in peruſing ſome hiſtorical compariſons analogous to the facts we relate, or ſome developments of the ideas or of the principles which belong to the nature of the ſubject. With this view, and not to clog the narration, which ought itſelf, as much as poſſible, to poſſeſs the rapidity of the events it repreſents, we have referred to notes ſuch articles as we have thought deſerving of a particular diſcuſſion.

The teſtimonies of approbation which our labours have hitherto obtained, have confirmed us in the intention of collecting every material that might appear to us capable of throwing light upon the hiſtory of the war.

Thus, although we have not given the official reports which are to be found in the public papers, we think we ought to make an exception in favour of the diſpatch in which Lord *Mornington* gives to the Court of Directors of the Eaſt India Company an account of the motives that determined him upon the attack which he directed againſt *Tippoo Saib*, and the reſult of which has been the deſtruction of

of the power, and even the death of that Indian prince. This event is of a nature to be followed by conſequences ſo important commercial power, which, in our days, is become the baſis of the proſperity and political influence of nations, that we are of opinion that the hiſtorian will collect, with particular attention, every circumſtance which has given riſe to it, or by which it has been attended.

Under this perſuaſion we do not take the liberty of altering a ſingle word in Lord *Mornington*'s diſpatch, in order to enable the public to form an impartial judgment on this ſort of manifeſto intended to legitimate the war, which has rendered the Engliſh maſters of *Seringapatam* and of the kingdom of *Myſore*.

The following account of the laſt war in India is extracted from a letter of Lord *Mornington*, Governor General, dated Fort *St. George*, the 20th of March 1799, addreſſed to the Court of Directors.

" A proclamation iſſued by the Governor General of the Iſle of France, in the month of February 1798, made its firſt appearance at Calcutta on the 8th of June of the ſame year.

" This proclamation ſtates, that an embaſſy had arrived at the Iſle of France with letters from Tippoo Sultaun, addreſſed, not only to the government of that iſland, but to the Executive Directory of France, propoſing to conclude an offenſive and defenſive alliance with the French, to ſubſidize and to ſupply whatever troops the French might furniſh to the Sultaun, and to commence againſt the Britiſh power in India, a war of aggreſſion, for which the Sultaun is declared to be fully prepared, waiting with anxiety the moment when the ſuccour of France ſhall enable him to ſatisfy his ardent deſire of expelling the Britiſh nation from India. The proclamation concludes by offering encouragement to the ſubjects of France to enter into the ſervice of

Tippoo

Tippoo Sultaun, on terms to be fixed with his ambaſſadors then on the ſpot.

" Although I was inclined, in the firſt inſtance, to doubt the authenticity of this extraordinary publication, I thought it adviſable to tranſmit a copy of it, on the 9th of June, to Lieutenant-general Harris (then governor of Fort St. George, and commander in chief on the coaſt of Coromandel), informing him, that, if the proclamation ſhould prove authentic, it muſt lead to a ſerious diſcuſſion with Tippoo Sultaun; and directing Lieutenant-general Harris to conſider, without delay, the means of aſſembling the army on the coaſt of Coromandel, if neceſſity ſhould unfortunately require ſuch a precaution.

" On the 18th of June 1798, I received a regular authentication of the proclamation in a letter from his Excellency the Earl of Macartney, dated the 28th of March; and at the ſame time ſeveral perſons arrived at Calcutta, who had been preſent in the Iſle of France at the time of the publication of the proclamation.

" By a ſtrict examination of the moſt reſpectable of theſe perſons, I was enabled to obtain an authentic and accurate ſtatement of all the material circumſtances attending the publication of the proclamation at the Iſle of France; the ſubſtance of which ſtatement I have already forwarded to your Secret Committee, and now have the honour to ſubmit to your Honourable Court.

" Tippoo Sultaun diſpatched two ambaſſadors, who embarked at Mangalore for the Iſle of France, and arrived at Port Nord-oueſt in that iſland towards the cloſe of the month of January 1798. The ambaſſadors were received publicly and formally by the French government, with every circumſtance of diſtinction and reſpect, and they were entertained at the public expenſe during their continuance on the iſland.

" Previous

"Previous to the arrival of ambaſſadors on the iſland, no idea or rumour exiſted there of any aid to be furniſhed to Tippoo Sultaun by the French, or of any proſpect of a war between that prince and the Company; but within two days after the arrival of the ambaſſadors, the proclamation in queſtion was fixed up in the moſt public places, and circulated through the town of Port Nord-oueſt.

"The ambaſſadors, far from proteſting againſt the matter or ſtyle of the proclamation, held without reſerve, in the moſt public manner, the ſame language which it contains with reſpect to a war of aggreſſion to be commenced by Tippoo Sultaun againſt the Britiſh poſſeſſions in India; and they even ſuffered the proclamation to be publicly diſtributed by their agents at the place of their reſidence.

"The ambaſſadors were preſent when the French government proceeded to act under the proclamation in queſtion; and the ambaſſadors aided and aſſiſted the execution of the proclamation by making promiſes, in the name of Tippoo Sultaun, for the purpoſe of inducing recruits to enliſt in his ſervice.

"The ambaſſadors propoſed to levy men to any practicable extent, ſtating their powers to be unlimited with reſpect to the force to be raiſed in the name of Tippoo Sultaun. They entered into certain ſtipulations and engagements in the name of the Sultaun (according to the tenour of the laſt paragraph of the proclamation) with ſeveral Frenchmen, and others, particularly with M. Dubuc, whom the ambaſſadors engaged in the ſervice of their ſovereign, for the expreſs purpoſe of aſſiſting in the war to be immediately commenced againſt the Britiſh power in India.

"An opportunity now occurred of aſcertaining beyond the poſſibility of doubt, whether the acts of the Sultaun's ambaſſadors

ambaſſadors in the Iſle of France were conformable to the inſtructions of their Sovereign. For although the preſumption was already ſufficiently powerful, that the ambaſſadors would not have ventured to tranſgreſs the limits of their commiſſion in a matter of ſuch momentous importance, as the concluſion of offenſive engagements with the French againſt the Engliſh Eaſt India Company, yet it remained a queſtion, whether Tippoo Sultaun would venture openly to avow proceedings, which could not fail to expoſe him to the juſt reſentment of your government.

"This queſtion was immediately ſolved; for the Sultaun, without heſitation, permitted the French force to land publicly at Mangalore; and far from manifeſting the leaſt ſymptom of diſapprobation of the conduct of the embaſſy in any part of the negotiation, he formally received his ambaſſadors, and the French officers, and principal perſons in their ſuite, with public and extraordinary marks of honour and diſtinction; and finally, he admitted the greater part of the French force, raiſed for the purpoſe of making war upon the Honourable Company, into his ſervice, in which it is ſtill entertained.

"To confirm the concluſions neceſſarily reſulting from the facts already ſtated, I received undoubted information, that Tippoo Sultaun had, for ſome time paſt, been employed in military preparations, conformably to the hoſtile ſpirit of his engagements with the enemy; that the greater part of his army was actually in a ſtate of equipment for the field; and that a large portion of it was then encamped under his perſonal command.

"The Sultaun himſelf had not attempted to allege even the pretext of a grievance againſt the Britiſh Government. In his letters to Sir John Shore (written a ſhort time before the return of the Myſorean ambaſſadors from the Iſle of

France, and received at Fort William on the 26th of April 1798, the day on which the French force landed at Mangalore), Tippoo declares 'that his friendly heart is diſpoſed 'to pay every regard to truth and juſtice, and to ſtrengthen 'the foundations of harmony and concord between the two 'nations;' and he ſignifies his deſire, that 'Sir John Shore 'would impreſs Lord Mornington with a ſenſe of the friend-'ſhip and unanimity ſo firmly ſubſiſting between the two 'ſtates.'

"This is not the language of hoſtility, nor even of diſcontent. From what diſpoſition in the friendly heart of the Sultaun theſe amicable profeſſions have proceeded, how they are connected with a regard to truth and juſtice, or calculated to ſtrengthen the foundations of harmony and concord, and to impreſs me with a ſenſe of the Sultaun's friendſhip, your Honourable Court can now determine without difficulty; ſince it is now proved, that theſe letters were written at the very criſis when he was in anxious expectation of the hourly arrival of that military ſuccour which he had earneſtly ſolicited from the enemy, for the expreſs purpoſe of commencing a war of aggreſſion againſt the Company's poſſeſſions.

"Under all theſe circumſtances an immediate attack upon Tippoo Sultaun, for the purpoſe of fruſtrating the execution of his unprovoked and unwarrantable projects of ambition and revenge, appeared to me to be demanded by the ſoundeſt maxims both of juſtice and policy.

"The act of Tippoo Sultaun's ambaſſadors, ratified by himſelf, and followed by the admiſſion of a French force into his army, was equivalent to a public, unqualified, and unambiguous declaration of war. But while his hoſtile purpoſe had been clearly manifeſted, the immediate means of accompliſhing it had happily diſappointed the order of his hopes.

" The inconſiderable amount of the aid which he had already received from the French, while it could not be conſtrued as a limitation of my juſt right to vindicate the public ſafety, afforded ſtrong argument of policy in favour of attacking this deſperate, implacable, and treacherous enemy, before he could either complete the improvement of his own army, under the French officers whom he had already admitted into his ſervice, or could receive a further acceſſion of ſtrength under the progreſſive operation of his alliance with France."

" In the moment of his comparative weakneſs, of his diſappointment and probable dejection, the principles of juſtifiable ſelf-defence, and of prudential precaution, required that we ſhould ſtrike ſuch an inſtantaneous blow againſt his power and reſources as ſhould preclude the poſſibility of his deriving any ſubſtantial advantage from the aid of France, whenever it might reach his dominions.

" The diſpoſition of the French government to attempt an enterpriſe againſt the Britiſh poſſeſſions in India, has never been diſguiſed; and although I had not obtained poſitive proof that any formal and regular correſpondence between Tippoo Sultaun and the Executive Directory of France, had exiſted previous to the embaſſy and letters which arrived at the Mauritius in January 1798; yet the nature of that tranſaction afforded a ſtrong preſumption that a previous intercourſe of the ſame hoſtile character had taken place. This preſumption was further corroborated by my certain knowledge, that for ſome time paſt various emiſſaries of France had reached the councils of Tippoo Sultaun, and that, through their repreſentations, he had been taught to entertain a confident expectation of ſpeedy and effectual ſupport.

" Even admitting that this expectation was likely to be fruſtrated, either by a failure of faith on the part of France,

or by the vigilance and ſuperior power of his Majeſty's fleets, I was appriſed that Tippoo had alſo diſpatched an embaſſy to Zemaun Shah, the object of which could be no other than to encourage that prince in the proſecution of his long-threatened invaſion of Hindoſtan. The whole tenour of my advices from the north-weſtern countries of Hindoſtan, led me to believe that Zemaun Shah would endeavour to purſue his avowed project of invaſion in the enſuing ſeaſon; and it appeared probable that his approach, which muſt neceſſarily engage the attention of the army in Bengal, might be the ſignal to Tippoo Sultaun for an irruption into the Carnatic.

" Under ſuch circumſtances it would have been an unmanly and weak policy to have confided the ſafety of the Carnatic to the precarious forbearance of Tippoo Sultaun, or to have left him any longer in the undiſturbed poſſeſſion of the powerful advantage of being able to chooſe, according to his convenience, the time and mode of the attack which he had openly menaced.

" I therefore recorded my decided judgment, that it was neceſſary to aſſemble the armies on the coaſts of Coromandel and Malabar without delay, and I iſſued my final orders for this purpoſe on the 20th of June 1798.

" Some officers of approved military talents, experience, and integrity, at Fort St. George, declared, that your army in the Carnatic could not be aſſembled for offenſive purpoſes before the commencement of the year 1800, and that a period of ſix months would be required for its equipment, even for the purpoſe of defending the Carnatic againſt any ſudden attack. I was not diſcouraged, either by the ſuggeſtions to which I have referred, or by ſubſequent repreſentations of a ſimilar character and tendency, from inſiſting on the immediate execution of my orders.

" While the army was aſſembling on the coaſts of Coro-

mandel and Malabar, my early attention was directed to ſtrengthen and improve the defenſive alliance concluded between the Honourable Company and their Highneſſes the Nizam and Peſhwah, under the treaties of Paangal, Poonah, and Seringapatam, for the purpoſe of eſtabliſhing a barrier againſt the ambition and revenge of Tippoo Sultaun.

" The ſtate of this alliance afforded abundant matter of painful anxiety; I found both the Peſhwah and the Nizam (whoſe reſpective power it was the object of the treaty of Seringapatam to maintain in ſuch a ſtate of efficiency as might render them uſeful allies in the event of a war with Myſore) reduced to the loweſt condition of depreſſion and weakneſs; the former by the intruſion of Doulet Row Sindia, and the latter by the threatened hoſtilities of the ſame chieftain, and by the eſtabliſhment of a numerous and active French faction in the centre of the Decan; and while the internal convulſions of each ſtate had diminiſhed the reſources of both, their co-operation againſt Tippoo Sultaun had become impracticable by the progreſs of their mutual animoſities and diſſenſions.

" The final reſult to the Britiſh government appeared to me to be, firſt, the entire loſs of the benefit of the treaty of triple alliance againſt Tippoo Sultaun, by the utter inability of our allies to fulfil their defenſive engagements with the Company; and, ſecondly, the eſtabliſhment of a French army of 14,000 men, in the dominions of one of our allies, in the vicinity of the territories of our irreconcilable enemy, and on the confines of the Carnatic and of the Northern Circars.

" In this ſtate of our political relations, the Company was expoſed, without the aid of a ſingle ally, to the hazard of a conteſt with the united force of Tippoo Sultaun and of the French.

" On

" On the 18th of September I ratified the new ſubſidiary treaty with the Nizam.

" On the 18th of October I received the firſt authentic information of the invaſion of Egypt by the French, and of the progreſs of their arms in that country.

" The neceſſity, however, of either compelling Tippoo Sultaun to detach himſelf from the intereſts of France, or of depriving him of the power of co-operating with the French, if they ſhould be enabled to reach India, now became too evident to admit of any doubt. My opinion had long been decided, that no negotiation with Tippoo Sultaun could be ſucceſsful, unleſs accompanied by ſuch a diſpoſition of our force, as ſhould alarm him for the ſafety of his capital; and that no military operation could effect an adequate or ſpeedy reduction of his power, unleſs directed immediately to the ſiege of that city.

" On the 20th of October, therefore, I gave peremptory orders to the government of Fort St. George, for completing the equipment of their battering train, and for advancing it with all practicable diſpatch to the moſt eligible ſtation on the frontier of the Carnatic, with a view of proceeding towards Seringapatam, at the earlieſt poſſible period, if ſuch a movement into Myſore ſhould become neceſſary. At the ſame time I ſignified to the government of Fort St. George, my intention of reinforcing their army with 3000 volunteers from the native infantry, on the eſtabliſhment of Bengal, who had offered their ſervices with the utmoſt alacrity and zeal.

" To the government of Bombay I iſſued further orders for the collection not only of their troops, but of the largeſt poſſible ſupplies on the coaſt of Malabar.

" On the 22d of October (as I have already informed your Honourable Court), the diſmiſſion of the French fac-

tion

tion in the Nizam's army was happily accompliſhed at Hydrabad.

" I then reſolved to proceed to Fort St. George, for the purpoſe of conducting the expected negotiation with the Sultaun, which I flattered myſelf my preſence on the coaſt of Coromandel might enable me to bring to an iſſue, before the ſeaſon ſhould be ſo far advanced, as to relieve Tippoo Sultaun from thoſe alarms for the ſafety of his capital, on which I founded my ſole hope of obtaining any ſatisfactory adjuſtment with him.

" On the 10th of December I addreſſed a letter to the Sultaun, informing him of my intention to proceed to Fort St. George, and again urging him to receive Major Doveton. On the 25th of December I embarked on board his Majeſty's ſhip the Sybille, Captain E. Cooke, and arrived at this preſidency on the 31ſt of the ſame month.

" The advanced period of the ſeaſon abſolutely required that I ſhould aſcertain the Sultaun's views within a ſhort time. My propoſition contained nothing derogatory to the honour or dignity of the Sultaun. It was now urged for the third time without variation, and it related ſimply and diſtinctly to the admiſſion of an ambaſſador, for the purpoſe of opening a negotiation; to demand an immediate anſwer to a propoſition of ſuch a nature, could not, therefore, be deemed either offenſive or unreaſonable.

" Tippoo Sultaun remaining ſilent for a conſiderable time after the receipt of my letter of the 9th of January, I concluded that his object muſt be to delay his anſwer until the ſeaſon ſhould be ſo far advanced, as to render the capture of Seringapatam impracticable during the preſent year.

" In the mean while the advices from Buſſorah, Bagdad, Conſtantinople, and Bombay, were of ſo uncertain a nature,

ture, as to leave me ſtill in doubt with reſpect to the condition of the French army in Egypt; the only ſafe concluſion which could be drawn from thoſe advices being, that the French ſtill maintained the poſſeſſion of that country with a large army.

" In order, therefore, to defeat the object of the Sultaun's ſilence, and to avail myſelf of the actual ſuperiority of our force, and of the advantages of the preſent ſeaſon, before the French could effect any junction with him, I determined to commence hoſtilities without delay, and to ſuſpend all negotiation, until the united forces of the Company, and of their allies, ſhould have made ſuch an impreſſion on the territories of Myſore, as might give full effect to our juſt repreſentations.

" With theſe views, on the 3d of February, I directed Lieutenant-general Harris to enter the territory of Myſore with the army aſſembled under his command; on the ſame day I iſſued orders to Lieutenant-general Stuart to be prepared to co-operate from Malabar; and I ſignified to Rear-admiral Rainier, and to the ſeveral allies of the Company, that I now conſidered the Britiſh government in India to be at war with Tippoo Sultaun.

" At length, on the 13th of February, I received from Tippoo Sultaun a letter informing me, that being frequently diſpoſed ' to make excurſions and hunt,' he was ' accordingly proceeding upon a hunting excurſion,' and deſiring that I would ' diſpatch to him Major Doveton ſlightly ' attended.'

" But the ſeaſon for negotiation through the pacific channels ſo often offered by me, was now elapſed. After mature deliberation on the grounds already ſtated, I had directed the advance of the army into the territory of the Sultaun;

Sultaun; and I had ſignified to the allies my determination to proceed to hoſtilities.

"I replied to the letter of Tippoo Sultaun, by declaring to him, that Lieutenant-general Harris was the only perſon now authorized by me to receive and to anſwer whatever communications the Sultaun may think fit to make, with a view to the reſtoration of peace, on ſuch conditions as appear to the allies to be indiſpenſably neceſſary to their common ſecurity. This letter I directed General Harris to forward to the Sultaun on the day on which the army under his command ſhould paſs the frontier.

"The Nizam's contingent conſiſts of above 6000 of the Honourable Company's troops, ſubſidized by his Highneſs, of about the ſame number of his own infantry (including a portion of Mr. Peron's ſepoys, now commanded by Britiſh officers), and a large body of cavalry. This force, under the general command of Mur Allum, formed a junction with the Britiſh army on the 19th of February.

"General Harris entered the territory of Myſore on the 5th of March, with orders to proceed directly to Seringapatam."

Lord *Mornington* concludes his account with ſome reflections upon the effect and the conſequences of the meaſures he has taken. Towards the end he ſays: "If Tippoo Sultaun had been diſpoſed to content himſelf with the quiet poſſeſſion of his preſent dominions; if he could have been brought to a ſenſe of his own peril in forming a connexion with the French, the repreſentations which I addreſſed to him would have produced an early and ſalutary impreſſion. Whatever ſpeculative opinions might have been entertained with reſpect to his intereſts, views, and power, the juſtice and moderation of the Britiſh govern-

ment would never have diſturbed his tranquillity. But he reſolved to attempt the recovery of his loſt dominions, at the hazard of thoſe which he ſtill retains; and, in the ardour of his paſſionate purſuit, he overlooked not only the certain deſtruction of his own independence, the inevitable conſequence even of the moſt proſperous ſucceſs of an alliance with France, but alſo the predominant influence of the Engliſh Eaſt India Company, which would detect his treachery, and turn againſt his own empire the ruin which he had meditated againſt theirs*."

* This letter from Lord Mornington to the Court of Directors of the Eaſt India Company, may be ſeen at length in the eighth volume of Debrett's "*Collection of State Papers relative to the War againſt France.*"

NOTE

NOTE II.

AT the moment when this Number was nearly printed off, we received by a *ſure channel*, a document, which, from its importance, as well as its authenticity, appears to us deſerving of the attention of our readers. It is a copy of the inſtructions ſent from Italy by General *Suwarrow* to the Ruſſian and Auſtrian generals in Switzerland, in which he explained to them his general plan of attack, the points of junction of the columns, and requeſted from them ſuch information, reſpecting the localities, as might determine his farther views.

Although events have not anſwered the hopes of the generaliſſimo of the Imperial armies, this diſpatch is conceived with ſo much clearneſs and preciſion, that we think it extremely well calculated to throw ſome light upon that multiplicity of affairs, actions, or battles, which have taken place from the Griſons to *Schaffhauſen*. In publiſhing *this official paper*, we willingly engage to give with the ſame exactneſs, all thoſe documents which ſhall anſwer the ſame deſcription, and which can ſerve to elucidate the hiſtory of the preſent war.

To Lieutenant-generals, Baron de LINCKEN, *Baron de* HOTZE, *and Prince* KORSAKOW.

Aſti, September the 5th, 1799.

THE Imperial troops of Ruſſia, which till now were with the army of Italy, will ſet out from Piedmont on the 8th of September (28th of Auguſt, Greek ſtyle), on their

march to Switzerland, and I expect to arrive with them on the 17th at *Airolo*, at the foot of that ſide of Mount *St. Gothard*, which I purpoſe to attack on the 19th.

As the troops under the Royal Imperial Colonel *Strauch*, thoſe of *Prince Victor Rohan*, and of General Count *Haddick*, are to co-operate in this attack, it will be very neceſſary that the armies of the two Imperial courts, united in Switzerland, ſhould, with firmneſs and perſeverance, make a combined and ſimultaneous general attack upon all the poſitions of the enemy; but, in particular, the left wing, under the orders of General *Lincken*, ſhall combine all its means, and exert all its efforts, perhaps even with previous reinforcements, in order to facilitate and ſupport the paſſage of the main Ruſſian army by Mount *St. Gothard*, the upper valley of the *Reuſs* and that of the *Linth*, ſo that it will be poſſible to take the enemy in the rear. It may likewiſe be poſſible, by the rapid junction of the left wing of the army of Switzerland, and by advancing in concert, to prevent the enemy from defeating the Ruſſian corps of Italy, and from deſtroying it piece-meal.

As I have not an exact knowledge of the poſitions of the two Imperial armies united in Switzerland, but only ſuch as I have picked up accidentally, I may preſume that the corps of Ruſſian troops, under the command of General *Korſakow*, is poſted between *Zurich* and the *Aar*, along the right bank of the *Limmat*; the corps of Royal Imperial troops, under the orders of Baron *Hotze*, between the lake of *Zurich* and that of *Wallenſtadt*, from *Meyenfeld* in the *Rheinthal* to *Diſentis*—I muſt, above all, expect the junction of the troops of the latter general; I wiſh to learn from himſelf, as he is better acquainted with the country, where and how to effect it, in like manner on my part. As ſoon as the junction ſhall have taken place, I think that the Ruſſian

troops of Italy, *having then nothing more that can arreſt their progreſs*, will penetrate upon both banks of the lake of *Lucerne*; the corps under Generals *Lincken* and *Hotze* between the lakes of *Zurich* and of *Zug*; and laſtly, the total aſſemblage of the Ruſſian troops, under General *Korſakow*, near the right bank of the *Lower Reuſs* and of the *Aar*; this will be the only manœuvre that can promiſe a deciſive reſult for the ſubſequent operations.

As I ſhall haſten to make known to you, from *Bellinzona*, the arrival of the column of the Ruſſian army of Italy; it will alſo be at *Bellinzona*, at the lateſt, unleſs you can do ſo earlier by the route of *Novara* and *Vareſa*, that you will let me know, by couriers, the poſition and the ſtrength of all the troops, both Ruſſian and Royal Imperial, which are united in Switzerland, as well as the poſitions of the enemy, his forces and their diſtribution; I deſire, likewiſe, that Generals *Hotze* and *Lincken* would communicate to me their opinion and their local knowledge, relative to the ground, and to the manner of carrying on war in that country; indicating at the ſame time how the before-mentione co-operation of all the troops which are already in Switzerland, and of thoſe which are on their march thither, can be the moſt effectually and the moſt advantageouſly executed; I ſhall thence be enabled to prepare my attack, and to fix the poſitive day and hour.

Poſtſcript.

For the general attack, I muſt recommend a precaution which becomes more and more neceſſary; namely, to keep the troops, as much as poſſible, collected, in order not to render the attack ineffectual, by parcelling them out unneceſſarily, and weakening them to no purpoſe; beſides, each diviſion ſhould be minutely and exactly acquainted with

with the poſition and the ſtrength of the enemy's corps
which it is oppoſed. No time ſhould be loſt in previou
communicating theſe particulars, as we ought every d
reciprocally to ſend to each other, by couriers, very minu
reports of our firſt operations.

I alſo wiſh that all the troops aſſembled ſhould, in th
interval of the leiſure days till the day of the general attack
be exerciſed, in executing in three columns, *this attac*
with the bayonet and the ſabre.

It is to this mode of attack that we are hitherto in-
debted for our repeated ſucceſſes which have coſt litt
blood; and, in my opinion, General *Korſakow* may, fo
the performance of this exerciſe, diſtribute the Ruſſian offi-
cers, who are acquainted with it, in the Royal Imperia
corps which is in Switzerland.

The before-named General *Korſakow* is thereto authorize
by the orders ſubjoined.

(Signed) SUWARROW.

PLAN
of the
CITY and FORTIFICATIONS of
SERINGAPATAM.



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

Engraved by J. Cooke 50 Howland Str.

ry. Whitehall. Feb.y 21. 1800.

MAP

of part of

SWITZERLAND,

illustrative of the Movements and Actions which there took place

between the 24.th of Sep.r and the 12.th of Oct.r 1799.

Drawn and Engraved for the

EPITOME of MILITARY EVENTS.

October 1799.

Scale of leagues 25 to a Degree.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10

Published by T. Egerton, Military Library, Whitehall Feb.y 25.th 1800.

Engraved by J. Cooke, 50. Howland Str.t

EPITOME

OF

MILITARY EVENTS,

November, 1799.

IN collecting the materials which may one day serve to erect the monument of the history of the revolutions and wars of the end of the eighteenth century, we are often stopped by a reflection painful to the real friends of humanity: we cannot avoid remarking the sort of universal apathy, the selfishness which seems to be the vice of the age, and which destroys, with the *amor patriæ*, the ties and even the foundations of general society.

Doubtless also, the greatness, the multiplicity and the singularity of events, by too rapidly effacing the traces of anterior epochs, have, in no small degree, contributed to this barbarous levity, the characteristic trait of the Europeans of our days. We have seen bloody battles, in which whole armies have

been mowed down, recall, on theſe theatres of carnage and deſolation, from the Texel to the Appenines, only a faint remembrance of the battles formerly fought almoſt in the ſame poſitions; the political cauſes, the intereſt of ſo many former wars, are, in a manner, ſwept away by the torrent of new events, and, diſappearing from our ſight in the waves of the general revolution, are a ſufficient augury that freſh wars, ſimilar battles, and other revolutions will baniſh ſtill more rapidly theſe recollections which we endeavour to fix in our memory. Thoſe plains of Germany and of Italy, where our brothers and our children have periſhed on the graves of our anceſtors, will again be inundated with the blood of our poſterity.

But it might be ſaid, that in proportion as this ſcourge extends its ravages, men accuſtom themſelves to them as to the natural ſtate of ſociety. Never did the horrors of war make leſs impreſſion: it is neceſſary, at the foot of the volcano, to ſolicit the attention of the ſpectators, as if they ran no uncommon danger, as if the lava, or the matter emitted from the crater, could not reach them.

Yet, notwithſtanding this almoſt general unconcern, extraordinary enterpriſes, thoſe which are conducted, in countries formerly famous, by men themſelves already celebrated, and whoſe deſtiny may have an influence on that of nations, ſuddenly awaken intereſt. We attach ourſelves to the perſonages, and the heroic part of their performance

increaſe

increaſes by a ſort of enchantment. In a war of Africa and of Aſia, it is not now merely military facts which arreſt attention, but the recollection of ancient and great events mixes with recent occurrences; and we, at the ſame time, meet with the charms of fable, and the intereſt of hiſtory.

We ſee, in fact, that the details of the expedition of General *Buonaparte* to Egypt and Syria, have been received with a lively eagerneſs; the moſt minute circumſtances have been collected with equal avidity in England, in France, and in Germany. Every eye was fixed on the ſcene which had juſt been opened in the Eaſt, and reſpecting which, every one formed conjectures and wiſhes as various as the ſentiments and oppoſite intereſts that gave them birth.

But what writer would, henceforth, dare to endeavour to gratify the expectation of the public, and would venture to preſent to them the new hiſtory of Egypt under the eyes of the actors whoſe teſtimonies on both ſides have been ſo very recently publiſhed, and are yet only imperfect ſketches, which the labours of the artiſts, the reſearches of the antiquaries, and the meditations of the men of ſcience, will ſucceſſively embelliſh and complete.

It were to be wiſhed that a pen worthy of ſuch a ſubject, an able, but, above all, an impartial critic, would, at a future period, devote himſelf to this great work; compare, preſerve in all their purity,

and arrange in a ſatisfactory order, theſe valuable materials.

We are very far from pretending to theſe advantages; time, the limits of this work, the period at which we began it, and its object from which we never willingly depart, do not permit us even to undertake ſuch a taſk.

The expedition to Syria having taken place in the courſe of this campaign, it ſhould naturally find a place in this hiſtorical eſſay; but we cannot entirely detach it from anterior facts; and we muſt, before we reſume, from the accounts of both parties, the ſummary that we have announced, preſent a haſty view of the events which have preceded them.

It is at this time the more important to revert to the firſt expedition againſt Egypt, and to make known the motives for it, the circumſtances, and the firſt preparations; as the ſituation of Europe, at that epoch, will ſerve better to explain that in which ſhe is at preſent, and enable the reader to judge of the reſpective intereſts and means for continuing the war, as alſo of the poſſibility of laying anew the foundations of a juſt and laſting peace.

None of the preceding wars of Italy, wars always bloody, and always prolonged by the diverſity of the intereſts of the ſmall ſtates, were ſo quickly and ſo completely terminated as that conducted by *Buonaparte*; we ſhould in vain ſeek in hiſtory another inſtance of ſo great a conqueſt, undertaken with ſo much

much boldneſs, proſecuted with ſo much ardour and judgment, ſecured by the poſſeſſion of all the fortified places, completed by deciſive battles, and finally ſtrengthened by a peace advantageous to both parties, in the ſpace of ſixteen months.

The conſequences of this extraordinary event were likely to change, with the form of the ſtates of Italy, the face of the affairs of Europe; there can be no doubt that the conqueror who was ſo fortunate as to have attached his name to it had conceived various plans for conſolidating his work; but it appears that he was ſtopped in the very outſet of their execution. In their unſteady progreſs, the Directors of the French Republic, like all new authorities, ſtrengthened themſelves by war; the ſucceſſes of *Buonaparte* had elated them; they were accuſtomed to ſee all the luſtre of the triumphs of the armies irradiate the government; and they beheld, with regret, limits fixed to the career open to their ambition.

The preliminary articles of *Leoben*, received coldly by the diſtruſtful policy of a few members of the government, were welcomed by the French nation with juſt gratitude. From the bottom of the hearts of the people was ſeen emanating an unanimous ſentiment, which terror alone had been able to ſuppreſs; the hope, the want of beholding an end put, at once, to the war and the revolution.

If the force of circumſtances and the diſtreſſed ſituation of the French and Auſtrian armies had brought

brought about this tranſaction, the firſt overtures bore at leaſt an appearance of frankneſs and generoſity, which might be attended with the moſt happy conſequences for both nations; and an opinion may be formed on this ſubject from the official communications of *Buonaparte*, and of a prince whoſe character has never varied.

In the Introduction to this work we have had occaſion to obſerve, how theſe diſpoſitions were cooled on both ſides, by difficulties, which, prolonging the negotiation, rendered abortive the moſt ſolid of its advantages, its inevitable influence upon a general pacification.

It is pretty well known what events changed, much about the ſame time, the government and the interior ſtate of France, and what effect they muſt have produced on her exterior relations: of all theſe occurrences we wiſh here to recall to mind the influence alone which theſe ſame events and the vacillations of the government appear to have had on the ſituation, and at a ſubſequent period, on the reſolves and projects of *Buonaparte*.

It ſeems to us, in fact, that the ſort of dictatorſhip with which this general found himſelf inveſted at the epoch of the preliminaries of *Leoben* ceaſed ſhortly after, and became to him as irkſome as the alarms which it is aſſerted that it had occaſioned among the members of the French government; and yet the ſolidity of the peace, and the fate of the republics of Italy, depended on the duration of that concentrated

concentrated authority, without which ſo many new elements could not agree and ſubſide.

When the new Directory, after the concluſion of the treaty of *Campo Formio*, haſtened to ſend for *Buonaparte*, in order to derive ſupport from his preſence, and when they removed him from the grand buſineſs of the peace of the Empire, and from the government of Italy, to give ſome conſiſtency to the project of the conqueſt of England, all Europe muſt have believed that they dreaded his character and his talents, doubted his ſincere attachment to the new revolution, and wiſhed to deſtroy his influence.

It is a ſign of weakneſs, and one of the moſt ordinary ones in a new government, to wiſh to direct the execution of the ſmalleſt details, and much leſs thoſe of the operations of war, to concentrate the action of authority, and to ſubmit all its effects to individual influence; thus it is that in the eyes of men animated by an intereſt of party, almoſt always contrary to that of the ſtate, every thing that does not immediately concern it becomes ſuſpicious: they get angry when opinion, inſtead of giving them credit for what is executed in their name, on the contrary, ſeparates and diſtinguiſhes the cauſes, and applauds the effects. How often has the old Committee of Public Safety broke its inſtruments of triumph? How often have we heard repeated that terrible word—*Woe be to grateful nations!* and yet none of the generals of the armies of the republic

republic had gained that aſcendancy of which the members of the committees and of the directories ſhewed themſelves ſo jealous; none of them, after great conqueſts, obtained over the army, over the nation, over affairs in general, an influence equal to that which the peace concluded with the Houſe of Auſtria gave to General *Buonaparte*; we muſt not, therefore, be aſtoniſhed at the ſecret envy excited by the conqueror, the pacificator, the legiſlator of Italy; its effects cannot be queſtioned in the precipitation with which, under pretence of directing againſt England all the forces of the republic, the Directory diſorganiſed his army, diſtributed it on the coaſts of the two ſeas, and endeavoured to make a uſeleſs generaliſſimo of him for whom there was no longer any other glory to be acquired, than that of conſolidating the peace on the continent.

The deviations from the preliminaries of *Leoben*, and ſhortly after the evaſive interpretation, the non-execution even of an important article of the treaty of *Campo Formio*, muſt have cooled *Buonaparte*; he could not have approved the new baſis laid down by the Directory; if, however, that name can be given to the abuſe of the fruit of conqueſts, to that ambition fatal to the republic herſelf, had the conſtitution of the Empire been deſtroyed or modified according to their immoderate pretenſions.

Not only the ſtyle of the negotiations, but alſo the ſlowneſs of the forms, and the almoſt endleſs diſcuſſions to which this overbearing policy gave

riſe, counteracted the wiſh felt by *Buonaparte* to ſuperintend his work till the concluſion of a definitive treaty; he had finiſhed his part as a plenipotentiary; in his journey to Raſtadt, he had ſettled the important exchange, the double evacuation of Venice and Mentz, and, no doubt, after having ſurmounted the moſt conſiderable difficulties, a paper war, under the dictate of the Directory, accorded little with his way of thinking; and, on the other hand, the interior ſituation of France did not permit him to take a part in the management of affairs; he did not attempt to uſe his influence, and to give that impulſe which the nation, fatigued with ſo many troubles, had always in vain expected from thoſe whoſe courage, talents, and ſucceſs, ſeemed to have deſtined to fix the revolution, and whom fortune had ſucceſſively raiſed and precipitated from that dangerous poſt.

It was in theſe circumſtances that *Buonaparte* is ſaid to have propoſed to the Directory his expedition to Egypt, as a mean of ſtriking England blows more certain than thoſe with which they threatened her, in preparing a deſcent upon her coaſts. It is affirmed that before he left Italy, this general had meditated more than one project againſt the Eaſt, and that on approaching the ſhore of the Adriatic gulph, the ſight of ancient Macedonia and of Peloponneſus, by reminding him of other conqueſts, and of other models, had rekindled his thirſt of glory.

We cannot avoid recogniſing, in this project, however romantic in appearance, ſome great views which were often meditated by the old government. The object was not ſolely to ſucceed in deſtroying the territorial power of the Engliſh in India, and there to dry up the principal ſource of their riches; the poſſeſſion of Egypt might likewiſe counterpoiſe theſe advantages, give a new turn to commercial ſpeculations, and by that means even increaſe the ſtrength and the wealth of the maritime powers, rivals of Great Britain.

Had the only queſtion been to employ abroad the talents, the activity, and the warlike ſpirit of that flower of the armies of the republic, it might be ſaid, that no enterpriſe was more analogous to the national character, and could fix more the attention of the people, or affect the intereſt of more individuals, eſpecially in the departments of the ſouth of France. Incomplete ſucceſs, the mere poſſeſſion of the iſland of Malta, might give to the commerce of the Levant a new vigour, and gradually render it more difficult, perhaps, almoſt impoſſible, to be carried on by England. Complete ſucceſs might alſo give a ſhare of this advantage to the maritime powers of the Mediterranean allied to France, not even excepting the Grand Signior. Thoſe who will not fail to contradict this laſt aſſertion, have not, perhaps, examined it ſufficiently. The precipitation with which this affair was treated at Conſtantinople; the confidence

and

and the contempt of forces ſo important to the Turks; laſtly, the ſea-fight of *Aboukir*, which ſo feelingly recalled the remembrance of the diſaſter, and of the burning of the Turkiſh fleet at *Tcheſmé*, accelerated the reſolutions of the ſeraglio; and theſe very conſiderations have in general cauſed a too haſty judgment to be pronounced on this great political queſtion. We think, that, notwithſtanding this *eclat*, and preciſely on account of the importance of the armament, it was not impoſſible to keep the Ottoman Porte within the limits of its real intereſts, that of its fundamental policy, of its natural alliance; means might be found to compenſate it for the nominal poſſeſſion of Egypt; and experience, which can alone guide men who carry fatalism into the deliberations of affairs of ſtate, would ſoon have convinced the Ottomans of the immenſe reſources, of the ſupport which they would have derived from that brilliant colony lying between their poſſeſſions in Aſia, and the regencies of Africa. Nevertheleſs we ſhall here repeat with confidence what we have ſaid at the beginning of this work: the Directory, who, during the negotiations at Raſtadt, reſolved on, or conſented to the expedition to Egypt, committed a great fault; and every thing that has happened ſince that period, has ſerved only to ſtrengthen us in this opinion. We could not ſtrive to make the opinions we have formed beforehand on the wiſdom or improvidence of men in ſtate affairs coincide with events; ſel-

dom are they confirmed by fate; but however favourable or contrary may have been its ſtroke with reſpect to our conjectures, to juſtify them it is ſufficient that no other part was left to Fortune, than that which could not be ſnatched from her power.

Was it not an inſtance of blind temerity, to ſend to the bottom of the Gulf of Syria the beſt part of the armies, and the remainder of the Mediterranean fleet, at the moment when the Directory were fanning the flame of war againſt England; when they were giving to the Houſe of Auſtria ſubjects for diſcontent and inquietude, by the new revolutions of Italy and of Switzerland; when they were affecting to dictate to the empire a diſgraceful peace; when they were expoſing themſelves, in ſhort, to recommence the war with means ſo inferior?

On recollecting that the men who then governed France perſuaded themſelves that they had gained new ſtrength at home by the violation of the laws, and that they would acquire ſome abroad by affecting dominion; we are tempted to think that *Buonaparte* laid hold of perhaps the only means which he had left in ſuch circumſtances, of eſcaping from the dangers of his own fame; he thus diſengaged himſelf from the dependence of the parties which, ſince the revolution of the 18th Fructidor, were contending for power; he opened for himſelf a new career, in ſpite of thoſe, who, reſerving for him only a ſecondary part, an empty ſhew of

againſt Great Britain, took his place in the great tranſaction, the foundations of which he had juſt laid, and which, perhaps, no other hand than his could ſo well ſupport and conſolidate.

The preparations for this expedition were made with equal ſecrecy and diligence: the activity which was diſplayed on the coaſts of the ocean, in the diſpoſitions for a deſcent upon England, occupied every mind, fixed every eye; the conduct even of the Engliſh government, their precautions, their multiplied attentions, to put the coaſts in a ſtate of defence, ſerved to conceal the real object of the armament of the French in the Mediterranean. The Engliſh miniſtry ingeniouſly ſeizing this opportunity of rallying the great body of the nation by the intereſt of property, and the ſentiment of the defence of the country, ſhewed themſelves more uneaſy than they really were; it was no longer doubted in London, as well as in Paris, that the ſquadron and the convoy of troops, which were preparing at Toulon, were deſtined for the weſtern ocean; and when the details of the embarkation began to be known; when indications, ſuch as the aſſemblage of a great number of artiſts and men of ſcience attached to this expedition, ſufficiently manifeſted that its object was a great eſtabliſhment, and that it could be deſtined only for the caſtern ſhores of the Mediterranean, people perſiſted in conſidering theſe ſingular preparatory arrangements as falſe demonſtrations employed to conceal

conceal the object, which the government had revealed with a ſort of rage, namely, the relieving of the Spaniſh fleet blocked up in Cadiz, the aſſembling of all the naval forces of the two nations, in order to protect the conveyance and the debarkation of the army, in ſhort, the invaſion of England.

Our readers may have been aſtoniſhed ſeveral times in the courſe of the war of the revolution, at the ſecrecy with which the greateſt enterpriſes of the French have been prepared; for this ſecrecy neither accords with the levity with which, in the moſt ſerious affairs they have always been reproached, nor with democratical forms, public diſcuſſions, and the diviſion of authority. The abuſe of principles, and the exaltation of ſentiments, have produced this effect, the cauſe of which cannot be diſcovered, either in the very principles of the republican government, or in the given ſtate of things. The violence employed by the National Convention as a principal ſpring of government, fell in the firſt inſtance upon the members of its committees, and afterwards re-acted upon their agents; they all trembled at the ſight of one another; they ſcarcely held any communication among themſelves, and armed, as it were, with poiſoned weapons, they durſt not come in contact; ſecrecy was then guaranteed by terror; and, it is certain, that, in the ſtate of convulſion in which France has remained ſince that epoch, theſe impreſſions have

have been prolonged beyond the reign of *Robeſpierre*, the iron age of the French revolution: but fear alone has not produced this extraordinary diſcretion; it muſt be acknowledged, that never was the individual intereſt of the leaders of a government ſo ſtrongly connected with the ſucceſs of the cauſe, and ſuch is the meaſure of the zeal with which they are themſelves ſerved. There is neither coldneſs nor negligence in their agents, when they participate in ſo great riſks; always imminent dangers and vaſt hopes; accordingly the changes, even the fall and the alternate triumphs of parties, have ſerved only to ſtrengthen this faithful obſervance of ſecrecy. What a crowd of uſeful reflections preſent themſelves, when we dwell an inſtant upon the ſmalleſt circumſtance of the hiſtory of our age; and how eaſy is it in this too extenſive career to forget the limits which we have ourſelves laid down!

Let us endeavour to paſs more rapidly over theſe details, to which are attached ſo many intereſts, ſo many connexions with the ſubſequent eras, with the events, the recital of which, and the obſervations reſulting from them, have been more particularly the object of this work.

While the preparations were haſtened as well in France as in Italy, *Buonaparte* was living at Paris in a ſort of obſcurity, and occupying himſelf very much with theſe details; he ſeemed to have entirely withdrawn from public affairs, to devote

his whole attention to the culture of the ſciences: the more he fixed the general attention, the more the inſtability of his proceedings, and the uncertainty which prevailed concerning his real deſtination, ſerved to conceal it from conjectures. He contrived to wear this maſk till the moment of his departure, and by various means kept up the vacillation of opinion, as well at home as abroad. Thus was the real project revealed by the French government, without either fear or riſk, that the ſuſpicions of the Engliſh miniſtry would light on it in preference to any other. After having repeatedly ſpread and contradicted the reports of *Buonaparte*'s return to Raſtadt for the acceleration and concluſion of the negotiations, there appeared in the official journals, about the beginning of April 1798, the *arrêté* of the Directory ordering him to repair to Breſt, to take the command of the land and ſea-forces, of which he had made a prior inſpection. Shortly after it was announced, through the ſame channel, that he was certainly going to ſet off for Raſtadt; *Buonaparte* himſelf wrote to Count *Cobenzel*, to requeſt him to repair to Raſtadt, in order to act in concert with him in removing the difficulties with reſpect to the peace. The courier ſet out on his return from Vienna on the 10th of May, with the anſwer of the Imperial miniſter, who was to go to Raſtadt on the 12th, and *Buonaparte* arrived at that very time at *Toulon*. It has always been thought at Vienna, that he really had

an intention of repairing to Raſtadt, and that he did not determine on ſetting off and purſuing his plan till the laſt moment, and from conſiderations relative to the interior ſtate of the republic, and to the coalition of the majority of the members of the Directory with the Jacobins of the oppoſition.

The Toulon fleet, when aſſembled, was compoſed of fifteen ſhips of the line, ſix frigates, eight ſhips armed *en flute*, with a few corvettes; and the convoy conſiſted of about three hundred and fifty ſail of tranſports. Twenty-five thouſand troops of different deſcriptions, and in every reſpect well appointed, were embarked with great precipitation; the impatience of the ſoldiers and ſailors was extreme, and the generals could ſcarcely ſuppreſs the diſcontent and the murmurs of the troops, when the preſence of *Buonaparte* re-eſtabliſhed their confidence, and revived their ſpirits.

This was a very remarkable epoch, when France, ſcarcely drawing breath, and indulging the hope of peace, having to repair ſo many ſacrifices, and the wealth ſquandered in ſeven campaigns, ſaw exported from her ſhores, the moſt precious reſources that could poſſibly be collected in the ſouthern departments and in Italy, as well in men, as in money and ſtores of every ſort.

General *Berthier*, during his ſtay at Rome, had made the firſt arrangements for the embarkation of a diviſion at *Civita Vecchia*, and in ſome other ports. General *Déſaix* went to Italy to take the

command of it, and was to ſet ſail from *Civita Vecchia*. At the ſame time, another part of the convoy, the armament and embarkation of which were directed by General *Murat*, and which was under the immediate command of General *Baraguey d'Hilliers*, ſailed from Genoa: the junction of the whole was to be effected at ſea.

There was a great deal of concert, unanimity, and preciſion, between the different points; a reſult which is ſo difficultly obtained in operations of this nature. Every thing was ready about the 15th of May.

The moment in which General *Buonaparte* went with Admiral *Brueys* on board of the *Orient* of 110 guns, and there hoiſted the colours (the 14th of May 1798), was alſo that of the laſt glimpſes of peace; not but that it was ſtill time to prevent a rupture, and to profit even by the diſpoſition of the court of Vienna to make ſatisfaction to the republic for the diſturbance committed by the people of that capital at the hotel of the ambaſſador *Bernadotte*; but England, already impolitically inſulated and excluded from the congreſs at Raſtadt, threatened with the loſs of Ireland, which being almoſt entirely in a ſtate of inſurrection, was ready to receive the French, had made, with ſucceſs, the greateſt efforts to form by the intermediation of Ruſſia a new coalition. The negotiation of Count *Cobenzel*, which, if carried on with *Buonaparte* might, by the explanation and ſanction of the moſt

important articles of the treaty of *Campo Formio*, have led to ſatisfactory conſequences, was, in ſo far as regarded the ex-director *François de Neufchateau*, only the maſk of the offenſive and defenſive alliance between the two Emperors.

However favourable to the new plan of England might be the opinion and the private ſentiments of the Emperor of Ruſſia, yet his political ſituation with reſpect to the Ottoman empire muſt have inſpired him with no ſmall degree of ſecurity, for him to venture to ſtrip his ſouthern frontiers, and to march towards the Eaſt, to the extremities of Europe, the beſt part of that army, become for the laſt thirty years ſo formidable to the Turks. It was firſt neceſſary to ſucceed in re-eſtabliſhing peace between Ruſſia and Perſia, becauſe that war could not but lead to hoſtilities with the ſubjects of the Grand Signior. Peace was concluded about this period at *Teflis*, the capital of Perſic Georgia; the conditions of the treaty, the principal one of which was the reſtitution of the conqueſts made by the Ruſſian armies, to the weſt of the Caſpian ſea, prove that the Emperor wiſhed, at the price of theſe ſacrifices, to diſpoſe quickly of his armies, in order to aſſiſt the new coalition. The Turks were as yet ſo far from being free from alarm, and inclined to the ſtrange alliance which exiſts at this day, that the corps of 20,000 Ruſſians which was left upon the banks of the *Kur*, on the limit that ſeparates the empires of Perſia and Ruſſia, gave offence to

the Ottoman Porte, which ordered a corps of nearly equal force to be aſſembled on the frontiers of Armenia.

On the other hand, the rebellion of *Paſſawan Oglou* produced great inquietude at Conſtantinople, on account of the ſupport that he might receive from the old enemies of the Ottoman empire. The deep impreſſion of the victories of *Catherine II.* and of her projects of conqueſt, and of the partition of Turkey in Europe, was by no means effaced; and to prove the change of ſyſtem of the cabinet of Peterſburg in this reſpect, it required nothing leſs than the offer, no doubt very unexpected by the Turks, of employing the conqueror of *Iſmael* to ſubdue the rebel Paſha of *Widin*.

The old French government had long neglected its connexions with the Porte; it had long departed from the real baſis of the alliance, and, ſince the new political era of the treaty of 1756, had itſelf contributed to weaken that balance to the power of the Houſe of Auſtria, and to the increaſe of Ruſſia. The incoherence, the uncertainty, and the confuſion, in which the firſt revolution neceſſarily involved the exterior relations of France, the difference of opinion of miniſters, the intrigues of parties, were more felt at Conſtantinople than in any other court of Europe, owing to the diſtance, and ſtill more to the religious reſpect for ancient cuſtoms, and the apathic ſluggiſhneſs of the Turks, who

who cannot comprehend that human inſtitutions are periſhable like their authors.

Inſtead of applying themſelves to found anew, and to cultivate an alliance ſo neceſſary to the republic, ſince ſhe was engaged in a conteſt with the natural enemies of the Porte, the French government, too much occupied by the war, and by ſucceſſive commotions, conſidered it of very little importance; they did not ſecond the miniſters and agents, who felt the neceſſity of reſpecting thoſe forms and cuſtoms held ſacred; they ſent ſome who neglected them; and when, a few months previous to the expedition to Egypt, they wiſhed to renew the ancient connexions, it was too late to recover confidence; there was not time enough left to be in a ſituation to treat reſpecting a very delicate affair, but which it would not have been impoſſible to arrange, if the former conduct of the French government had cultivated the means of ſo doing; it would have been requiſite to be aſſured of the favourable diſpoſitions of the Divan, and to have paved the way to them long before; for the neceſſity of keeping ſecret the object of the expedition, allowed not of entering into an open negotiation for the poſſeſſion of Egypt.

The Toulon armament, which, if it was not directed againſt England or Ireland, evidently threatened the poſſeſſions of the Grand Signior, gave the Engliſh miniſter at Conſtantinople uſeful pretexts for inſpiring miſtruſt, and ſapping the foundations

ations of one of the alliances moſt profitable to France, and which for a long time excited the envy of England.

Yet, even after the departure of *Buonaparte*, which took place on the 19th of May, the laſt doubts reſpecting the real object of the expedition were not diſpelled. The fleet ſtood to the eaſtward, and was ſucceſsfully joined by thirty-ſix veſſels, having on board 4000 men from *Baſtia*, and the two grand diviſions of the coaſts of Italy: that of *Genoa*, of one hundred and fifty ſail of tranſports, joined the body of the convoy between the 26th and 28th of May, abreaſt of the iſland of *St. Magdalen*; on the 31ſt of May the fleet put into the bay of *Cagliari*, and on the 4th of June anchored off the coaſt of Sicily, in ſight of *Marſala*. It was in theſe ſeas that *Buonaparte* had fixed the rendezvous of the diviſion from *Civita Vecchia*, under the command of General *Déſaix*, convoyed only by a few frigates. The ſquadron and the whole of the convoy were collected together on the 9th of June, under the iſland of *Goza*; and, on the 10th, this formidable armament appeared off *Malta*.

The requeſt made by *Buonaparte*, and the refuſal of the Grand Maſter to admit the French ſquadron into the harbour of Malta, and to allow the veſſels of the convoy to water at the different anchorages of the iſland, were not empty formalities. To ſecure the moſt important point between Europe and

and Aſia, the entrance of the ſeas of the Levant, and the excluſive navigation of the Mediterranean, of which the Engliſh were on the point of making themſelves completely maſters; to deprive that nation of a port of retreat, which, at this middle diſtance, was equally convenient as an emporium for their commercial ſpeculations, and formidable as a point of ſupport for aſſiſting the Italians, and revictualling their cruiſers; in ſhort, to ſecure this communication, which was indiſpenſable for the execution of his ſubſequent projects; ſuch were the views of *Buonaparte*, and the motives of this unexpected attack.

The debarkation was executed, with the greateſt diſpatch, upon different points at once, and principally at the head of Port *St. Paul*, and at the anchorage of *Marſa Sirocco*, under the orders of General *Déſaix*; Generals *Lannes* and *Marmont* cloſed on the place to the very foot of the glacis.

So much ardour and boldneſs awed the ſurpriſed Malteſe; but even after having neglected to oppoſe the debarkation, this place, one of the ſtrongeſt in Europe, and the works of which are kept in ſuch good order, might have ſtood a ſiege as memorable as that which, in 1565, eternalized the memory of *Jean de la Valette*. It would have been paying a fine homage to his memory, to defend the fortreſs which, after having driven away the Turks, he himſelf conſtructed, and the defences of which have been

been ſince perfectionated by the moſt ſkilful engineers.

But the ſecret underſtanding between the French and a party of their countrymen among the knights, the neglect of the preparations of defence, the weakneſs of the Grand Maſter and of his Council; and, laſtly, the tumultuous movements of the inhabitants who had taken ſhelter in the fortreſs, cauſed there an extreme confuſion; no doubt the diviſions of nations, parties, and intereſts, which were fomented by the form of government and the adminiſtration of the order, broke out, and paralized every bold reſolution.

After twenty-four hours of a reſiſtance, which the importance of the conqueſt ſcarcely permits us to mention, the ſurrender of the place and of all the forts, together with all the navy, (two ſhips of the line, one frigate and four gallies), that of all the artillery, magazines, treaſures, and other property belonging to the Order, was agreed on, and ſigned on board the *Orient*, on the 13th of June at midnight.

Thus paſſed at once under the dominion of France, this famous iſland, which, under the Romans, was not of leſs importance than in our days. In the middle age it was conquered from the Saracens by a Frenchman named Count *Roger le Normand*: it is well known that it afterwards became a fief of the kingdom of Sicily, and that it was poſſeſſed by the King of France *Lewis XII.* at the time of

of the conqueſt of Naples; the knights of St. John of Jeruſalem, being driven from *Rhodes* in 1522, received it as a fief from the Emperor *Charles V.*; they did homage for it to the King of Sicily: and ſuch is the baſis of the vain reclamation of the Court of Naples, after *Buonaparte* had, by a ſingle blow, deſtroyed the territorial and political exiſtence of this celebrated order.

Fortunate in not having been delayed by a reſiſtance which would have given the Engliſh time to meet the French fleet and the convoy in a very unfavourable poſition, and to make his enterpriſe miſcarry, *Buonaparte*, after being reinforced and revictualled, loſt not a moment: he left at *Malta* a ſtrong garriſon under the command of General *Vaubois*, and quickly reimbarked his troops.

Admiral *Brueys* ſtood to the eaſtward, keeping under his lee this immenſe convoy conſiſting of upwards of four hundred ſail, and left the canal of Malta; greatly aſtoniſhed, no doubt, that the five and twenty days elapſed ſince his departure from Toulon had not been ſufficient for the Engliſh to diſcover, and intercept his route.

Admiral Lord *St. Vincent*, who was blocking up the harbour of Cadiz with about twenty-five ſail of the line, thought that the French had no other plan than to compel him to leave the coaſt in order that they might execute their junction with the Spaniards. He had the motions of the French fleet watched when too late, and being perſuaded

that it would first endeavour to reach *Mahon*, he contented himself with detaching Admiral *Nelson* on the 9th of May with three line of battle ships and a few frigates to reconnoitre the road of Toulon. This Admiral was almost in sight of the coast as early as the 17th of May, at the moment that the French fleet was preparing to get under sail, when he was blown off it by a gale of wind which forced him to put into the harbour of the isle of *St. Peter* near Sardinia, the commandant of which at first refused to admit him. *Nelson* could not again put to sea till the 26th; he continued to cruise in these seas, waiting for the eleven ships of the line which were to form his squadron, and which did not join him till the 10th; and it was not till the 11th of June that he appeared with sixteen ships of war in sight of the harbour of Toulon.

The French fleet had sailed thence three and twenty days before: the very judicious arrangement of the junction of the different convoys off the coast of Sicily; the winds which had favoured it; in short, the delays of the English, now convinced, that, to get certain information, it would be sufficient for them to intercept all vessels steering to the south and south-west, entirely concealed from them the course and the first operations of *Buonaparte*.

Nelson, perceiving his error, made sail for the sea of Tuscany, and after having, through the medium of Sir *William Hamilton*, the English envoy, ascertained that in case of necessity he would find in the ports of

of Sicily all the aſſiſtance that he might want, he continued his courſe towards the Strait, and anchored at *Meſſina*, where he learnt, on the 19th of June, that the French were maſters of the iſland of *Malta*; this was ſeven days after the ſignature of the capitulation, and conſequently the two fleets were at the ſame time, the Engliſh to the northward, and the French to the ſouthward of Sicily, as they had been a fortnight before, ſeparated and working round the iſland of *Sardinia*, without falling in with each other. It is in theſe circumſtances of a maritime war, that chance almoſt alone decides the ſucceſs, and that the caprices of the winds and of fortune can alike favour boldneſs and confound foreſight.

Of this, the ſequel of the courſe of the navigation of the two fleets furniſhes a ſtill more ſingular and more ſtriking example. Admiral *Nelſon* ſtopped only three days at *Meſſina*, and made ſail from Cape *Paſſaro* for Egypt on the 21ſt of June. Theſe three days were the only ſtart that Admiral *Brueys* had been able to gain on him, not having entirely quitted *Malta* till the 19th, at the moment when the Engliſh ſquadron arrived at *Meſſina*. The French fleet was embarraſſed and delayed by an immenſe convoy, and the Engliſh fleet, on the contrary, carrying a preſs of ſail, and always ſtanding on their courſe; the latter ought, upon the ſame paſſage and with the ſame winds, to gain on the former at leaſt a third in point of ſpeed: in fact, it

paſſed it without falling in with it, and arrived on the 28th of June, the eighth day of its departure from Sicily, in ſight of *Alexandria*.

The officers that Admiral *Nelſon* ſent on ſhore having reported to him that there were no tidings of the French, that no veſſel had appeared, and no preparations had announced a project of a deſcent upon Egypt, the Admiral contented himſelf with ſpreading the alarm on the coaſt. By the preſence of his ſquadron he inſpired the inhabitants of Alexandria with ſufficient confidence to induce them to defend themſelves; he diſpatched to that city a packet for India, and again ſet ſail to go and meet the French.

Admiral *Brueys*, having been only four days in croſſing the Mediterranean, made the iſland of *Candia* on the 25th of July; he took care to ſtop all the merchant-veſſels that he fell in with, and forced them to follow him, that the Engliſh might not receive any intelligence from ſea, ſo as to calculate and intercept his route. On approaching the coaſt of Egypt he ſteered a little to the northward, for the purpoſe of placing himſelf between the land and the convoy. *Nelſon*, on the contrary, having kept his wind, in order to ſtand along the coaſt to the weſtward, did not meet with the French fleet, but made the *Towers of the Arabs*, and on the firſt of July appeared off *Alexandria*.

Buonaparte being informed by the French Conſul that the Engliſh fleet had made its appearance two days

days before, ordered the debarkation to be commenced that very evening.

Nelſon, after a fruitleſs cruiſe, finding himſelf on the 9th of July off *Candia*, and being already in want of wood and water, made ſail for Sicily, where, in conformity to the promiſes and orders given by the court of Naples, he was received; he revictualled his ſquadron with the greateſt expedition in the road of *Syracuſe*, at *Auguſta*, and ſome other anchorages on the coaſt as far as *Girgenti* (Agrigentum); he arrived in Sicily on the 19th, and left it on the 24th of July, five days after.

Buonaparte, who had reaſon to think that the Engliſh ſquadron was cruiſing in ſuch a ſtation as to watch any veſſels that might make *Alexandria*, gave orders for the debarkation, notwithſtanding the freſh breeze and heavy ſwell, which breaking on the reefs that ſkirt the coaſt, rendered this operation equally difficult and dangerous. General *Ménou* landed firſt with his diviſion a league and a half from Alexandria at the anchorage of *Marabou*, without meeting with any oppoſition; the diviſions of Generals *Kléber*, *Bon*, and *Regnier*, joined him; but it was impoſſible to land either artillery or horſes. However, *Buonaparte*, having already from five to ſix thouſand men on ſhore, left General *Regnier* the charge of continuing the debarkation, and determined to penetrate into Alexandria: he marched thither in three columns; that of General *Ménou* followed the beach, and directed its route towards the

the weſt ſide of the encloſure of the city of the Arabs which covers New Alexandria; General *Kléber*, on the ſide of the column called Pompey's Pillar, whither *Buonaparte* went firſt to reconnoitre this ancient encloſure flanked with towers, the breaches of which had been repaired, and which an armed people, uttering loud ſhouts, were preparing to defend. The third column, under the command of General *Bon*, proceeded to the eaſt ſide againſt the gate of *Roſetta*.

Buonaparte having reconnoitred this encloſure, which would not have reſiſted the ſmalleſt diſcharge of artillery, formed his columns within half muſket-ſhot, and ſtormed the place in ſpite of the fire of the beſieged, and the ſhower of ſtones which they hurled on the aſſailants. General *Ménou* having reached the top of the wall with the foremoſt of his troops, was dangerouſly wounded and thrown down: General *Kléber*, pointing out at the foot of the wall a breach more practicable, was likewiſe wounded. The encloſure was ſcaled; the Arabs and Turks, diſlodged from the towers and warmly purſued, took refuge in the triangular fort, in the light-houſe, and in the new town; they there ſtill defended themſelves obſtinately, when the principal inhabitants came to meet the French general. The two caſtles capitulated, and before the cloſe of the day, *Buonaparte* was entirely maſter of the city, the forts, and the two harbours. The convoy entered the old harbour of Alexandria; and the ſquadron got under way, and

and anchored in the road of *Aboukir*, in order to complete the debarkation of the artillery.

Being now in poſſeſſion of the principal entrance of Egypt and of the moſt important harbour, *Buonaparte* loſt not a moment in marching towards *Cairo*, aſcending the Nile, occupying all the poſts on the coaſt, profiting by the firſt impreſſion, and attacking the Mamalûks, before the Beys ſhould be able to concert a general plan of defence; he committed not the fault which coſt *St. Lewis* ſo dear, when, in conſequence of having waited too long at *Damietta* for the arrival of the Count *de Poitiers*, he ſuffered the ſeaſon favourable for operations to elapſe.

Buonaparte ſigned the capitulation of *Alexandria* on the 5th of July; and the very next day his advanced guard, commanded by General *Déſaix*, arrived at *Damanhour*, after having croſſed fourteen leagues of deſert.

The ſame day the other diviſions ſet out on their march from *Alexandria* and *Roſetta*; and on the 10th they joined each other on the banks of the Nile at *Rahmanie*; here took place the firſt engagement with the Mamalûks, who, to the number of ſeven or eight hundred, attacked General *Déſaix*, and were repulſed and diſperſed.

This was the advanced guard of an army which *Murad* Bey had aſſembled, and the greater part of which conſiſted of cavalry, and particularly of the brilliant corps of the Mamalûks. He had taken a

poſition at the village of *Chebreiſſe*; his right, which extended to the Nile, was ſupported by eight or ten large gun-boats, and ſeveral batteries erected on the bank of the river.

On the 13th of July the two armies were in preſence of each other; *Buonaparte*, who had only two hundred cavalry, ſtill weak, and oppreſſed by the fatigue of the ſea, drew up his five diviſions in order of battle by *échellons*, flanking themſelves between each other and the line of battle, which was itſelf flanked by two villages. Each diviſion was concentrated into a compact body, and formed a ſquare, having its baggage in the centre, and the artillery in the intervals of the battalions. This formidable diſpoſition preſented a double fire in flank and in front, and oppoſed an invincible obſtacle to the impetuous, but unconnected, charges of *Murad* Bey's cavalry.

Here we may remark the immenſe advantage of the improvement of the tactics of the Europeans. In adopting artillery and modern arms, the Orientals have not adopted the tactics or the regulation introduced by the uſe of theſe new implements of war; they have ſcarcely made any change in their manner of marching and fighting, and notwithſtanding their valour, and the furious impetuoſity of their attacks, they can ſtand againſt regular troops only by the great ſuperiority of numbers.

On this occaſion, even their ſuperiority was uſeleſs to them. The Turkiſh flotilla was firſt attacked by

by the naval *Chef de diviſion Perrée*, who had only three gun-boats, a half-galley, and a zebec, on board of which were two of the men of ſcience, *Monge* and *Bertholet*. The three gun-boats and the half-galley were firſt taken by the Mamalûks, but the French commodore ſucceeded in retaking them, after an obſtinate engagement, and ſet their Admiral's gun-boat on fire; the General of Artillery *Andréoſſy* commanded the troops on board theſe French veſſels.

Murad Bey, in outflanking the wings of the French army by his numerous cavalry, not having been able to find a weak point where he could penetrate between the battalions, which were like ſo many walls of fire, made his retreat towards Cairo. *Buonaparte* continued his march by *Alkam*, *Abonnécube* and *Waardam*, and on the 20th of July was at *Oumedar*, in ſight of the Pyramids, and within ſix leagues of the capital of Egypt.

Murad, having aſſembled the Beys of Egypt with all their forces, had intrenched himſelf at the village of *Embabé*, which he had furniſhed with artillery; 6000 cavalry, both Arabs and Mamalûks, were ſpread over the plain.

The French army, which in its laſt marches had endured exceſſive fatigue, halted at *Waardam*, in order to recruit its ſtrength, remount the artillery, and clean the muſkets ſo quickly ruſted by the vapours of the Nile. It was on the 21ſt of July that was fought that ſecond battle, called the Battle

of the Pyramids; General *Déſaix* with his advanced guard at firſt made a corps of Mamalûks fall back; the order of battle of the other diviſions was nearly the ſame as in the preceding affair; *Déſaix*'s advanced guard and *Regnier*'s diviſion formed the right wing of the army, and were at firſt charged with the greateſt impetuoſity by one half of the Mamalûk cavalry; the other half having remained to ſupport the intrenchments of the village of *Embabé*.

Notwithſtanding this determination to anticipate the attacks of the French columns, the raſh valour of the Mamalûks again failed againſt thoſe compact bodies briſtling with bayonets, and keeping up within half muſket-ſhot a moſt galling fire.

While theſe charges were taking place againſt his right, and the Mamalûks were retreating in diſorder, *Buonaparte* directing againſt the intrenchments the two diviſions of his centre, ordered the village of *Embabé* to be turned by means of a ditch which maſked this movement, and thus cut to pieces, or rather drove into the Nile, 1500 of the enemy's cavalry. This attack, which was extremely warm, was conducted by General *Marmont:* forty pieces of cannon, the camp of the Mamalûks, their rich ſpoils, together with upwards of four hundred camels, fell into the hands of the conquerors.

The remainder of the forces which *Murad* Bey had collected on the left bank of the Nile fled towards Upper Egypt.

This

This retreat was always the resource of the Mamalûks, when, pressed by the Turks, and compelled to yield to numbers, they went to recruit their forces in Upper Egypt; they there dispersed in such a manner that not a single corps of troops remained together; but their rallying was not less expeditious: the conquerors satisfied and relying on the terror of their arms, neglecting to pursue them, and not knowing how to check them by any defensive disposition, having no idea of military vigilance, or political foresight, they were soon surprised, attacked in their turn, and driven out of Lower Egypt.

General *Désaix*, the very day of the battle, pursued *Murad* Bey as far as *Gizah*, beyond the heights of Cairo, at the entrance of the great valley of the Nile; his division had been incessantly marching and fighting during this whole day; it had performed a march of near eighteen hours, a prodigious effort for European troops in such a climate.

General *Désaix*, who a short time after was charged to pursue *Murad* Bey in Upper Egypt, displayed in this difficult and singular war, so much vigour and ability in anticipating or disconcerting the movements of the Mamalûks, that he exhausted them by degrees, and cut to pieces their parties even in their last retreats, at the entrance of the deserts of Nubia.

Ibrahim Bey with the Mamalûks that were on the right bank hastily retreated towards the desert of Syria.

The next day, the 22d of July, the city of Cairo opened its gates to the French; the government of the Mamalûks was overthrown, and the conqueſt of Lower Egypt completed.

Although, relatively to the affairs of Europe, this part of our hiſtorical eſſay is only a grand epiſode, it however ſo abounds with memorable facts, and notwithſtanding the interruption of the communications of *Buonaparte*'s army with France, ſuch has been the influence of the events of the war of Egypt on the general war of the revolution, that we ſhould be ſorry to withhold from our readers the notions which we think uſeful in order to follow them and appreciate them juſtly. We are, doubtleſs, to ſuppoſe that every one is acquainted with the deſcriptions of the moſt eſteemed travellers, and particularly thoſe of *Volney*, whoſe exactneſs and juſt diſcrimination have undergone the moſt ſevere and the moſt uncommon teſt, ſince they have been juſtified by the approbation of all the officers of the army, and the men of ſcience who accompanied *Buonaparte*; yet as it is agreeable to find annexed to facts ſuch hiſtorical and geographical details as relate to them, we have endeavoured to ſupply the deficiency of the geographical deſcription of Egypt and of Syria by a map conſtructed from the very valuable work of *D'Anville*, which the later maps by *Mentelle* and *Chanlair* have ſerved us to correct; and we have taken care to compare them with the differ-

ent

ent accounts, and the geographical details given by the moſt admired travellers.

We have collected the plans of the principal places the moſt frequently mentioned in the accounts which we recapitulate, and we have been particularly attentive to lay down on this map, and on theſe plans, no bearings or names but what are confirmed by ſeveral authorities.

With reſpect to the recollection of events recorded in hiſtory, which we are far from wiſhing to ſuppreſs, but for which, however, we ſhould wiſh to avoid interrupting too frequently the thread of a ſuccinct and rapid narrative, we hope we have ſatisfied the wiſhes of our readers by collecting in a ſingle note every thing that has appeared to us worthy of being ſuggeſted to thoſe, who, having already conſulted the firſt ſources of information, have acquired an extenſive knowledge of this part of hiſtory and political geography, or of being pointed out to thoſe who may be inclined towards that ſtudy.

Buonaparte had neglected nothing to make the moſt of the political motive of the invaſion of Egypt; he flattered himſelf that by ſeparating the oppreſſive government of the Beys which he had juſt deſtroyed, from the ſhadow of ſovereignty and power which the Grand Signior had remaining, this expedition would be conſidered at Conſtantinople as a great effort of an old and powerful ally, to ſerve the cauſe, to re-eſtabliſh the Ottoman dominion

nion upon the banks of the Nile, and under the protection of the French arms, to form, for the benefit of both nations, eſtabliſhments which would be a ſource of proſperity to all the ſouthern powers of Europe, and could be prejudicial to England alone.

We admit that in the ſituation in which the affairs of the republic ſtood with the Porte, this hope was ill-founded; but, very far from thinking it an illuſion, a vain pretext, we doubt not, on the contrary, that had it then been, or were it even yet as eaſy to enlighten the Turks reſpecting their real intereſts, as to excite their jealouſy and rouſe their fanaticiſm, the return to their former cloſe alliance with France, their co-operation in every thing that could favour and extend her commerce, would prevail, as a permanent and fundamental advantage, over every other conſideration.

On entering the ſea of Libya, *Buonaparte* had diſcloſed to his troops the myſtery of the expedition. "Soldiers," ſaid he to them, "you are going to "undertake a conqueſt, the effects of which on civi- "lization and the commerce of the world are inap- "preciable."

This conqueſt was to have been made only againſt the Mamalûks; and both in his proclamations to the army, and in that addreſſed to the people of Egypt, the Turks were deſignated as the friends and allies of the French; while the poſſeſſions of the Grand Signior, and every thing that concerned religion and civi-

civil cuſtoms, were recommended to the attention and vigilance of the officers and ſoldiers.

Previous to the debarkation of the army, *Buonaparte* wrote to the Pacha of Egypt, that he was coming to *chaſtiſe* the Beys, "whoſe inſults the "Porte had declared that it would not tolerate." In that letter is to be found this remarkable paſſage: "Thou who ſhouldſt be the maſter of the Beys, "and whom, nevertheleſs, they keep at Cairo with-"out authority and without power, thou muſt ſee my "arrival with pleaſure." At the time of the taking of Alexandria, the captain of a caravel or Turkiſh ſhip of war, which happened to be in the harbour, received ſome preſents from the French general; and ſhortly after, when he was ordered to quit Egypt, *Buonaparte* ſent with him an officer, whom he charged with his diſpatches, and with freſh aſſurances of good underſtanding, the public marks of which he took care to multiply: the Turkiſh colours were flying by the ſide of the tri-coloured flag in all the poſts occupied by the French.

However, this politic conduct could not have at Conſtantinople an effect ſufficiently prompt and immediate to balance the preſſing proceedings of the Engliſh and Ruſſian envoys, who now had ſome grievances to enlarge on, ſome injuries to magnify; accordingly, notwithſtanding the releaſe of a great number of Turkiſh ſlaves that *Buonaparte* ſent to Conſtantinople, the news of the capture of Malta, of the deſtruction of the Order,

and

and of its navy (an advantage which, in other circumſtances, the Porte would have acknowledged with joy, and perhaps have rewarded by great ſacrifices), produced no other effect than to ſpread alarm reſpecting the final deſtination of this formidable armament. Theſe alarms, blending with thoſe created more juſtly, by the check which *Alo-Pacha* had received before *Widin*, there was a ſort of commotion in the capital; the government, threatened by a double danger, thought that Conſtantinople might be at once attacked by land and ſea; they ſtifled, by acts of vigour, the germs of an inſurrection, which it was aſſerted had been planned by the partiſans of *Paſſwan Oglou*, whoſe rebellion the envoys failed not to repreſent as combined with the expedition to Egypt.

Againſt ſuch preſumptions of what avail could be the conferences and official proceedings of the *Chargé d'Affaires Ruffin*, whoſe perſon and family had long been held in high eſteem by the Divan; but who had neither the inſtructions, nor the means neceſſary for averting ſuch a ſtorm?

The Engliſh envoy, Mr. *Spencer Smith* (brother of Commodore Sir *Sidney Smith*, who had juſt miraculouſly eſcaped from his confinement in the tower of the Temple at Paris, and whom the Engliſh miniſtry already deſtined for the important ſtation of the Archipelago of the Levant), took advantage of the increaſing uneaſineſs of the Turkiſh government. He negotiated with the *Reis Effendi*, a treaty

of alliance between the Porte, England, and Ruſſia, the baſes of which could not but be very difficult to ſettle, when the news of the debarkation of the French troops, and of the capture of Alexandria, reached Conſtantinople. *M. de Tamara*, the Ruſſian ambaſſador, had already obtained an extenſion of the ancient treaties, for the free paſſage from the Black Sea into the Archipelago; and concluded a particular convention, in conſequence of which, a Ruſſian ſquadron and convoy paſſed, two by two, through the canal, and did not join each other till they reached the Strait of the Dardanelles. The ſuccours offered by the Engliſh government, as well in officers, as in ſhipping and warlike ſtores, were not yet accepted. At length, the important victory gained at *Aboukir* by Admiral *Nelſon* fixed the waverings of the Divan, effaced the remaining ſigns of diſtruſt between the contracting parties, and, with the declaration of war of the Porte againſt the French republic, produced the impriſonment of the French agents, and the violation of perſons and property, which, among theſe ſtill half-barbarous people, make a part of what they call the laws of war.

Admiral *Brueys*, after he had covered the debarkation of the army, having ordered the channel of the old harbour of Alexandria to be ſounded, found that there was not a ſufficient depth of water to admit the ſeventy-four gun ſhips: ſome officers propoſed to lighten them by taking out their guns,

in order to get them into this harbour, which was very ſafe, and very eaſy to defend. Admiral *Brueys*, ignorant of the courſe that the Engliſh ſquadron had ſteered after its ſhort and ſudden appearance, and expecting, every moment, to ſee it again return, was unwilling to attempt ſo ſlow an operation, the ſucceſs of which was, beſides, not inconteſtable; he contented himſelf with ordering the convoy, and the ſhips of war, whoſe inferior burden ſecured to them an eaſy entrance, to anchor in the old harbour of *Alexandria*; and, on the 5th of July, he went, with thirteen ſhips of the line, three frigates, and an advice-boat, and anchored in the road of *Aboukir*.

Our readers may have been aſtoniſhed that *Brueys*, who, after having ſo ſucceſsfully accompliſhed his miſſion, could not doubt but Lord *St. Vincent*, when undeceived, would ſend againſt him a ſquadron at leaſt equal, and probably ſuperior, ſhould not have quitted an open roadſtead, where he was, at all events, expoſed to fight a uſeleſs battle; while, by getting clear of the coaſt of Egypt, he might gain *Corfu* or *Malta*, and perhaps collect freſh reinforcements, before Admiral *Nelſon* had received all thoſe which were deſtined for him.

On the 1ſt of Auguſt, the ſignal for the Engliſh fleet was made, for the ſecond time, upon the coaſt of Egypt; and about three o'clock in the afternoon it appeared off the bay of *Aboukir*. The thirteen French line of battle ſhips were moored in a line,

at two-thirds of a cable's length from each other; they had approached as near the ſhore as the ſand-banks would permit; the French had there erected ſome batteries, inſufficient, however, and too far diſtant, for effectually flanking the line which the ſquadron had formed. Admiral *Brueys* being certain of having left between the van of his line and the land, no more than the interval neceſſary for getting under ſail, thought himſelf in the greateſt ſecurity: mention has been made of a letter which he wrote to *Buonaparte*, in reply to the fears expreſſed by the French general reſpecting the poſition of his fleet, and in which he aſſured him that he wiſhed to be there attacked.

Nelſon, after having reconnoitred the anchorage and the poſition of the ſhips, which were at a great diſtance from the land, and appeared to rely only on their own means of defence, did not heſitate, but made the ſame diſpoſition for the attack that he might have made in the open ſea, if, having the weather gage, he had come up with and brought to action the van of this fleet. Thus, with a view of doubling the van of the French line, and placing it between two fires, he ordered his leading ſhip to ſteer for the interval between the anchorage and the land. This firſt ſhip having run aground, the five ſhips which followed her, paſſed and anchored, yard arm and yard-arm, between the firſt ſix French ſhips and the ſhore. Seven other Engliſh ſhips ſtood along, and brought up on the op-

poſite ſide of this part of the French line, which found itſelf thus engaged by a double force, on the larboard ſide as well as the ſtarboard. At the ſame time, Admiral *Nelſon* ordered the line to be broken by a ſhip that he had reſerved for this manœuvre, the ſucceſs of which prevented moſt of the ſhips of the rear of the French from taking a part in the action.

In this poſition, both fleets cannonaded each other with the greateſt vigour the reſt of the day and the whole night. When daylight appeared on the 2d of Auguſt, at three o'clock in the morning, there was not as yet any decided advantage; the ſhips approached each other within piſtol ſhot, and every poſſible means of deſtruction were employed on both ſides. It was in this ſituation that Admiral *Brueys*, who, though already dangerouſly wounded, continued to command, was cut in two by a ſhot; ſhortly after, his ſhip caught fire, and every effort was, in vain, made to extinguiſh the flames.

We find in the midſt of this account, an incident that warmly retraces thoſe moments of confuſion and carnage, of which ſuch ſea-fights preſent the moſt frightful image; and in which, with the elevation of ſoul, and the courage that makes us brave dangers, we feel a pleaſure in recogniſing the indelible impreſſion of the ſentiments of nature.

Caſa Bianca, a young midſhipman, ten years of age, fought by the ſide of his father, the captain of the French admiral's ſhip, who fell mortally wounded,

wounded, at the moment when the flames were conſuming that fine veſſel. Some ſailors wiſh to ſave the boy, and to carry him away in a boat; this he refuſes; he embraces his dying father, and will not abandon him. The boat rows away from the ſhip now entirely in flames; young *Caſa Bianca* contrives to tie his father on a ſtump of a maſt thrown overboard, to which the intendant of the ſquadron had likewiſe faſtened himſelf; they were floating, and perhaps ſaving themſelves, when the *Orient* blew up with a horrible noiſe, and ingulfed the three unfortunate victims.

Our readers will pardon us for having interrupted this account of the battle of *Aboukir*, in order to record ſo magnanimous an example of filial piety.

The exploſion was ſo terrible, that the two ſquadrons remained as if buried under a ſhower of iron and fire; a profound ſilence reigned for ſome minutes; but the battle was ſoon renewed with increaſing obſtinacy. Almoſt all the commanders of the French ſhips were killed or wounded in this action; prodigies of valour were performed on both ſides, and in no naval engagement would there, perhaps, be found ſo many remarkable traits of gallant daring and heroic firmneſs; one, in particular, has been quoted of the French Captain *du Petit Thouars*, who, although maimed, and not chooſing to quit the deck, having loſt all his limbs, but ſtill living, made his crew promiſe not to ſtrike, and to throw his remains overboard.

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The ſhips which happened to be between two fires being already diſmaſted or crippled, were forced to ſurrender. The battle ſtill continued the third day, the 3d of Auguſt. The *Timoléon* would not ſtrike her colours, and was ſet on fire, after her crew were ſaved. Two French ſhips only, the *Généreux* and the *Guillaume Tell*, having got under way, in obedience to the ſignals of Rear-admiral *Villeneuve*, made their eſcape with two frigates, and reached the canal of Malta. All the reſt were taken or burnt. The Engliſh were able to carry away, firſt to Gibraltar, and afterwards to England, only ſix out of the nine ſhips that they had captured.

The crews taken priſoners that Admiral *Nelſon* could not keep, in the ſituation he was in, were landed on their parole.

After the action, Admiral *Nelſon* cauſed the harbour of *Alexandria* to be blocked up by ſuch of his ſhips as had ſuffered leaſt, and ſet ſail for Sicily, in order to refit there thoſe which were no longer in a condition to keep the ſea. He arrived at *Naples* on the 18th of September; and the reception he there met with, was conſidered by the French government as a ſecond violation of the neutrality, as an outrage, for which they did not delay taking a terrible revenge.

The ſea-fight of *Aboukir* is one of the moſt bloody that has been fought; more than half of the crews that were in the action were killed; the Engliſh

Engliſh had one ſhip more than the French; but, it muſt alſo be obſerved, that they had not a ſingle firſt-rate, and that the ſhip which ran aground, could not, either by her manœvring, or her fire, effectually join in the action; *Nelſon* therefore deſtroyed or diſperſed as many ſhips as he had under his command; and, with his flag on board the *Vanguard* of 74 guns, he ſaw burn and blow up, under his fire, the admiral's ſhip of 120 guns, one of the fineſt that had come off the French ſtocks.

The intrepid reſolution diſplayed by Admiral *Nelſon* in entering the bay, and ſubjecting himſelf to the neceſſity of conquering, or of loſing his ſquadron, reminds us, indeed, of ſituations and actions ſomewhat ſimilar; ſuch as that of the Count *D'Eſtrées* at *Tobago*; that of the Dutch under *Ruyter*, ſailing up the Thames, and deſtroying the ſhips and the docks in the river *Medway*; the battle of *La Hogue*, and, in our days, the burning of the Turkiſh fleet off the iſland of *Scio*; and it is remarkable, that, notwithſtanding the ſtrength of the poſition, which we may naturally aſcribe to a fleet of ſhips moored in a line, with ſprings on their cables, and ſupported by the fire of batteries on ſhore, ſucceſs has almoſt always crowned the boldneſs of thoſe who have undertaken ſimilar enterpriſes.

We ſhould in vain ſeek in modern naval hiſtory an inſtance of a victory ſo complete; but, if Fortune was never riſked with more daring than Admiral *Nelſon* manifeſted, never too did preſumption,

and

and the neglect of the means of defence, give to Fortune ſo great a ſhare in the iſſue of a naval engagement. Beſides the capital error, which we have pointed out, of not having quitted the coaſt of Egypt immediately after the debarkation of the army, ſeamen have reproached the French admiral, who fell ſo glorioufly, with two eſſential faults. The firſt, of having left the Engliſh a poſſibility of placing themſelves between the land and the van of his line; the ſecond, of having fought at anchor, while it was eaſy for him to get under way, and thus to render a battle at leaſt equal. Whatever may have been the motives that determined Admiral *Brueys* not to ſlip his cables, but to remain in ſo diſadvantageous a poſition, we cannot account for thoſe which could prevent the ſhips of his rear from getting under ſail, and, after having made a ſingle board, in order to weather the line of battle, from putting in practice, againſt the Engliſh, the ſame manœuvre as they had juſt executed againſt the van of the French line, and placing between two fires the ſhips that had doubled it as far as abreaſt of the *Orient*, where they had broken the line.

The conſequences of the battle of *Aboukir* were ſtill more diſaſtrous to the French government than could have been imagined. They were not confined to the particular object of the expedition; and the influence of this event, which, by ſecuring to the Engliſh flag the domination of the ſeas of

the Levant, and attracting thither the Ruſſian navy, was about to change all the political and commercial connexions of the Ottoman empire, had alſo the moſt ſpeedy influence on the affairs of Europe, and on the courſe of the negotiations for peace. If, on the one hand, the powers which were humbled, and endured impatiently the yoke of the conqueror, conceived freſh hopes, and appeared leſs diſpoſed to reciprocally abandon each other; on the other hand, the Directory, exaſperated by this reverſe, and by the public cenſure, bore up the more obſtinately againſt difficulties, and againſt the ſlighteſt oppoſition; armed themſelves againſt the public opinion; and, far from relaxing in their immoderate pretenſions for the demarcation of the new frontiers of the republic upon the Lower Rhine, they affected to ſupport them by an imperious and threatening language.

The alarms which had been felt in London, and which had even been exaggerated reſpecting the conſequences of *Buonaparte*'s expedition, upon the poſſeſſions in India, were now diſpelled. The joy diffuſed by the news of *Nelſon*'s victory, ſcarcely allowed the Engliſh to perceive that the principal object of the French general, the occupation of Egypt, was actually accompliſhed; they hardly any longer entertained a doubt of the deſtruction of that flower of the republican armies; and the miniſtry thought only of taking advantage of circumſtances, and of the national enthuſiaſm, in order

to make greater efforts, and rekindle the continental war.

It was at this epoch that the cabinet of St. James's redoubled its activity to cement the ties of the new coalition; it extended its views towards all the ſtates of the continent, multiplied and varied its meaſures, ſeized hold of the grievances which all the powers muſt have felt, and of the fears with which the invaſion of Switzerland muſt have inſpired them: it addreſſed to each affected intereſt, to each irritated paſſion, the true language of policy, and the more eaſily enveloped the Directory in this vaſt intrigue, as a blind preſumption led them to inſulate themſelves more and more.

While the Engliſh government were completing the union between the two Emperors, and, at the price of the greateſt ſacrifices, removing the obſtacles which the reſpective ſituation of their ſtates, and the difference of their political intereſts, oppoſed to the junction of their forces, they warmly preſſed the court of Pruſſia to accede to this new league of *Augſburg*; they threatened the commerce and the independence of the neutral powers of the ſecond order; they endeavoured to ſhake Spain, and detach her from her alliance with the republic; laſtly, by ſuccours in ſhips, troops, and money the acceptation of which they procured from the King of Naples, who was more immediately threatened, they ſecured an opportunity of renewing the quarrel, and of involving the Houſe of Auſtria, ſtill

wavering, ſtill terrified at the conſequences of a freſh war, and dreading to bear once more all its burden.

At this very time the court of Vienna ſuddenly broke off the private negotiation of Seltz, and ſent Count *Cobenzel*, the miniſter who had conducted it, to the court of Peterſburg. The Auſtrians no longer made any myſtery of their proceedings, or of their preparations; *Ulm*, fortified at a great expenſe, became, with reſpect to Swabia and Upper Auſtria, a place very important for the opening of the campaign, and for covering Bavaria; the Auſtrian army in Italy was placed on a reſpectable footing; and the new frontier upon the *Adige* cloſely fortified with intrenchments and artillery. In every quarter were remarked the ſigns of the weakneſs of the government of the republic, the moſt certain of which is always the abuſe of authority; on all ſides the coaleſced powers excited each other to profit by circumſtances; and the battle of *Aboukir*, which ſhould naturally have had only an indirect influence on continental affairs, was, to them, like a ſignal given by England for again taking up arms.

We have already ſaid that it was not till after the news of the deſtruction of the French fleet that the Porte came to an open deciſion. On the 30th of Auguſt, the *Reis Effendi*, at the end of a conference with the Ruſſian miniſter, ſent for the *Chargé d'Affaires Ruffin*, and declared to him, that the

Sultan had ordered that he ſhould be immediately confined in the caſtle of the Seven Towers, with his family, and all the perſons attached to the French embaſſy. The invitation to the Ruſſian fleet to join that of the Grand Signior, the formal notification of the victory gained by *Nelſon*, and the magnificent preſents ſent by the Sultan to the Engliſh admiral, were the public ſigns of the new alliance.

An Imperial decree announced, with the declaration of war againſt the French, the depoſition of the Grand Vizir *Jzzed Mahomed* Pacha, and his exile to the iſland of *Scio*. The Mufti was likewiſe diſgraced; they both had oppoſed the concluſion of the treaty with Ruſſia; the Vizir, in particular, was accuſed of having neglected the defence of Egypt, and of having ſhewn himſelf favourable to the views of the French. There no longer remained any hope of reſtoring confidence; any mean of explanation: M. *Deſcorches*, who had already been miniſter at the Porte, and whom the Directory had deſtined, when too late, for this delicate miſſion, could not obtain leave to go to Conſtantinople. Before long there appeared a public manifeſto, in which were remarked, for the firſt time, the forms of diplomatic diſcuſſions; ſhortly after this, a manifeſto ſtated the grievances of the Porte againſt the French republic, and left no veſtige of the ancient policy, no baſe of the commercial connexions between France and her oldeſt ally.

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The Divan had changed maxims; and England and Ruſſia, at their pleaſure, directed againſt the French, the Turkiſh land and ſea forces that were diſpoſable.

Djezzar Pacha of Syria, a man of ferocious courage, who deteſted the French, and governed with deſpotic ſway, in a ſort of independence bordering on rebellion, had not waited for the deciſion of the Divan, to declare himſelf againſt the conquerors of Egypt; he had ſent back, without any anſwer, the officer that *Buonaparte* had diſpatched to him; and had put in irons all the French who were at *St. Jean d'Acre*. The ſea-fight of *Aboukir* confirmed him in theſe hoſtile diſpoſitions, and diſpelled the terror which he muſt probably have felt from the preſence of a French fleet in the Gulf of Syria.

Such were the conſequences of *Nelſon*'s victory. It is obvious, from every thing that we have juſt ſaid, that theſe conſequences were more perceptible, and more important with reſpect to the ſtate of Europe, than with reſpect to the operations of the army of Egypt; an effect ſo much the more remarkable, as it has ſeldom happened, ſince the creation of navies, that ſea engagements have had a real influence on the deſtiny of ſtates.

Buonaparte muſt have felt the more ſenſibly the loſs of his fleet, as he had, in a manner, foreſeen and wiſhed to prevent this diſaſter, by again inſiſting that *Brueys* ſhould ſurmount the obſtacles which rendered the entrance of the old harbour of Alexandria

andria ſo difficult, or that he ſhould immediately quit the coaſt of Egypt. *Nelſon* would not have failed to follow him; and not daring to weaken his ſquadron, he would not have been able to block up the harbour of Alexandria, and to intercept the communications ſo neceſſary to the French army.

Buonaparte not only bore this great reverſe with much calmneſs and fortitude, but he contrived to avail himſelf of the firſt impreſſion that it made on his army, in order to raiſe the ſpirits and inſtil the ſtrongeſt reſolutions into the minds of his companions, who ſeeing in this deſtruction of the remainder of the French fleet in the Mediterranean, an entire ſeparation from their country, were henceforth to ſhift for themſelves, to complete their projects, to found and to defend a new empire.

The two corps, and the two principal chiefs of the Mamalûks, ſeparated at the moment of the entrance of the French into *Cairo*, after the battle of the Pyramids; but this was leſs the reſult of a military combination, concerted between them, than the effect of the hatred and rivality which had long kept them at variance. *Ibrahim*, having prepared his retreat towards Syria, to effect it, waited only for the iſſue of the battle fought by *Murad* Bey, upon the left bank of the Nile, while General *Déſaix* vigorouſly repulſed the latter towards Upper Egypt. *Buonaparte* purſued *Ibrahim* Bey, came up with and cut to pieces part of his rear-guard at *Salchieh* on the confines of the Deſert; but *Ibrahim* ſucceeded in reaching

reaching *Gaza* with about a thouſand Mamalûks, and was favourably received in Syria by *Djezzar* Pacha. In this expedition, in theſe extraordinary marches, as well as in all the principal diſpoſitions, *Buonaparte* was ſeconded by General *Berthier*, the chief of his ſtaff; his talents for the direction and moſt ſkilful and expeditious application of all the movements of troops to the different grounds, were the more valuable in a country in which all the uſual data were changed, and which required extraordinary foreſight and new combinations. We cannot, without a lively intereſt, inſpect the ſeries of orders given to this army, and the means employed for preſerving it morally and phyſically, and for regulating the different parts of the ſervice.

After having diſperſed ſome hordes of Arabs, and extricated from their hands the caravan of Morocco, *Buonaparte* returned to *Cairo*, and occupied himſelf in conſolidating his conqueſt, by a good ſyſtem of defence: this ſyſtem was actively purſued in Upper Egypt, as long as the Mamalûks, continually defeated by the indefatigable *Déſaix*, and continually rallied by *Murad* Bey, found a country to traverſe, and reſources to prolong their reſiſtance. As for the frontier of Syria and the places and poſts on the coaſt, the greateſt activity was diſplayed in repairing the fortifications that were ſuſceptible of repair; new works were conſtructed at *Salchieh*, at *Belbeis*, and at other principal points: thus the line of the frontiers of Lower Egypt was ſoon in a reſpectable ſtate, conſidering the means of attack that could be employed

employed by the Turks, and the difficulties arising from the nature of the general situation.

Damietta, *Mansoura*, *Rosetta*, and all that part of Lower Egypt, were under the command of General *Ménou*, whose head-quarters were at *Rosetta*; General *Kléber* commanded at *Alexandria*; they both had been wounded at the storming of that city, and were now engaged in putting these two important posts in a state of defence; they likewise superintended the establishments necessary for the army, and for the maintenance of the communications, always difficult and dangerous.

The French had been forced to renounce all intercourse, by sea, between *Rosetta* and *Alexandria*, since Admiral *Nelson*, after having refitted his ships in the road of Aboukir, had left Commodore *Hood* to cruise off the harbour of *Alexandria*. In order to supply the deficiency of this navigation, and provide for the indispensable conveyance of provisions, there had been established a caravan, which regularly crossed the Desert, and secured both the passage of the couriers and of travellers, who were going up to or coming down from *Cairo*. For the protection of this caravan, the sailors, who escaped from the battle, had been formed into a legion; it was stationed at *Aboukir*, and furnished the necessary escorts; but the conveyance on the backs of camels being too slow and too expensive, *Buonaparte* gave orders for cleansing the canal of Alexandria, which, every year, at the epoch of the overflowing of the Nile,

Nile, conveys the water from *Rahmanie* to Alexandria, acroſs a deſert of about fifteen leagues.

This epoch of the inundation of the Nile being arrived, *Buonaparte*, on his return to *Cairo*, had, with the accuſtomed pomp and ceremony, already made the cut in the dike, and opened the canal which conveys the water of the river through the city of Cairo; the Nile being ſoon ſufficiently ſwelled to flow into the canal of Alexandria, the town of Alexandria, which was the grand depot of the army, received, at the ſame time, the waters which were to fill the ciſterns, and carry the convoys of proviſions; this canal remained navigable only for twenty or twenty-five days, and General *Kléber* availed himſelf of this interval to have a great quantity of artillery ſhipped and ſent up by the Nile to *Gizah*, where *Buonaparte* eſtabliſhed the grand park under the orders of the General of Artillery *Dommartin*. The Arabs endeavoured to obſtruct this very important operation, by making cuts in the canal, in order to bring the lighters aground, and to be able to plunder them; but General *Marmont*, at the head of a brigade, purſued them ſo warmly, and protected the convoy with ſo much vigilance, that they were compelled to renounce their enterpriſe.

General *Kléber*, commandant at Alexandria, ſaw from that city the ſea-fight of *Aboukir*, and reanimated the courage of the troops, and of the ſailors diſmayed by that frightful ſpectacle; the proceſs of the debarkation, and of the unlading of the three

hundred ſail of tranſports, was not yet finiſhed; he had ſcarcely had time to have ſome batteries erected upon the heights; but foreſeeing that the Engliſh would exert all their efforts to deſtroy or burn this immenſe convoy, and the five frigates which had alſo anchored in the old harbour, he employed all his means to put the two harbours in a ſtate of defence; he eſtabliſhed batteries, the fire of which croſſed each other over the channel; and he conſtructed furnaces for heating ſhot; in a few days the old harbour was ſecure againſt any enterpriſe, except that of a bombardment, too far diſtant and too uncertain on the open ſea not to be ineffectual.

Buonaparte did not confine himſelf to ſecuring the defence of the frontiers; but in order to ſtrengthen himſelf in the poſſeſſion of Egypt, as well as to be able to draw from it the reſources of which he ſtood in need, he haſtened to remedy the diſorder into which the fall of the government of the Beys, and the ſtop to all adminiſtration of the public affairs, had precipitated this fine country. He neglected nothing to gain the mind of the people, and inſpire them with that confidence in himſelf and his army which reſults with almoſt certain effect the difference of manners, of cuſtoms, and above all of religious practices and opinions. The pains he took to eſtabliſh, every where, the moſt ſalutary precautions and preſervatives againſt the ravages of the plague; the vigilance and the courage of the officers of health of that army, ſhould

here

here be remarked, ſince they have, perhaps, been an eternal benefit to human nature, by ſhewing this people, that, inſtead of giving themſelves up to the decrees of fate, they may ſtifle the germs of death or ſtop their expanſion.

A police unknown among theſe nations, the maintenance of the ſtricteſt diſcipline among the French troops, the attention paid in collecting the forſaken young Mamalûks and ſlaves, in order to incorporate them in the army, by making them aſſume the European dreſs and the French uniform; and a number of other general meaſures which we regret not being here able to particularize, gave to the conqueſt of Egypt a ſtability which was far from being ſuſpected in Europe.

All *Buonaparte*'s public acts, all his views, all his diſpoſitions, bore the character of the eſtabliſhment of a great colony, and as it were of the foundation of a new empire; as ſoon as he was wholly maſter of Cairo, and had completely driven the Mamalûks from Lower Egypt, he oppoſed the attacks and depredations of the Arabs by a new ſyſtem of vigilance and repreſſion, by which, in ſpite of the rapidity of their excurſions, they were almoſt always diſcovered and prevented.

In order to give to the new government all the energy and activity of which it could be ſuſceptible, and to inſpire the Egyptians with the firſt ideas of liberty, all thoſe who by their *influence over the people*, their *knowledge*, or their *talents*, had been diſ-

tinguiſhed by the different French commanders in the fourteen provinces, were called to take a ſhare in the adminiſtration. Theſe aſſemblies of *notables* at firſt formed, in each province, a Divan, the members of which received a fixed ſalary; the Aga and the companies of Janizaries of each diſtrict were regularly paid, and rations of bread were diſtributed to them. The members of the Divan were diſtinguiſhed by a tri-coloured ſhawl; and all the inhabitants wore the French national cockade.

A general aſſembly of all the *notables* of the provinces was convoked at Cairo for the 1ſt of October: each deputation was compoſed of three lawyers, three merchants, and three *ſheicks-el-belled*, or governors of towns.

A very ſingular, and perhaps unexampled experiment in the annals of human ſocieties, was this ſudden application of the moſt complex forms of the modern legiſlation of the people of the Weſt, or rather of their ſtill imperfect eſſays of political equilibrium and economy, to that mixed population made up of all the wrecks of the nations of the Eaſt, which had fallen into the moſt profound ignorance; it muſt not be forgotten that in the execution of this plan of organization, as well as in all his efforts to give to Egypt a new exiſtence, *Buonaparte* found uſeful aid among the members of the Inſtitute and the artiſts he had brought from France, moſt of whom remained at *Alexandria*, during the march of the army towards *Cairo*; he called them thither,

thither, founded an Inſtitute under the direction of *Monge* and *Bertholet*, and was himſelf extremely aſſiduous at the ſittings of this ſort of civil, military, and political academy. A great work-ſhop was eſtabliſhed for all the mechanical arts; they were all applied to the preſervation and improvement of the public eſtabliſhments and of uſeful cuſtoms; to the extenſion of induſtry and the different branches of inland commerce: ſaltpetre was purified; new hydraulic machines were conſtructed; the making of bread and of fermented liquors was improved; the ſciences, led back by the hand of another conqueror, towards the cradle from which the rage of war had repeatedly torn them, ſeemed to carry thither a tribute of expiation and the homage of their aſtoniſhing progreſs; natural philoſophy and chymiſtry became enriched by new obſervations, and ſeveral diſcoveries; hiſtory was ſupported by a more certain knowledge of the moſt ancient monuments; the antiquities of the different ages were inveſtigated and compared; laſtly, geography was diveſted of conjectures, and, with the help of aſtronomy, determined the conformation of theſe famous countries.

What well-informed man among thoſe who look with confidence for the improvement of human knowledge, that of general ſociety, would not be ſtruck with this picture, and would not accuſe himſelf of partiality, if he perceived nothing more than a vain eulogium in the expreſſion of thoſe ſentiments

ments which are inſpired by the dignity of man, the power of his genius, and the glory of the arts?

During theſe interior labours, great part of the army was in active employment, and, multiplying itſelf by its movements, overcame the laſt efforts of the Beys, and ſupported the eſtabliſhment of the new inſtitutions. In the Delta, near *Damietta*, there had been ſome movements excited by the party of *Ibrahim* Bey; Generals *Vial*, *Damas*, and *Dugua* had diſperſed the inſurgents; while General *Murat* had attacked and almoſt deſtroyed a horde of Arabs. In the *Fayoum* General *Déſaix* had gained againſt *Murad* Bey, the battle of *Sediman*, in which the French, fighting man to man with the Mamalûks, performed prodigies of valour. In this affair the Chief of Brigade *Robin* and the Aide de camp *Rapp*, greatly diſtinguiſhed themſelves. *Murad* Bey had a few days before loſt a conſiderable convoy of lighters laden with proviſions for the Mamalûks. General *Déſaix* had taken from him ſix pieces of cannon, and had at length forced him to recede from the banks of the Nile, the inundations of which favoured his retreat by paſſages known only to the inhabitants of the country, and which concealed his movements. Driven back towards the mountains, and towards the confines of the Deſert, *Murad* Bey had not been able to eſcape the activity of General *Déſaix*, who in this laſt battle cut to pieces the remains of the flower of the Mamalûks, and opened to himſelf the country of Upper Egypt.

Such

Such was, towards the middle of October, the situation of the French in Egypt, when the *notables* deputed by the different provinces met at Cairo. In this assembly the chief *Abdala Kezhanoni* presided; *Monge* and *Bertholet* performed the functions of Commissaries of the French Government. Under the guidance of the commissaries, the *notables* deliberated with a great deal of calmness and dignity on the establishment and distribution of the imposts, on the definitive organization of the Divans, on the penal law, and those concerning successions, and on various objects of general police and administration.

Every thing appeared quiet and subjected to the conquerors, the people accustomed themselves by degrees to the new forms of the government, when the signs of an approaching revolt were perceived in the capital. The insurrection broke out all at once in different quarters, and in the environs of the city of *Cairo*, on the 21st of October in the morning. General *Dupuis*, who commanded there, having ventured out with a weak escort, and endeavouring to disperse one of the meetings, was assassinated, as were also several officers and a few dragoons; on all sides the insurgents attacked the insulated French, and murdered all those whom they could get at; the house of the commanding officer of engineers *Caffarelli*, was besieged, and forced; some engineers who were in it, defended themselves bravely, but were massacred; the *générale*

was

was beaten; all the French flew to arms; *Buonaparte* ordered ſeveral battalions to march into the city, and directed them againſt the moſques, in which the Turks had intrenched themſelves as in ſo many fortreſſes; they were there attacked with all the ardour of revenge, and they defended themſelves with deſperation; the General of Artillery *Dommartin* ordered ſome howitzer ſhells to be thrown into the middle of the groups, and into the edifices, from which iſſued a heavy fire and a ſhower of ſtones againſt the French. The citadel fired on the town and principally on the great moſque, into which a few bombs carried confuſion and diſmay; the gates were forced, and the French made a horrible ſlaughter among all thoſe who fell into their hands. The general in chief ſummoned theſe wretches to deliver up their leaders; they refuſed, continued to fight with a blind fury, and were almoſt all put to the ſword.

The affair of the next day was likewiſe very bloody, and ſome French, diſperſed or ſurpriſed, having been killed, all the Turks that the ſoldiers found armed, were ſacrificed. The loſs of the French was eſtimated at three hundred men in killed and wounded; upwards of five thouſand Turks periſhed in the courſe of theſe two days, and on the third day, order and tranquillity were re-eſtabliſhed in the city of Cairo.

Some bodies of inſurgents, hoping to eſcape, left the city armed, but they were purſued by the cavalry;

valry; and thoſe that it could not overtake, fell into the hands of the Arabs, who plundered them.

It was remarked, that theſe movements coincided with the epoch in which the declaration of war of the Porte was known in Egypt, and the appearance off Alexandria of ſome Turkiſh veſſels, whoſe junction with the diviſion of the Engliſh fleet that was blocking up the ports, revived the courage and the hopes of the partiſans of the old government. In almoſt all the towns were perceived ſome ſymptoms of a revolt, which it was preſumed had been fomented by the chiefs of the Mahometan religion, in league with the Mamalûks. Strict ſearch was made in the houſes of the Turks, and in theſe were found ſeveral Mamalûks concealed, or diſguiſed, who were puniſhed with death.

The ſuppreſſion of this inſurrection, which a raſh and blind fury could alone have recommended to this fanatic people, completely ſtrengthened the power of *Buonaparte*; he had triumphed over the Mamalûks, and overthrown their government; but in exterminating the rebels of *Cairo*, he deſtroyed the foundations of their empire, and their laſt hopes; the Muſſulmans were ſubdued; they felt all the weight of the French arms, and afterwards ſhewed themſelves reſigned and tractable. The Greeks, who, till then, had taken no part in the cauſe of the French, ranged themſelves on their ſide, and attacked the Turks; the inſurrection was to them an epoch of emancipation: and if this people,

debaſed by ſo long a ſlavery, could for the moment bring only a feeble increaſe to the forces of the new maſters of Egypt, it was eaſy to foreſee that they would there one day become powerful auxiliaries when a land of refuge and of liberty ſhould be open to the unfortunate inhabitants of *Peloponneſus* and of the iſland of *Crete*.

EPITOME

OF

MILITARY EVENTS,

December, 1799.

NOTWITHSTANDING the profound calm which ſucceeded the late ſtorms, the conquerors were unable to enjoy perfect ſecurity. England could not patiently ſuffer the eſtabliſhment of ſuch a colony, and combined with the Porte in a plan of general attack. The principal preparations were made in Syria, by the orders, and under the direction of *Djezzar* Pacha, who was to be ſupported by an army that was to traverſe Aſia Minor; the attack of the frontier of Egypt, on the ſide of the deſert of Syria, was to be favoured by a powerful diverſion towards the mouths of the Nile; and by different attacks executed by the remains of *Murad* Bey's corps, united with parties of malcontents. In order to direct the execution of this vaſt plan,

and to co-operate in it, by affording every maritime ſuccour, Commodore Sir *Sidney Smith*, commanding the *Tigre* of 84 guns, ſailed from Portſmouth on the 29th of October; and, after having carried ſome rich preſents to the Emperor of Morocco, went up the Mediterranean, where he haſtened the preparations for the campaign of Egypt.

Commodore *Hood*, with four ſhips of the line and five frigates, continued to block up the harbour of *Alexandria*, and the mouths of the Nile. He had diſcovered the impoſſibility of burning or deſtroying the fleet of tranſports and the French frigates, without the concurrence of a debarkation of troops, ſufficiently conſiderable to be able to attack the city of Alexandria itſelf. The reinforcement of ſmall veſſels which the combined Turco-Ruſſian ſquadron, joined at the iſland of *Scio*, had ſent to Commodore *Hood*, and which appeared off Alexandria at the time of the inſurrection at Cairo, was of no utility to him; the reports which circulated reſpecting the burning of the French ſhips in the old harbour, and the official account of that event, publiſhed by the Porte, upon the credit of the diſpatches of the Pacha of *Rhodes*, were totally void of foundation.

In the mean time *Buonaparte*, informed that the arrival of Commodore Sir *Sidney Smith*, who took the command of the different cruiſing ſtations, was to be the epoch and the ſignal for offenſive operations, reſolved to anticipate them, and to march

into

into *Syria*, in order to deſtroy the preparations that *Djezzar* Pacha was there making.

The two months which elapſed from the entire ſubmiſſion of Egypt to the moment when the troops deſtined for the expedition to Syria were ready to march, were employed in completing the military ſurveys entruſted to different officers, and the journies which, from the month of October, had been undertaken by the men of ſcience, and the artiſts of the various claſſes of the Inſtitute.

The moſt conſiderable of theſe labours was the ſurvey made under the protection of an armed force, of the lake Menzaleh and the *Peluſian* mouths of the Nile, by the General of Artillery *Andréoſſy*; he ſounded the roads of *Damietta*, of the *Boghaſs*, and of Cape *Bouyau*, as well as the *Dibeh* mouth, and entered the lake Menzaleh, where he was warmly attacked, but without ſucceſs, by 130 of the Egyptian craft called *germes*, manned by Arabs. General *Andréoſſy*, after having conſtructed an exact map of the lake *Menzaleh*, and meaſured with the chain the circumference of the coaſt, over an extent of upwards of 45,000 toiſes, determined the bearings of the iſlands, and diſcovered the ruins of *Tineh*, of the ancient *Peluſium*, and of *Farama*, went to perform the ſame operations at the lakes of Natron. *Berthollet* accompanied him thither, for the purpoſe of making new chemical experiments.

In compreſſing ſo many articles, we cannot notice

tice all the names of the authors of theſe labours, the moſt complete that have ever been undertaken in any quarter of the globe; let us hope that their reſults will not be withheld from the republic of letters. The time is paſſed, when, in order to ſecure an uncertain advantage, in a ſuppoſition of circumſtances ſtill more uncertain, uſeleſs *ſtate* ſecrets were made of diſcoveries the moſt important to commerce, to navigation, to the ſciences, and to the common intereſts of mankind; we ſhall ſee thoſe maps conſtructed by *Andréoſſy*, and by other officers of the engineers, and of the ſtaff, and the grand baſes of which have been determined by the obſervations of *Nouet* and *Méchain*; we ſhall ſee the drawings of *Dutertre* and thoſe of *Denou*, which his bold and original graver ſhall have ſo happily multiplied; laſtly, we ſhall have the level of the canal of *Suez*, taken in the moſt accurate manner.

The ſolution of this laſt problem, that of the exiſtence of the canal, which would have joined the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, particularly occupied *Buonaparte*; towards the end of November, he had detached, under the command of General *Bon*, a corps of 1500 men, which had taken poſſeſſion of *Suez*; on the 26th of December he went thither in perſon, accompanied by *Monge* and *Berthollet*; he firſt made a very particular ſurvey of the town and adjacent coaſts, ordered the conſtruction of ſome works, provided for

the

the defence of this important poſt, and made various arrangements favourable to commerce.

In order to remove the remaining doubts, *Buonaparte*, having aſcended the north coaſt, diſcovered the entrance of the canal, and followed it for the ſpace of four leagues. Then paſſing through Fort *d'Adgerond*, croſſing the Deſert, and returning by *Belbëis*, he again found in the *Oaſis* of *Honoreb* the remains of the canal of Suez, at its entrance into the cultivated and watered lands of Lower Egypt: having thus indiſputably aſcertained the two iſſues, he charged *Peyre*, engineer of bridges and highways, to take the level of it, beginning his operation at Suez.

During this ſurvey, *Buonaparte* was informed of the movements of *Djezzar* Pacha, whom the Grand Signior had appointed Pacha of Egypt; and who had advanced a corps of troops towards *El-Ariſh*, which is ſituated within a day's march of the entrance of the Deſert on the ſide of Syria. The diviſion forming the advanced guard, commanded by General *Regnier*, was already aſſembled at *Salchieh*, upon the frontier of the Deſert on the ſide of Egypt: this general was ordered to cauſe *Cathieh* to be occupied and fortified; General *La Grange* marched thither with a demi-brigade, and he was maſter of this poſt, on the very day that *Buonaparte* returned to Cairo, and gave his final orders, for the compoſition and the march of his army of Syria, and

for

for the employment and the different commands of the troops that were to remain in Egypt.

The following is the ſtatement of the effective force of the army that was deſtined to croſs the Deſert.

		Men.
Infantry	*Kléber*'s diviſion - - -	2,349
	Bon's ditto - - - -	2,449
	Lannes' ditto - - -	2,924
	Regnier's ditto - - -	2,160
Cavalry under General *Murat* - -		800
Engineers ——— *Caffarelli* - -		340
Artillery ——— *Dommartin* - -		1,385
Guides on foot and on horſeback - -		400
Dromedaries - - - - -		88
		12,943

It is here eſſential to obſerve, that the difficulty of conveying the artillery and the ammunition, had forced *Buonaparte* to attach to the four diviſions a number of field-pieces much below the ordinary proportion; and including the reſerve of the park, which in all conſiſted of only twenty-ſeven pieces of cannon, namely, four twelve-pounders, fifteen eight-pounders, eight three-pounders, eleven howitzers, and three five-inch mortars.

As for the garriſons which were to remain in Lower Egypt, they were formed of the 19th demi-brigade,

brigade, of the three battalions of the demi-brigades of the expedition of Syria, and of the *Nautical* and *Malteſe* legions, and the depots of cavalry: General *Dugua* was charged with the command of Cairo, General *Ménou* preſerved that of *Roſetta*, Adjutant-general *Almeyras* was appointed to the command of *Damietta*, with orders to expedite the completion of the fortifications; the city of *Alexandria*, which became more and more important, and which was threatened not only by the Engliſh, but alſo by the ſymptoms of the plague that had juſt made their appearance, was entruſted to General *Marmont*.

General *Déſaix*, with his corps, remained in Upper Egypt, and redoubled his vigilance and activity, in order to curb the remains of the Mamalûks, and prevent *Murad* Bey from taking advantage of the expedition to Syria, as a diverſion favourable for rallying his party, and marching towards Lower Egypt.

Such was the military and political ſituation in which *Buonaparte* left Egypt; he employed on the expedition only the ſurplus of the forces neceſſary for defending the coaſts at this ſeaſon of the year, in which it is almoſt impoſſible to attempt debarkations. He had nothing to dread on the ſide of Upper Egypt, which was conquered, and kept in ſubjection by General *Déſaix*; this diviſion had undergone great fatigues, and loſt a great many men, whom blindneſs, the too common effect of

the vapours of the Nile, had rendered incapable of ſervice, but all the reſt were now *acclimatized*, and accuſtomed to this kind of war. In ſhort, *Buonaparte* left at Cairo, and in the principal poſts of the provinces of the interior, troops ſufficient to maintain order and obedience.

The diviſion of General *Kléber*, who commanded under *Buonaparte*, was embarked at *Damietta*, and conveyed to *Tineh*, upon the lake *Menzaleh*, of the navigation of which the French had made themſelves maſters, with ſome gun-boats conſtructed at *Boulac*. On the 25th of January, General *Kléber* arrived before *Cathieh*. General *Regnier* there rejoined his advanced guard, and two days after marched againſt *El-Ariſh*: the village and the fort or caſtle of *El-Ariſh* were occupied by 2000 troops belonging to the Pacha of *St. Jean d'Acre*.

The diviſion of General *Regnier* carried *El-Ariſh* by the bayonet; the Arnauts and Maugrabines, who defended it, after having made an obſtinate reſiſtance, retired precipitately into the fort, abandoning two hundred of their companions.

Scarcely was the fort blockaded by General *Regnier*'s diviſion, before a reinforcement of the enemy's cavalry and infantry, eſcorting a convoy of proviſions, appeared in ſight of *El-Ariſh*, and, on the 13th of February, encamped on a plain covered by a very ſteep ravine; General *Kléber* arrived at this moment, and approved of *Regnier*'s project to turn the ravine, and ſurpriſe the camp

of

of the Mamalûks during the night. This attack ſucceeded; the camp was carried, the corps of cavalry cut to pieces, taken, or diſperſed; a great many horſes and camels, together with a large quantity of proviſions, ſtores, and ammunition, and all the baggage and camp equipage, fell into the hands of the French. The two other diviſions of the army joined a few days after at *El-Ariſh*, where *Buonaparte* arrived on the 17th of February. The following are the ſtages between *Cairo* and *El-Ariſh*: *Belbeïs*, *Cored*, *Salchieh*, *Cantara* in the deſert, *Cathieh*, the well of *Bir El-Apt*, the well of *Meſſondiat*, *El-Ariſh*.

On the 18th of February, the French army took a poſition before *El-Ariſh*; the caſtle was cannonaded, ſummoned, and it ſurrendered two days after.

The battering train of artillery indiſpenſable for reducing the fortreſs of *St. Jean d'Acre* could be conveyed only by ſea, and *Buonaparte* had ventured to order it to be ſhipped at *Alexandria*. Rear-admiral *Perrée*, with three frigates, got under way in the night to convoy the flotilla; he had orders to cruiſe off *Jaffa*.

The ſecrecy and promptitude of the arrangements for the expedition to Syria, and the celerity of the firſt marches, ſurpriſed the Turks. As this kind of war was as new to the Ottomans, as the political ſyſtem which had involved them in it, and as they were obliged to ſend troops, proviſions, and military ſtores, to the extremities of the empire, into

provinces, for the defence of which, ſuch foreſight, and ſimilar operations, were equally unuſual, the preparations were very ſlow. At Conſtantinople, the Engliſh, notwithſtanding their newly-acquired favour, notwithſtanding the importance of the ſupport of their naval forces, and the activity of Commodore Sir *Sidney Smith*, were unable to obtain the means of executing the whole of the plan concerted for the attack upon Egypt. Scarcely were the firſt *ortas* of the Janizaries, who were to form the army of the Grand Vizier, and traverſe *Natolia*, arrived at *Scutari*, and the corps which was deſtined to act upon the coaſt of Egypt, under the protection of the Engliſh ſquadron, was not yet aſſembled.

Sir *Sidney Smith*, informed of the firſt movements of *Buonaparte*, endeavoured to detain him, by alarming him reſpecting *Alexandria*, which, on the 3d of February, he cauſed to be briſkly bombarded; two tranſports only were ſunk. After this fruitleſs attempt, he went to the aſſiſtance of the Pacha of Syria, who had at firſt no thoughts of defending himſelf in *St. Jean d'Acre*, and wiſhed only to ſecure his retreat, and the conveyance of his women and his treaſures; he went and caſt anchor in the road of *Caiffa*, with the *Tigre* and *Theſeus* line of battle ſhips, and the *Alliance* frigate.

The French army continued its laborious march acroſs the Deſert, and defiled by diviſions, at one or two day's interval, in order not to exhauſt the wells. It would be difficult to form an idea of a march ſo fatiguing

fatiguing over theſe ſands, where bodies of troops, thouſands of men and horſes, can be eaſily bewildered. General *Kléber*, with his diviſion, was led aſtray by the guides; the two diviſions which followed him were deceived by the tracks of the firſt, and it was not till after marching forty-eight hours that the army, which was dying with thirſt, arrived at *Kan-Jouneſſe*, the firſt village in *Paleſtine*, got out of the Deſert, and diſcovered the cultivated plain of *Gaza*.

A corps of Mamalûks, commanded by *Abdalla* Pacha, was encamped in front of *Kan-Jouneſſe*; they fell back upon *Gaza*. *Buonaparte* marched thither, formed his diviſions into deep files, manœuvred to ſurround the town, and this corps of cavalry, which diſappeared, and the rear guard of which General *Murat* could ſcarcely come up with. The head-quarters were eſtabliſhed at *Gaza*, where the French found very conſiderable magazines of proviſions, ammunition, and warlike ſtores, which the Turks had neither had time nor means to remove.

It was at *Jaffa* that *Buonaparte* firſt experienced any oppoſition: this town, which has no out-works nor ditches, but is encloſed by a wall flanked by ſtrong towers, was provided with cannon: two ſmall forts on the ſea-ſhore defended the harbour and the roadſtead; the trenches were opened: a breach-battery was conſtructed againſt the moſt commanding of the ſquare towers, as were alſo

two croſs-batteries, while a falſe attack was made on the north ſide of the place. The Turks defended themſelves bravely, and made two ſorties, in which they loſt a great many men; but, after the batteries, the heavieſt guns of which were only twelve-pounders, had rendered the breach practicable, *Buonaparte* ordered the aſſault to be made; the carabineers of the 22d demi-brigade of light infantry, whoſe commander was killed, marched at the head of the column, which was led on by Adjutant-general *Rambeaud*; while his coadjutor *Netherwood*, and *Vernois*, an officer of engineers, cleared the way, with the artificers of the artillery and of the engineers. The battle was bloody; the French climbed the breach, and made a lodgment in the tower. The Turks, however, perſiſted in defending themſelves; they rallied, and attacked the column, although ſupported by General *Lannes*' diviſion, which ſoon forced, from ſtreet to ſtreet, the remaining barriers, and made itſelf maſter of the fort on the ſea-ſide. The greater part of the garriſon, compoſed of 1200 Turkiſh artillery-men, deſtined to form the field train of *Djezzar* Pacha, and of 2500 Maugrabines or Arnauts, were put to the ſword. The Egyptians, who had eſcaped the ſlaughter, were ſent back into Egypt. It was, with difficulty, that General *Robin*, who, after the aſſault, took the command of the place, ſucceeded in putting a ſtop to the diſorders and the fury of the ſoldiery.

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After having made *Jaffa* and its harbour the principal *entrepot* of the army, for the artillery and ſtores that were expected from *Damietta* and *Alexandria*, *Buonaparte* marched againſt *St. Jean d'Acre*, with the three diviſions of *Kléber*, *Bon*, and *Lannes*; the fourth diviſion, *Regnier*'s, which had led the way in the Deſert, formed the rear guard, at two days march behind the army, which it had orders to join at *St. Jean d'Acre*, by taking its route along the ſea-ſhore by *Cæſarea* and *Cantoura*.

On the 15th of March, the French advanced guard, on approaching *Zetta*, diſcovered the corps of cavalry of *Abdalla* Pacha, who, in order to retard the march of the army, had taken a poſition upon the heights of *Korſum*, protecting himſelf by the mountain of *Naplouſa*, where ſome thouſands of Naplouſans were poſted.

While Generals *Kléber*, *Bon*, and *Murat*, advanced againſt *Abdalla*'s cavalry, and were manœuvring to bring on a battle, which he avoided, General *Lannes*' diviſion was ordered to march to the right, and to cut off the Pacha from the Naplouſans. The latter took to flight; but the light infantry, who purſued them, having advanced too far in the defiles, they rallied, and in their turn attacked it, during its retreat, to the outlet of the mountain. *Barthélemy*, chief of the 69th demi-brigade, was killed in this affair.

General *Kléber* two days after occupied *Caiffa*, at the foot of Mount *Carmel*, a town encloſed by a ſtrong

ſtrong wall, flanked with towers, and which *Djezzar* Pacha had ordered to be evacuated, after having diſmantled the caſtle, which defends the harbour and the roadſtead.

The advanced guard of this diviſion, on approaching *Caiffa*, diſcovered the Engliſh ſquadron, which had anchored there on the 14th of March; the launches of theſe ſhips drew near the coaſt, reconnoitred this advanced guard from the foot of Mount *Carmel*, and endeavoured by their fire to obſtruct its march.

Sir *Sidney Smith* had already revived the courage, and increaſed the means of reſiſtance of the Pacha of *St. Jean d'Acre*, by ſending him a very ſkilful French engineer, to whoſe attachment he was indebted for his eſcape from the priſon of the Temple, and his return to England. Colonel *Phélippeaux* had repaired this place, which was fortified in the manner of the twelfth century, with curtains flanked by ſquare towers. Captain *Miller*, commanding the *Theſeus*, had furniſhed him with all the means at his diſpoſal to repair this ancient bulwark of Syria.

Nevertheleſs theſe labours and theſe early ſuccours would probably not have ſufficed to ſuſtain *Djezzar* Pacha againſt the attacks of the French, if, at the very moment when *Buonaparte* was completing the inveſtment of *St. Jean d'Acre*, the flotilla which had on board the greater part of his battering train and his ammunition, had not fallen into

into the hands of the Engliſh. This flotilla was doubling Mount *Carmel*, when it was diſcovered from the *Tigre*, purſued, and ſoon overtaken by the guns of the ſhips; ſeven of the veſſels which compoſed it ſtruck their colours; a corvette and two ſmall craft effected their eſcape.

It may be ſaid that this loſs, which was irreparable to the French, in the ſituation they were in, decided the fate of *St. Jean d'Acre*; perhaps, notwithſtanding the ſtate of defence in which Colonel *Phélippeaux* had put it, the boldneſs and intrepidity diſplayed in the attacks, might have compenſated for the implements of war, for the want of heavy artillery, and of all the ſtores indiſpenſable for puſhing on a ſiege; but it is evident, that theſe valuable articles, which were not only loſt to the beſiegers, but taken and conveyed to the defence of this very place, muſt, if they were well employed, make the balance of the means turn on the ſide of the beſieged. The pieces of cannon, the platforms and the ammunition, were immediately landed, and the gun-boats were manned and employed in moleſting the French poſts eſtabliſhed on the coaſts, in order to intercept or haraſs the communications and the convoys. In one of theſe attacks, the *Chef d'Eſcadron Lambert*, commanding the poſt of *Caiffa*, took one of the Engliſh launches armed with a thirty-two pounder. *Buonaparte* having driven in the outpoſts, and cloſed on the place, made his army

encamp upon an inſulated eminence, which ſkirts the ſea in a parallel direction, at the diſtance of about 1000 toiſes, and which extending to the northward as far as Cape *Blanc*, commands to the weſt a plain of about a league and three quarters in length, terminated by the mountains that lie between *St. Jean d'Acre* and the river *Jordan*.

He ordered the caſtles of *Safad*, *Nazareth*, and *Scheſtamz*, to be occupied, in order to keep clear the defiles on the road to *Damaſcus*. With his generals of artillery and of engineers, *Dommartin* and *Caffarelli*, he cloſely reconnoitred the place, and reſolved to attack the front, on the eaſt the town, the ſalient angle of the rectangle, the two ſides of which, waſhed by the ſea, and flanked by the fire of the ſhips, rendered the development of the attacks neceſſary for embracing it extremely difficult.

On the 20th of March 1799, the trenches were opened, at 150 toiſes from the place, under favour of the gardens, of the ditches of the old town, and of an aqueduct that joins to the glacis. Commodore Sir *Sidney Smith* quitted the road of *Caiffa*, and came and caſt anchor under the walls of *St. Jean d'Acre*.

In order to underſtand thoroughly the details of this memorable ſiege, which laſted upwards of two months, our readers ſhould have before them plans of the town and ſuburbs of *St. Jean d'Acre*. It would be impoſſible even, without correct drawings

ings of the front of attack, and of the principal tower of the ſalient angle, to form a clear idea of theſe repeated aſſaults, and of theſe continual battles, fought with ſo much valour and perſeverance, in a ſpace ſo confined, that the beſiegers and the beſieged were for two months within the diſtance of a ſtone's throw of each other. We ſhall confine ourſelves to relating the principal feats of arms, which have, for a ſecond time, rendered famous the walls of *Ptolemaïs*.

The French at firſt puſhed on their works with ſo much activity, that the ninth day after the opening of the trenches, the breach-batteries and the croſs-batteries, mounted as at *Jaffa*, with only four twelve-pounders, eight eight-pounders, and four howitzers, had made a breach in the tower, while a mine had been branched out to blow up the counterſcarp. The mine was ſprung, but it made only a tunnel in the glacis; the counterſcarp was thought to be thrown down; the ditch, imperfectly reconnoitred, appeared of little depth; and the ardour of the grenadiers, and the contempt with which the capture of *Jaffa* had inſpired them for this kind of fortification, made it impoſſible to reſtrain them. However, inſtead of finding theſe obſtacles removed, they were arreſted in their progreſs by a ditch fifteen feet deep, ſcarcely half of which was filled up by the rubbiſh of the breach; they deſcended into it, placed their ladders, climbed the breach, but found themſelves ſeparated, by the

counterſcarp, from the troops that were to ſupport them. *Mailly*, *Leſcales*, and *Laugier*, the brave officers who conducted the attack under a very heavy fire, were killed; the Turks, who had already abandoned the tower, re-entered it, and the French retired within their trenches.

The ill ſucceſs of this firſt aſſault, and the hope conceived by *Djezzar* Pacha of being aſſiſted by a corps of Naplouſans and Maugrabines, who were to aſſemble at *Damaſcus*, induced him to make vigorous ſorties, in which the French killed a great many of his men; and, on their ſide, loſt the engineer, Chief of Brigade *Troyes*.

Buonaparte had as yet received none of his battering train; he had ſent to *Damietta*, and diſpatched a veſſel to meet Rear-admiral *Perrée*, in order to try to replace what he had loſt. Only a few pieces of cannon, and part of the ammunition, had been landed at *Jaffa*; and theſe had not yet been able to reach him. He again gave orders for battering in breach that ſame tower, which the Turks had filled with wood, ſand-bags, and bales of cotton; the howitzers ſet them on fire, but the attempt of the French to make a lodgment in it was unavailing.

On the 9th of April, at the break of day, Sir *Sidney Smith*, in concert with *Djezzar*, ordered a conſiderable ſortie in three columns, at the head of which were the marines of the Engliſh ſhips. The object of this ſortie was to deſtroy the work

works neareſt to the body of the place, and principally the mine puſhed on under the counterſcarp. This dangerous attack was entruſted to the brave Captain *Thomas Oldfield*, who had already diſtinguiſhed himſelf at the taking of the Cape of Good Hope, where he was the firſt that entered the place; he penetrated, at the head of the centre column, and ſprang forward the foremoſt to the entrance of the mine, where he was mortally wounded; carried off by the French grenadiers, he expired in their arms, amid the warmeſt marks of eſteem. The three columns ſuffered conſiderably from the fire of the places of arms, and of the parallels, the approaches to which were covered with dead.

In the kind of attack and defence, in which the proximity, the nature of the place, and the deſcription of the combatants, forced both parties reciprocally to exterminate each other, the Engliſh had the misfortune to ſee, under their colours, which were united to thoſe of *Djezzar* Pacha, the Turks maſſacre wounded men and priſoners; and to experience that the ſentiments and the compacts of honour, the cuſtoms which, among civilized nations, mitigate the rage of war, are unknown to theſe barbarians.

Hitherto the poſts ſtationed in the caſtle of *Safad*, and at *Nazareth*, where General *Junot* commanded, had been ſufficient for covering the operations of the ſiege; but the aſſemblages of the corps of Mamalûks brought into Syria by *Ibrahim* Bey,

thoſe of the Janizaries of *Damaſcus*, thoſe of *Aleppo*, and of the Maugrabines, having become very conſiderable, it was neceſſary to oppoſe to them a corps of obſervation, the command of which was entruſted to General *Kléber*.

The firſt troops of this Turkiſh army, which was very numerous, eſpecially in cavalry, had already paſſed the *Jordan*: parties of Arabs had ſhewn themſelves at the outlet of the mountains of *Naplouſa*; General *Junot*, who ſaw them appear on the heights of *Loubi*, had turned the mountain, in order to fall upon them with his light infantry, a few companies of grenadiers, and 150 horſe; but he found himſelf ſurrounded and attacked by near 3000 horſemen: however, he effected his retreat in good order to *Kaff-Cana*, two leagues from the field of battle, after having ſeverely handled this cavalry, which had not been able to break his ranks.

General *Kléber* ſet out from the camp of *St. Jean d'Acre*, with the remainder of his diviſion, in order to join General *Junot* at *Nazareth*. On the 11th of April he was marching upon the heights of *Loubi*, and was near *Sed-Jarra*, a league and a half from *Cana*, when 4000 Arabian and Turkiſh cavalry, ſupported by 5 or 600 foot, deſcending from the height, iſſued forth into the plain, ſurrounded the French, and prepared to charge them. General *Kléber* attacked the village of *Sed-Jarra*, anticipated

anticipated and routed this cavalry, which fled to the banks of the *Jordan*.

A few days after, the whole army, deſtined to force the lines of the French, and to relieve *St. Jean d'Acre*, having croſſed the *Jordan* at *Jacob's Bridge*, and at that of *Giz-el-Mecanié*, joined the Samaritans and Naplouſans in the plain of *Fouli*, formerly *Eſdrelon*; at the ſame time the caſtle of *Safad* was warmly attacked and ſcaled, but was valiantly defended by the French Captain *Simon*.

General *Kléber*, after having reconnoitred the different corps of troops, by which he was almoſt ſurrounded, reckoned that their total force amounted to near 40,000 men, including the armed inhabitants; he informed *Buonaparte* of this, as well as of the movement which he purpoſed to make, in order to turn the main body of this army, and endeavour to ſurpriſe its camp.

Buonaparte, finding himſelf thus haraſſed and diverted from his object, by a kind of attack favourable to ſuperior numbers, reſolved to overtake this armed multitude, and to give it battle, with all the troops that he could draw from his beſieging army. His firſt care was to cut off the retreat of the Turks, by *Jacob's Bridge*, in order to diſperſe them, and drive them farther from him beyond the *Jordan*. General *Murat*, with 1000 infantry, and a regiment of cavalry, was charged with this difficult operation. On the 13th of April he left the camp of *St. Jean d'Acre*, and, by forced marches, advanced

vanced directly againſt *Jacob's Bridge*. There remained only two diviſions to carry on the ſiege, and to guard the trenches; *Buonaparte*, with the remainder of his cavalry, the diviſion of *Bon*, and eight pieces of cannon, arrived on the 16th of April in ſight of Mount *Tabor*, and the plain of *Eſdrelon*. General *Kléber*, retarded by the difficulty of the roads, and by ſome defiles, had not been able to reach and ſurpriſe the camp of the Mamalûks before daylight. Informed by their advanced poſts of the approach of the French, they had moved forward to the village of *Fouli*, which they occupied with the Naplouſan infantry. Near 20,000 cavalry ſurrounded *Kléber*'s diviſion, which, being formed into two ſquare bodies, was reſiſting their efforts, when *Buonaparte* appeared. He immediately detached Generals *Rampon* and *Vial*, each with a demi-brigade, to ſupport General *Kléber*, who, as ſoon as he had diſcovered this ſuccour, charged the Turkiſh cavalry with the bayonet, and attacked and carried the village of *Fouli*. While the columns of *Rampon* and *Vial* cut off their retreat towards the mountains of *Naplouſa*, the guides on foot did the ſame on their ſide; and General *Murat* had alſo juſt ſurpriſed the poſt of *Jacob's Bridge* and had raiſed the blockade of *Safad*.

The defeat of the Turks, Mamalûks, Arabs, and Naplouſans, was complete: ſeparated from their camps, they threw themſelves behind Mount *Tabor*, gained, during the night, the bridge of *Giz-*

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el-Mecanié, recroſſed the *Jordan* with great loſs, and in the utmoſt diſorder, and retreated towards *Damaſcus*.

General *Kléber* ordered the bridges of *Jacob* and of *Giz-el-Mecanié*, the forts of *Safad* and *Tabarié*, to be occupied; and, after having thus ſecured the banks of the *Jordan*, he took poſt, with his diviſion, at the Bazar of *Nazareth*. *Buonaparte* returned to his camp with the remainder of his troops, and puſhed on the works.

The mine intended to blow up the tower in which the breach had been made was completed. On the 24th of April it was ſprung; but part of the effort being ſpent by a ſubterraneous paſſage, one ſide alone of the tower was blown up, and the breach was not more practicable than before. Never did chance ſo opportunely favour the beſieged; never were a few toiſes of ground of ſo much importance in the attack and defence of a place; and never were the ruins of a bad work diſputed inch by inch with ſo much obſtinacy. It is not only on plans and drawings, but on profiles of this demoliſhed tower, that we ſhould be able to repreſent theſe attacks, theſe feats of arms, ſo remarkable from the bravery of the combatants, and ſo ſingular from the ſituation of the ſpot.

Scarcely was the mine ſprung, before *Buonaparte*, taking advantage of the firſt impreſſion of terror, wiſhed to diſcover how the tower was connected with the reſt of the place. Thirty grenadiers con-

trived to take poſt in the rubbiſh, under the arch of the firſt ſtory; but the beſieged, keeping up a communication by the gorge with the ruins of the upper arches, threw down combuſtibles into the lower ſtory, and forced the French grenadiers to abandon it. The next day the batteries continued to widen the breach, and in the night the artificers of the beſiegers again endeavoured to make a lodgment in the tower. They were again obliged to evacuate it, overwhelmed by the fire, and the burning materials poured upon them by the Turks, whom the French had not been able to diſlodge entirely from the upper ſtories. Will not the reader think that he is, at the ſame time, peruſing the details of an aſſault in the days of Cæſar, and thoſe of the attack and defence of the places, and the application of all the inventions of the moderns, eſpecially in ſubterraneous war? The trenches had been opened thirty-eight days, and the French had not yet received any battering artillery. It was not till the 28th of April that three twenty-four pounders, brought to *Jaffa* by the ſquadron of frigates under Rear-admiral *Perrée*, and ſix eighteen-pounders ſent from *Damietta*, arrived before *St. Jean d'Acre*, and were a few days after mounted on the batteries, in order to continue to demoliſh the tower. At this epoch the French experienced a very ſenſible loſs. General *Caffarelli*, of the engineers, died in conſequence of the wound which he

he had received in the trenches, on the 9th of April.

The beſieged, almoſt the whole of whoſe guns on the front of the attack were already diſmounted, opened a freſh fire of artillery, and undertook to make ſome outworks; they conſtructed two places of arms which flanked the tower that was attacked, raiſed there ſome cavaliers, and puſhed forward ſome ſaps in order to increaſe their fire of muſketry and confine the works of the beſiegers.

It was Colonel *Phélippeaux* who ſkilfully directed this counter-attack: he alſo died during the ſiege. On both ſides the works were carried on with vigour. They were alternately ſupported by freſh aſſaults and freſh ſallies; but theFrench had not ſufficient artillery to ſilence the fire of the place, and protect a lodgment in the works; they were ſoon in want of ammunition. The courage and activity of the beſieged increaſed in proportion as the fire of the beſiegers ſlackened. A new mine, intended to blow up the counterſcarp oppoſite to the ſecond breach which had been commenced under the curtain on the eaſt ſide, was countermined, the props pulled down, and the ſhaft filled up.

Buonaparte then perſiſted in opening for himſelf a paſſage by the breach in the tower which was half demoliſhed; he ordered an attack upon the two places of arms, and the *boyaux* which flanked the breach; they were all carried with ardour; the French again made themſelves maſters of the tower,

but were unable to maintain it; and the beſieged re-entered their works on the 7th of May.

The ſame day, a Turkiſh flotilla, come from *Rhodes* under convoy of a caravelle and ſeveral corvettes, having brought conſiderable reinforcements in men, proviſions, and ammunition, *Buonaparte* reſolved to make a freſh effort, previous to the debarkation of this ſuccour; he gave orders for the attack to be renewed againſt the places of arms, and the *boyaux* of the glacis, by the 18th and 39th demi-brigades under the command of Generals *Bon*, *Vial*, and *Rampon*. The advantage remained on the ſide of the French. The curtain to the right of the tower, battered in breach, having fallen down, and offering an aſcent far from being impracticable, *Buonaparte* went himſelf to reconnoitre it, and ordered General *Lannes*' diviſion to ſtorm: the column was headed by General *Rambeaud*; he climbed the breach, and penetrated into the place with a hundred grenadiers: the Turks, who were not yet diſlodged from the ruins of a tower to the right, and thoſe who were in the places of arms, opened a very warm fire of muſketry, filed off into the ditch, and, taking the breach in the rear, ſtopped the eſcalade and the impulſe of the column. The fall of the combuſtible materials, the fire directed from the top of the houſes, from the barricadoes, and from the Pacha's palace, againſt thoſe who deſcended from the breach into the town, either killed them, or forced them to fall back. The reſerve, formed of the guides of the army, then ſprang forward

forward to the breach, but without being able to renew the action; the garriſon rallied; and the troops brought by the fleet haſtened to debark in order to join the combatants. General *Rambeaud* was killed in the place; the French, after performing fruitleſs prodigies of valour, were forced to yield to numbers, and to the perſeverance with which the Turks from their high walls poured down on theſe ruins a heavy and deſtructive fire, and, ſuffering their fury to be guided by ſkilful officers, availed themſelves of the ſmalleſt advantages of the ground.

After theſe repeated and irreparable loſſes, it became almoſt impoſſible to reduce a place defended with ſo much intrepidity, continually revictualled, and ſuccoured by ſea, and protected by the ſquadron of Commodore Sir *Sidney Smith*, who, having no apprehenſion of being himſelf attacked, could diſpoſe of his crews, of his artillery, of his ammunition, in ſhort, of all the reſources which ſhips well equipped can furniſh to a place beſieged, and preciſely thoſe of which the beſiegers were in want. It might be ſaid, without fear of exaggeration, that, ſince the arrival of the Turkiſh flotilla and the ſuccours received from different points of the coaſt, the forces, and particularly the means of the beſieged, were become ſuperior to thoſe of the beſiegers, in the inverſe ratio of the proportion determined by the principles of the military art.

Nevertheleſs *Buonaparte* could not bring himſelf to renounce this conqueſt, which was ſnatched from him

him by fortune, for the firſt time unfaithful to his ſtandard: he ſaw the place open, the breach widened and rendered more acceſſible by the ſtrenuous efforts of his too feeble artillery; he therefore wiſhed to try once more the fate of arms. On the 10th of May at two o'clock in the morning he repaired to the foot of the breach, and ordered it to be mounted by the grenadiers of the 75th and 19th demi-brigades, and the carabiniers of the 2d light infantry. His plan was to ſurpriſe the Turks, and to make a powerful lodgment on the top of the breach. General *Verdiers* marched at the head of the grenadiers and pioneers; the troops in the outpoſts were put to the ſword; but the garriſon made a firm ſtand behind the cuts and new intrenchments, which ſtopped this impetuous attack, and compelled the French to retreat. They renewed the attack that ſame evening, and the grenadiers of the 25th demi-brigade, who had juſt arrived from the corps of obſervation, having requeſted to mount to the aſſault, the battle recommenced on the breach, with freſh fury: the beſieged, appriſed of this laſt attack, had reinforced a ſecond and a third line of firing which the grenadiers were unable to force.

Theſe three aſſaults coſt both parties a great deal of blood, and the French again ſuſtained conſiderable loſſes in the courſe of this day. Adjutant-general *Fouler* and the Chief of Brigade *Venoux* were killed. General *Bon* was mortally wounded; *Croiſier*, Aide de camp to the General in Chief,

Arrighy,

Arrighy, Aide de camp to General Berthier, and a great number of ſtaff officers, were dangerouſly wounded.

Buonaparte, having at length determined to raiſe the ſiege, firſt gave orders for the removal of the ſick and wounded; and in order to keep in check the beſieged, he cauſed the remainder of his ſiege ammunition to be expended, and redoubled the briſkneſs of his fire from the gun and mortar batteries. *Djezzar* Pacha, having remarked theſe firſt diſpoſitions of retreat, made frequent ſorties, which were repulſed with the ſame vigour. The aſpect of this field of carnage was frightful; the ditches, the backs of the parallels, the boyaux or lines of communication, were filled with dead bodies; the air was infected by them, and the propoſition of a ſuſpenſion of arms to bury the dead had remained unanſwered. There was between the two parties no other communication than that of an Engliſh flag of truce, which landed upon the beach, and with a letter from Commodore Sir *Sidney Smith* delivered a proclamation of the Porte, which did the French troops the injuſtice to ſuppoſe their defection. Deceived by falſe reports repeated in his official correſpondence, *Djezzar* Pacha perſuaded himſelf that the French army was in the greateſt diſorder. It appears that Sir *Sidney Smith* fell into the ſame error, and neglected the moſt brilliant trophy of the vigorous defence of *St. Jean d'Acre*, by withholding a juſt tribute of eſteem, the honourable teſtimony of a generous

a generous enemy, form that ſmall portion of a number of brave ſoldiers who had, with heroic perſeverance, ſupported labours and dangers the recital of which may one day appear fabulous.

On the 7th May *Buonaparte* addreſſed to his army a proclamation, in which he announced the raiſing of the ſiege, and the motives of his return to Egypt, for the purpoſe of defending the approaches to it in the ſeaſon for debarkations againſt the forces aſſembled at *Rhodes*, part of which had been ſent to the relief of *St. Jean d'Acre*.

The raiſing of the ſiege was effected in good order; the fire againſt the place was kept up till the laſt moment; and the very day on which the army began to move, the 21ſt May, the ſixty-firſt day of the trenches being opened, General *La Grange*, who commanded, repulſed two ſorties, and drove into the place the Turks who had made a lodgment in the boyau of the *courronnement* of the glacis of the tower in which the breach was made. General *Lannes'* diviſion led the way, directing its march towards *Cantoura*, and was followed by the baggage of the army, the park of artillery, and the diviſion of General *Bon*; that of *Regnier* evacuated the trenches, dragging by hand the field-pieces.

General *Kléber* formed a ſtrong rear guard with his diviſion and the cavalry, while General *Junot* covered the left flank; the bridges on the river were deſtroyed, and the columns were not at all haraſſed. *Buonaparte* cauſed to be thrown into the ſea the

pieces of artillery which he could not carry away by the route of the Deſert; he ordered the carriages to be burnt on the beach of *Cantoura*, and availed himſelf of what veſſels he had left, in order to convey to *Jaffa* his field-artillery and his ſick and wounded. This convoy left *Jaffa* a few days after; it ſet ſail for *Damietta*, and fell into the hands of Sir *Sidney Smith*, who, as ſoon as he had notice of the retreat, got under way, in order to give chaſe to the three French frigates, and ſteered along the ſhore to obſtruct the march of the French army.

Djezzar Pacha did not perceive till daybreak on the 22d of May, that the trenches, upon which the place had fired during the whole night, were evacuated; the Turks took poſſeſſion of the works, and, following the track of the army, found only a few pieces of cannon buried in the ſands.

The French army continued its march in the ſame order, ravaging the country, burning the harveſt, deſtroying the defences of the poſts, the magazines and all the reſources of which the Turks might have availed themſelves to approach the frontier of Egypt. General *Kléber* continued to form the rear guard with his diviſion, which, after having croſſed the Deſert, embarked at *Tineh*, in order to proceed to *Damietta*. *Buonaparte* left a ſtrong garriſon at *Cathieh*, and returned to *Cairo*, with the remainder of the army, twenty-ſix days after the raiſing of the ſiege.

Thus terminated the campaign of Syria; and not-

withſtanding the ill ſucceſs of the ſiege of *St. Jean d'Acre*, the deſtruction by battles, or by ſickneſs, of nearly one fourth of the troops which he had conducted thither, and the loſs of a great number of diſtinguiſhed officers, *Buonaparte* thought that he had accompliſhed the principal object of his expedition; he had at leaſt deſtroyed or diſperſed the greater part of the forces of the Pacha, and had ſtruck terror into all his ſubjects or allies; he had prevented the junction of the Grand Vizier, and the aſſembling of an army, the progreſs of which upon the eaſtern frontiers of Egypt would have effected a diverſion extremely prejudicial to the defence of the mouths of the Nile, againſt the army of debarkation; in ſhort, he had beforehand weakened the latter, and retarded its operations in the moſt favourable ſeaſon of the year.

We have already obſerved, that in Europe people in general had been much more occupied with the projects which *Buonaparte* might poſſibly have formed reſpecting the Peninſula of India, than they had been ſtruck with the importance and the ſolidity of his eſtabliſhment of a warlike colony in Egypt; and as the ideas of conqueſt have neither limit nor proportion, ſcarcely had a corps of 10,000 French croſſed the Deſert which ſeparates Africa from Aſia, than their looks were directed toward the capital of the Ottoman empire. It was ſuppoſed that, abandoning Egypt hardly ſubdued, and threatened by ſuperior forces, having no ſhipping, *Buona-*

parte

parte, united to the Druſes and the Maugrabines, would form an alliance with theſe half-barbarous people, and, entruſting to them his communications through *Syria* and *Karamania*, would traverſe Aſia Minor, advance to the extremity of the peninſula of *Scutari*, and ſummon the Grand Signior in the Seraglio. Thus there was given to the defence of the fortreſs of *St. Jean d'Acre* a relative influence ſo extenſive, that it was affirmed that it had preſerved Conſtantinople and the exiſtence of the Turkiſh empire.

The credit of England was increaſed by this new ſervice; and Sir *Sidney Smith*, purſuing with ardour the execution of the plan of campaign againſt Egypt, found more zeal and activity on the part of the Turks. *Seid Muſtapha* Pacha aſſembled in the different harbours of the iſland of *Rhodes*, the troops deſtined for the attack of *Alexandria*; the details of this enterpriſe were directed by European officers; and the combined fleet, in order to ſet ſail for Egypt, was waiting only for the arrival of a convoy which the Captain Pacha, who had anchored at the Dardanelles, was to diſpatch to *Rhodes*.

The allies had not neglected to agitate the interior of Egypt; they had taken advantage of the abſence of the French general and of the diminution of his forces to raiſe the hopes of the fallen parties. Several movements of revolt had manifeſted themſelves in the provinces; parties of Mamalûks, diſperſed and driven from Upper Egypt by General *Déſaix*, had

come down into the provinces of Lower Egypt, and were endeavouring to aſſemble the Arabs; and laſtly, to divide the attention of the French, and give the inſurgents more confidence, the Engliſh had ſent a few ſhips of war up the *Red Sea*: a two-decker and a frigate approached *Suez*, but having diſcovered that this poſt was in a ſtate of defence, Rear-admiral *Blanket* contented himſelf with ordering it to be watched by a brig which cruiſed off the harbour.

Previous to the return of the French army of Syria into the fortreſſes of Lower Egypt, General *Dugua*, commandant at *Cairo*, had ordered General *Lanuſſe* and the Chiefs of brigade *Duranteau* and *d'Eſtrées* to march againſt the different bodies of malcontents; the Arabs had been ſurpriſed and defeated in ſeveral rencounters. It had been neceſſary to exerciſe ſome acts of vigour; villages had been burnt, in order to quell ſedition. The preſence of *Buonaparte* completely reſtored order; he applied himſelf principally to repairing the loſſes ſuſtained by the four diviſions, and the cavalry which had marched with him into Syria; he completed the corps, and ſo perfectly re-eſtabliſhed their organization, that three weeks after the return of theſe troops to their garriſons and quarters, they were in a condition to march and to undertake new operations.

This activity and this knowledge of the details of ſervice, which produces, as it were, the creation of a new army by recompoſing it with the ſame elements,

ments, have been carried as far as was poſſible. It is in theſe extraordinary and unforeſeen ſituations that are diſplayed, eſpecially among the French, that inexhauſtible ſpirit of reſource, and that emulation which difficulties ſtimulate and inflame. It is when the ſort of men to incorporate and to form, the make of the clothing, all the eſtabliſhments neceſſary for ſupplying the wants of an army; it is when all the means to be employed are the object of a new trial, that we can beſt obſerve that application of talents, knowledge, and uſeful experience, to which, in general, little attention is paid, and which nevertheleſs are like the perfection of the diviſions, and of the diſtribution of the ſprings of a vaſt machine, and the ſecret of its moſt aſtoniſhing efforts.

If we had had more time to devote to a particular article, we ſhould willingly have choſen this epoch for extending theſe reflections, and we ſhould not have confined them to the part purely adminiſtrative. The diſtribution of the forces, the calculation and the combining of the marches with reſpect to the general junction upon the points of Lower Egypt which might be threatened, are about to furniſh us with an example of a complete diſpoſition, and of a very able execution of the different parts of the ſervice of the ſtaff of armies; but we ſhall, in one of our next Numbers, take an opportunity to eſtabliſh a few leading ideas on this ſubject, and, in particular notes, to develope, with the progreſs made

made in this principal branch of the art of war, its theory, which is too little known.

The movements of the Mamalûks and Arabs ſoon manifeſted the deſigns of the allies and the approach of their fleet. General *Déſaix* informed *Buonaparte* that the Mamalûks, who, ſince the laſt battle, had fled into Upper Egypt, and had ventured to ſhew themſelves only in rencounters and affairs of poſts, had recently made a combined movement; they had divided their forces; one part of them, paſſing by the *Oaſis* of *Sababiar*, was endeavouring to join *Ibrahim* Bey, who had juſt reappeared at *Gaza*; and the others, under the command of *Murad* Bey, were coming down by the *Fayoum*, to the lakes of Natron, in order to join the Arabs.

Theſe two corps of Mamalûks did not reach their deſtination; the former was ſurpriſed at *Sababiar* by General *La Grange*, who had ſet out from *Cairo* on the 10th of July: the camp, the baggage, and 700 camels, fell into the hands of the French; one of the Beys and ſome of the principal officers were killed; the remainder fled into the Deſert. As for *Murad* Bey, having been anticipated at the lakes of Natron by General *Murat*, who, after having diſperſed the parties of Arabs, marched to meet him, he retreated, and was, on the 25th, near the pyramids of *Gizah*, on the ſide of the Deſert.

Buonaparte, informed of this counter-march, and hoping to intercept the route and the retreat of *Murad* Bey, left *Cairo* on the 14th of July with his choice

choice troop, ſome horſe and foot guides, and a few companies of grenadiers: he arrived the ſame day at the Pyramids, where he ordered General *Murat* to come and join him. *Murad* Bey had ſet off in order to return towards the *Fayoum*; ſcarcely could the firſt advanced guards, which purſued him, overtake a few of his ſtragglers.

It was at the pyramids of *Gizah* that *Buonaparte* received an account from *Alexandria*, that a Turkiſh fleet of a hundred ſail had anchored on the 11th of July in the road of *Aboukir*, and at the very time when he was purſuing *Murad* Bey. Between the 14th and 15th of July, a corps of 3000 Turks debarked, with artillery, on the beach of the peninſula, and carried, by main force, the redoubt and the fort of *Aboukir*, which were badly defended, after the death of the commandant.

Before this ſecond account reached *Buonaparte*, he had diſpatched orders to all the Generals, both with reſpect to the part of the troops which were to act immediately under his command, and march againſt the point of debarkation, as well as for thoſe which were to guard the fortreſſes, curb the malcontents, and watch the Mamalûks and Arabs.

He immediately appointed *Rhamanié*, upon the left bank of the Nile, as the firſt general rendezvous of the army.

General *Murat*'s advanced guard, formed of his cavalry and of the grenadiers and infantry that had marched to *Gizah*, part of the diviſion of *Lannes*, and

and part of that of *Rampon*, which received orders to croſs the Nile; the moveable column which General *Menou* had conducted to the lakes of Natron, the park of artillery, and the head-quarters inſtantly began to move, and were all collected at *Rhamanié* by the 21ſt of July. Upper Egypt was ſtill occupied by General *Déſaix*, who followed the ſteps of *Murad* Bey, cauſed the forts of *Kené* and of *Coſſeir* to be proviſioned, and ſent half of his cavalry to Lower Egypt; he was ordered to keep a watchful eye upon Cairo, and to concert meaſures with General *Dugua*, who commanded there, and with General *Regnier*, who commanded upon the frontier on the ſide of Syria.

The garriſons of the forts of *El-Ariſh*, *Cathieh*, &c. were, in caſe of being attacked by ſuperior force, to ſhut themſelves up in the fortified places and in the forts; and the generals, with the remainder of their troops, were to concentrate themſelves in the poſition of Cairo.

Buonaparte ordered General *Kléber* to march to *Roſetta*, with part of his diviſion; and as he ſuppoſed that the army of debarkation would advance againſt that place, or againſt *Alexandria*, he likewiſe ſent ſome reinforcements to *Roſetta*, under the orders of General *Menou*. The Turks, after the reduction of the fort of *Aboukir*, had landed their artillery; they occupied the peninſula, and were engaged in making intrenchments and forming magazines; they had cut the pontoons conſtructed for

communication with *Roſetta* between the lake *Maadié* and the road of *Aboukir*; their force, which was increaſing from day to day, was eſtimated at about 15,000 men; a few Arabs had already joined them, and they ſeemed to be waiting for greater reinforcements and the junction concerted with *Murad* Bey, for the purpoſe of inveſting *Alexandria*.

Buonaparte, in order to be enabled to follow the movements of *Seid* Pacha, and intercept the ſuccours of the Arabs and Mamalûks, on the 25th of July took a poſition in the village of *Birket*, in a line with one of the angles of the lake *Maadié*; and ſeeing that the Turks, pent up in the peninſula, thought only of fortifying themſelves there and maintaining their ground, he determined to attack them.

The army, after having quitted the poſition of *Birket*, was aſſembled at the Wells, between *Alexandria* and *Aboukir*; *Buonaparte*, having transferred his head-quarters to *Alexandria*, inſpected the new works of that place which General *Marmont* had put in a reſpectable ſtate of defence, and from the accounts he received of the poſition of the Turks, he arranged his diſpoſition of attack.

General *Kléber* having left *Damietta*, and following the movement of the army, had already reached *Fouah*, with part of his diviſion; General *Menou* advanced againſt the extremity of the bar between *Roſetta* and *Aboukir*, at the paſſage of the lake *Maadié*, in order to cannonade the ſmall craft,

which the Turks might have ſent into the lake, and to give them ſome inquietude reſpecting their left.

Muſtapha Pacha occupied and barred the peninſula, by two lines of troops, and by intrenchments yet incomplete: he had advanced his firſt line half a league in front of the fort of *Aboukir*; the right of this line extended to the ſea ſide, and was protected by an intrenched ſand-hill, which was occupied by about 1000 men; a village at 300 toiſes from this point of ſupport was defended by a corps of 1200 men and four pieces of cannon. The left of the firſt line was detached and inſulated at 600 toiſes in front of the centre; and ſome gun-boats, ſtationed near the inner ſhore, flanked, on the left, the interval between the firſt and the ſecond line; the latter, which was much more advantageouſly poſted, was 300 toiſes in the rear of the firſt village: the centre occupied the redoubt, which had been taken from the French, at the time of the debarkation, and which had ſince been connected with the ſea-ſide (a ſpace of about 150 toiſes) by an intrenchment, behind which was the right wing; as for the left, it occupied ſome ſand-hills, and the inner ſhore, which was flanked by the gun-boats; 7000 men and twelve pieces of cannon defended this ſecond line, which was only 100 toiſes in front of the village and fort, which were occupied by 1500 men.

The fleet was anchored a league and a half from the ſhore, in the road of Aboukir.

The French had received various reinforcements;

the General of cavalry *Murat* had increaſed his advanced guard by the column under General *Deſtaing*; he had 600 men mounted, and the 400 cavalry detached from the diviſion of *Déſaix* in Upper Egypt had joined the army at the poſition of the Wells.

On 23d of July, at break of day, the French army, which was but at two hours march from the firſt poſts of the Turks, began to move in two columns, preceded by a ſtrong advanced guard, in which was the General of Brigade *Deſtaing*, under the orders of General *Murat*.

The diviſion of *Lannes* formed the right wing; that of *Lanuſſe* the left wing; and the diviſion of *Kléber*, which was not yet arrived, was to form the reſerve: a ſquadron of horſe covered the park of artillery; and General *Davont*, with two ſquadrons of horſe and 100 dromedaries, watched the motions of the Arabs upon the rears, and ſecured the communication with Alexandria.

The ſmall map which we give of the part of the coaſt comprehending the city and the two harbours of *Alexandria*, together with the peninſula and the road of *Aboukir*, will enable our readers to follow the movements, and thoroughly underſtand the diſpoſitions of *Buonaparte*, previous to this deciſive action. It is unneceſſary for us to mention, that on ſo ſmall a ſcale they muſt not look for the correctneſs of topographical details, nor the delineation of the particular movements of the different

corps. We have collected and reduced to a common ſcale a few plans already known. On this ſmall mape we have indicated the anchorage of the French fleet, before it was attacked by Admiral *Nelſon*, and we have likewiſe laid down therein the principal ſoundings both in the road of Aboukir and in the harbours of Alexandria. This ſketch will afford our readers an exact idea of the reſpective ſituation of the places, and will make them wiſh, with us, for the ſtill delayed publication of the valuable labours of the ſtaff of the army of Egypt.

As ſoon as the two armies were in preſence of each other, *Buonaparte* formed his columns of attack; General *Deſtaing* carried, with the bayonet, the intrenched height which formed the ſupport of the right of the Turks; at the ſame time General *Lannes* advanced againſt the left of this firſt line.

General *Murat* ordered ſome detached ſquadrons to cut off the retreat of the two wings that were attacked, and with the remainder of the cavalry marched directly againſt the centre.

Almoſt the whole of the firſt line, which conſiſted of about 2000 men, being diſlodged and ſurrounded by this manœuvre, were killed, or drowned; a part only of the right fell back upon the village, which was attacked and carried. The Turks were purſued to their ſecond poſition, which was more concentrated, and much ſtronger than the firſt.

The redoubt, which both flanked the intrenchments on the right, and the line of communication

begun

begun towards the left, formed the head of this position, which the Pacha, who had now no other retreat, had prepared to defend with obſtinacy. He had ſtill remaining 8 or 9000 men.

Buonaparte, perceiving that the principal force of the Turks was in the centre, changed his diſpoſition according to the nature of the ground. He ordered the cavalry to paſs to the right, in order to engage and drive in the left of the Turks, which was drawn up along the beach: he directed attacks of infantry againſt the intrenchment of their right, between the redoubt and the ſea, and prepared a reſerve to ſtorm the redoubt at the moment when the attacks by the wings ſhould have ſucceeded.

After having briſkly cannonaded the poſition and the redoubt, as well as the intrenchments which connected it with the ſea-ſhore, *Buonaparte* gave orders to commence the attack. General *Fugieres*, at the head of the 18th demi-brigade, marched in column along the beach; the Turks, ſeeing the French approach their intrenchments, ſallied out, and themſelves attacked the column; both parties became intermingled, and fought man to man: the Turks were repulſed, the French followed them, and threw themſelves into the intrenchments; but they were checked by the fire of the redoubt, which took them in flank, and to which they were completely expoſed; General *Fugieres* loſt an arm, and the column was forced to fall back upon the village.

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The cavalry having come abreaſt of the redoubt, had ſeveral times charged with impetuoſity, and repulſed the troops which came in their way; but they could not penetrate farther, or maintain their ground, between the deſtructive fire of the redoubt, and that of the gun boats. The Chief of Brigade *Duvivier* was killed; the Adjutant-general *Roize* and the Chief of the brigade of Guides *Beſſieres* headed and renewed the charges; the Adjutant-general *Le Turc* went and propoſed to the General in chief to ſupport them by a reinforcement of infantry; he rejoined the cavalry, when his horſe was killed under him; he then put himſelf at the head of the infantry, ſprang forward the foremoſt into the enemy's intrenchments; but not being followed by his men, he there fell.

At length, to decide the action, *Buonaparte* ordered General *Lannes*, at the head of two battalions, to march directly to the redoubt; the latter ſeized the moment when the Turks ruſhed out of their intrenchments, and attacked the redoubt by the left face, and by the gorge; the battalions of the 22d and 69th demi-brigades leaped into the ditch, climbed the parapet, and carried the work. *Muſtapha* Pacha made vain efforts to rally his troops; they were forced at all points.

General *Murat* took advantage of this firſt moment to charge again; he ordered his troops to croſs the poſitions of the Turks, and puſhing forward to the very ditches of the fort of Aboukir, he

he put them to a complete rout. They all fled, and threw themſelves into the ſea: moſt of the fugitives were unable to reach the ſhips, which were at too great a diſtance; and the remainder of this army, except the garriſon of the fort of Aboukir, and 200 men ſurrounded and taken with *Muſtapha* Pacha, wholly periſhed in the waves.

This victory coſt the French much blood; they had a great number of men wounded, among whom were General *Murat*, the Chief of the brigade of Engineers *Cretin*, and *Guibert*, Aide de camp to *Buonaparte*; theſe two laſt died of their wounds.

The fort of Aboukir, which was ſummoned the day after the battle, was defended with the fury of deſpair; the Turks can form no idea of a capitulation, nor of any convention whatſoever with arms in their hands. General *Lannes* was wounded in a ſortie, and General *Marmont* took the command of the ſiege, which was conducted with ability and vigour; the Engineers *Bertrand* and *Liedot*, and the Commandant of Artillery *Faultrier*, diſtinguiſhed themſelves on this occaſion. After a week's very briſk bombardment, the breach-batteries being already eſtabliſhed upon the counterſcarp, and the caſtle being now nothing but a heap of ruins, the ſon of the Pacha, his *Kiaya*, and two thouſand men, threw down their arms, and ſurrendered themſelves priſoners; in the fort were found three hundred

hundred wounded, and eighteen hundred dead bodies.

If we may credit the reports ſpread at Conſtantinople, Sir *Sidney Smith*, arriving at *Aboukir*, with the laſt veſſels of the convoy, was an eye-witneſs to this defeat, without being able, as at *St. Jean d'Acre*, to revive by his means and his activity the hopes of the Turks. His ſquadron, joined to that of *Abdul-Fetah* Bey, collected only the wrecks of an expedition, from which the Porte had looked for the recapture of Egypt, and the extermination of what was called, in the Seraglio, the remains of the French army.

The day after the battle, *Buonaparte* returned to Alexandria. He had been appriſed by ſome communications with the flags of truce from the Engliſh ſhips, of the firſt reverſes ſuſtained by the armies of the republic in Italy, and upon the Rhine; he was informed of that fatal ſtruggle between the factions, which, alternately oppreſſing France, were completely ſacrificing her to their fury, and ſought in their mutual deſtruction the guarantee of the duration of their power, and that of their impunity.

Buonaparte, having determined to return to Europe, was already meditating his ſecret departure; and, no doubt, the advantage of having accelerated the epoch of it, by terminating, by a ſingle blow, the military operations in Egypt for this campaign,

was

was to him the moſt agreeable trophy of the victory of Aboukir. He honoured the memory of the principal officers whom he had loſt there, as well as at the ſiege of St. Jean d'Acre, by giving their names to the different forts repaired or newly conſtructed for the defence of the city and the harbours of Alexandria.

On his return to Cairo, he occupied himſelf in ſecuring internal order; the tranquillity which had reigned during the expedition of Aboukir, was to him a ſufficient pledge of its duration; he neglected not to encourage theſe diſpoſitions of the inhabitants towards the French, by proofs of confidence, and by preſents given to the chiefs of the adminiſtration; he cultivated the affection of the people, by ſhewing freſh marks of reſpect for their religious cuſtoms; the feaſt of the Prophet was celebrated, with great pomp, in the preſence of *Muſtapha* Pacha, and the Turkiſh officers who had been taken with him at Aboukir.

About the 15th of Auguſt, two commiſſions of artiſts ſet off, with a ſtrong eſcort, in order to go and viſit the monuments of antiquity in Upper Egypt.

All was quiet in the interior; the ſtrong places, the forts, and the batteries of the coaſts, were well provided with cannon, and abundantly proviſioned; theſe defences might ſtill be perfected, before Commodore Sir *Sidney Smith* could make new preparations, and form with the different corps which had

left Salonica and the Dardanelles another army of debarkation. The advanced guard of the Grand Vizier had ſcarcely reached the camp of Damaſcus; and the deficiency of ſupplies which had retarded his march, the exhauſted ſtate of the provinces of Syria, and the want of concert that prevailed between the Ottoman miniſter and the old Pacha of *St. Jean d'Acre*, who was become more jealous and more untractable ſince his ſucceſs, removed all apprehenſion of the eaſtern frontiers being ſpeedily menaced.

The laſt moments of the ſtay of *Buonaparte* and of General *Berthier* were employed in ſecuring the pay of the army, in anticipating its wants, and in allotting rewards. The diſtribution of 35,000 ſuits of clothes in the corps of infantry alone (a diſtribution in which were not included the ſoldiers who had been clothed the preceding year) is remarkable, on account of the idea that it gives of a numerical force, and of means of recruiting, which were not thought ſo conſiderable.

Such was the internal and external ſituation of Egypt when *Buonaparte* ventured to quit his army, and, in order to accompliſh other views, to truſt his fortune to the waves. It is ſaid that he opened his mind only to General *Berthier*; he ordered Admiral *Ganthaume* to prepare for getting under ſail with two frigates, an advice-boat, and a tartan, without informing him of the deſtination of theſe veſſels; the perſons to whom he granted the peril-

ous favour of accompanying him, Generals *Lannes*, *Marmont*, *Murat*, *Andréoſſy*, the men of ſcience *Monge* and *Berthollet*, the Chief of brigade of the Guides *Beſſieres*, received ſealed notes, which they were not to open till the 22d of Auguſt, at ſuch an hour, and at ſuch a ſpot on the beach; they there found the order to embark immediately, and without taking the liberty of having any communication, a ſimilar packet, which was not to be opened till four and twenty hours after the departure of the veſſels, was addreſſed to General *Kléber*, and contained, for him, the appointment of commander in chief, and, for *Déſaix*, that of commandant in Upper Egypt. This confidence in the good diſpoſitions of his army, and in the firmneſs and influence of the character of Generals *Kléber* and *Déſaix*, could reſult only from a reciprocal and perfect attachment between the chiefs and the ſoldiers; but this ſudden flight, the only poſſible method of obviating every inconvenience attending it, was alſo the ſtrongeſt proof of military ſubordination.

Buonaparte, at firſt thwarted by the winds, did not quit the road of *Aboukir* till the 24th of Auguſt; and after having ſeen only one Engliſh frigate cruiſing on the coaſt, he made ſail for the iſland of Corſica, and put into *Ajaccio* on the 1ſt of October. He left it ſeven days after, and his two frigates having been chaſed by an Engliſh ſquadron, he did not permit Rear-admiral *Ganthaume*, who ſaw ſcarcely any appearance of ſafety, to put about to-

wards Corſica; he would follow his deſtiny, and it was as favourable to him in ſight of the coaſt of France, as it had been the preceding year in ſight of the coaſt of Egypt: he did not make the land near Toulon, in order to avoid the cruiſers that might be off that port; he entered the harbour of *Frejus*, and landed in France on the 14th of October, the forty-ſeventh day after his departure from Egypt.

The operations of *Buonaparte*, of which we have juſt preſented a ſketch, form, no doubt, an eſſential part of the campaign of 1799: we had often regretted our not having been able to compare theſe great events, with thoſe which were paſſing nearer to us, and in which the fortune of arms declared itſelf as in the Eaſt, and by a ſingular chance, at the ſame epochs, alike adverſe or favourable to the parties concerned. The raiſing of the ſiege of *St. Jean d'Acre* coincided with the evacuation of *Zurich* and of *Milan*, and the battle of *Aboukir* with the recapture of *St. Gothard*, and the capital defence of the country of Genoa. As ſoon as we have been able to collect the too ſcarce and too ſcattered materials which were neceſſary for our purpoſe, and which are yet but too incomplete, we have interrupted the chain which confined us, and led us back ſucceſſively to the different theatres of war. We were here going to reſume it with the ſame method, and the ſame details, and terminate this ninth and laſt Number of the year 1799, by a reſult of the campaign, a military and political review

view of the reſpective ſituation of the belligerent powers, of their views, and of their means; but we have employed more than the ſpace allotted to the two Numbers which we now publiſh, and in which we had intended to include this laſt labour; but the multiplicity and importance of the operations that have taken place in Italy and on the Rhine, compel us to reſerve it for the firſt Number of the year 1800.

NOTE

NOTE I.

A Summary of the Hiſtory of Egypt.

" Indocti diſcant, ament meminiſſe periti."

THIS motto announces the object which we have in view in the preſent Note: moſt aſſuredly we do not flatter ourſelves that it can convey any inſtruction to the well-informed; but we think that it will retrace events dear to the lovers of antiquity; and that, by recalling to mind what Egypt formerly was, a calculation may be made of what it may again become.

What country, in fact, has a better claim to fix attention than that which ſerved as a cradle to human knowledge, the hiſtory of which goes back to the firſt ages of the world, where every thing ſeems to have commenced: laws, arts, ſciences, and even fables which derive their origin from nature, whoſe attributes they immortalize, and which, at a ſubſequent period, formed the ground-work of the ingenious fictions of mythology?

What idea muſt we not conceive of the induſtry and civilization of a people who erected thoſe celebrated monuments, anterior to the annals of hiſtory, to the accounts even of tradition, theſe pyramids, the unalterable duration of which has been ſo well depicted by the firſt poet of our age:

" *Leur maſſe indeſtructible a fatigué le tems.*"

When

When we look back upon the ancients, the Greeks and the Romans almoſt excluſively divide our attention. The former, it is true, carried farther the love and the culture of the fine arts; the latter are more remarkable for the great traits of their character: both acquired that renown which men have ſo improperly attached to the ſucceſs of arms.

But, in allowing to Greece all the intereſt which ſhe claims, in ſo many reſpects, we cannot forget that ſhe was originally peopled by Egyptian colonies; that it was Egyptians, who, in later times, carried thither the knowledge of the arts, the moſt neceſſary and the moſt indiſpenſable to ſociety; and that, at the epoch which preceded the ſplendid days of Greece, it was alſo in Egypt that the ſages went to acquire that knowledge of a ſuperior claſs, which conſtituted their glory, and rendered their country illuſtrious.

What the Egyptians had been with reſpect to the Greeks, the latter were, in their turn, with reſpect to the Romans, who neither applied themſelves to the ſciences, nor imbibed a taſte for the arts, till after the triumphs of *Marcellus* and of *Paulus Æmilius*.

Beſides, we ſhould be juſtified in granting a pre-eminence to the nations who knew how to improve the ſocial art, to extend their reſearches to all the objects which ſhould intereſt mankind, and to open an unlimited career to the progreſſes of the human mind.

In this point of view, the Greeks, no doubt, obtain the preference, without ſpeaking of their aſſemblies, their battles, and their feſtivals; the men even, to the preſent time, have preſerved the firſt rank; *Homer* is ſtill the prince of poets, *Demoſthenes* the greateſt of orators, *Hippocrates* the oracle of phyſic, and *Æſchylus* and *Sophocles* the fathers of the dramatic art.

But

But what keeps up a ſort of rivality between Egypt and Greece, is, that, independently of the merit of the priority of knowledge, the former had the eminent advantage of opening her arms to philoſophy and the ſciences, which, forſaking their adoptive country, and not being able to ſurvive the loſs of liberty, fled to their natal ſoil, and found in the Muſæum an aſylum, which neither the Lycæum, the Portico, nor the Academy, could longer afford them.

It is, moſt certainly, to the reign of the *Ptolemies* that we are indebted for the preſervation of the knowledge acquired by the ancients; but could we ſpeak of Alexandria, without remarking, that its foundation is one of the traits which beſt characterize the genius of the conqueror of Darius and of India? For, if poſterity has not beſtowed leſs admiration on his political views than on the ſucceſs of his arms, it is, particularly, from his having judged of all the importance of the ſpot the moſt favourable to the commerce of the world, and by giving it his name, proclaimed it the centre of the vaſt empire which he had created.

Accordingly, though the death of this conqueror was likely to have ſtopped the execution of his plans, *Ptolemy*, ſon of *Lagus*, one of his lieutenants, and one of the firſt in his confidence, made no heſitation in ſecuring Egypt; and, under his juſt and liberal adminiſtration, Alexandria, which he had made the ſeat of government, ſoon excited aſtoniſhment by its population and riches. Inceſſantly occupied by every thing that could promote commerce, he built in the iſle of Pharos that celebrated light-houſe, which, from its magnificence, was reckoned one of the ſeven wonders of the world; and, not granting leſs protection to the culture of the ſciences, he founded the famous library of Alexandria.

Ptolemy Philadelphus followed the maxims of his father, and

and Egypt continued to proſper under his reign, and under that of *Ptolemy Euergetes* his ſucceſſor. The aſtronomers of thoſe times, by a refinement of flattery, placed in the heavens the hair of *Berenice*, who was both his ſiſter and his wife.

All the founders of empire muſt, more or leſs, have poſſeſſed great qualities; but, in proportion as their ſucceſſors forget the origin of power, they accuſtom themſelves to conſider it as a property, and, in general, they are little ſolicitous to deſerve it by the practice of the virtues which it requires.

Indeed the race of the Ptolemies (of the Lagi) appears to have degenerated after theſe three princes; troubles, diſorders, and crimes, almoſt entirely fill the ſpace of two hundred and ninety-two years, which elapſed till the time of *Cleopatra*, with whom ended the reign of the *Ptolemies*.

Yet, notwithſtanding the vices of the government, it appears that Egypt continued to proſper, if we may judge from the riches which it contained, in the time of that princeſs, whoſe magnificence aſtoniſhed *Cæſar* and *Anthony*, although accuſtomed to the pageantry of Aſia. *Robertſon* aſſerts, from the valuation of *Pliny*, that the two pearls which ornamented the ears of *Cleopatra*, had coſt upwards of one hundred and ſixty thouſand pounds ſterling.

The queen of Egypt, who had contrived to make herſelf agreeable to *Cæſar*, and ſubjugate *Anthony*, doubted not of the effect which her charms would produce on *Octavius*; but having been deceived by her hopes, ſhe preferred death to the diſgrace of adorning the car of the victor; and Egypt was reduced to a Roman province. It was with the treaſures which *Octavius* brought from that country, that he found means to reward his ſoldiers, to refund all that

was due to the public treaſury, to give ſpectacles, and
make immenſe preſents to the people.

It is reckoned that the revenue of the laſt *Ptolem*
amounted to upwards of ſixty millions *tournois* (two m
lions and a half ſterling); it afterwards followed the pr
greſs of commerce, and increaſed conſiderably under t
Roman adminiſtration.

Egypt, ſubjected, like the greater part of the kno
world, to the power of the Romans, no longer makes
conſpicuous a figure in hiſtory; nevertheleſs we may jud
of the importance which was attached to its fertility,
the following paſſage from *Tacitus*:

"In the conſulſhip of *Marcus Silanus* and *Lucius N*
banus, *Germanicus* made a progreſs into Egypt, to view t
monuments of antiquity ſo much celebrated in that cou
try. For this journey, the good of the province was
pretext. In fact, by opening the public granaries, he
duced the price of corn; and, by purſuing popular m
ſures, he gained the good-will of the inhabitants. He a
peared in public without a guard, with his feet uncove
after the Greek faſhion, and the reſt of his apparel was a
Greek. In theſe particulars he took for his model t
conduct of *Publius Scipio*, who, we are told, did the ſa
in Sicily, while Rome was ſtill convulſed by the diſtracti
of the Punic war. *Tiberius*, as ſoon as he received advi
from Egypt, condemned this affectation of foreign m
ners, but without aſperity. Another point appeared
him of greater moment. Among the rules eſtabliſhed
Auguſtus, it was a maxim of ſtate policy, that Egypt ſho
be conſidered as forbidden ground, which neither the ſe
tors nor the Roman knights ſhould preſume to tread, wi
out the expreſs permiſſion of the prince. This was,
doubt, a wiſe precaution. It was ſeen, that whoe
ma

made himſelf maſter of Alexandria, with the ſtrong holds, which by ſea and land were the keys of the whole province, might, with a ſmall force, make head againſt the power of Rome, and, by blocking up that plentiful corn country, reduce all Italy to a famine. Germanicus, without authority, had entered Alexandria; and this, to the jealous temper of Tiberius, was little ſhort of a ſtate crime."

This opinion of the importance of Egypt, in a military point of view, is likewiſe confirmed by *Tacitus*, who, in ſpeaking of the election of *Veſpaſian* by the legions of India, adds, that he was almoſt at the ſame time proclaimed by thoſe of Egypt; and that he loſt not a moment in cauſing the principal points of that province to be occupied.

Under the fortunate reign of the Antonines, the proſperity and the riches of Egypt continued to increaſe. Alexandria, which yielded only to the capital of the world in magnificence, had remained the centre of commerce: with a favourable wind, the veſſels which left the mouth of the Nile, reached Oſtia in twenty days, and carried to Italy not only part of the grain neceſſary for her ſubſiſtence, but merchandiſe of every ſort, and of the greateſt value; ſilk, a pound of which was exchanged for a pound of gold; diamonds, pearls, then as much eſteemed as diamonds, and aromatics deſtined for the ceremonies of religion, or for the pomp of funerals. Theſe valuable articles were brought from Perſia, Arabia, and India, to Alexandria, whence they were afterwards diſtributed to all the ſhores of the Euxine Sea, or of the Mediterranean.

It was not only in a commercial point of view that the capital of Egypt fixed attention; it continued to be the centre of knowledge, and the rendezvous of learned men and philoſophers. In the Muſeum originated ſyncritiſm,

the object of which was to conciliate the ancient ſects of Greece, and, at a ſubſequent period, and ſince the eſtabliſhment of the Chriſtian religion, electiſm, which tended leſs to conciliate the opinions of philoſophers, than to chooſe the beſt, in order thence to form a code of morality and inſtruction: a uſeful project, had it not, in the ſequel, become the ſource of the religious quarrels which deſolated the world!

But when the empire had fallen into the hands of weak or ferocious princes, this vaſt coloſſus was ſhaken on all ſides; authority, feeble, like thoſe who were the depoſitaries of it, was no longer capable of maintaining the obſervance of the laws, and anarchy ſucceſſively laid waſte the different provinces under the Roman domination. Egypt was one of the firſt to feel the ſcourge. Under *Gallienus*, about the year 260, Alexandria, whoſe population was 300,000 free men, and as many ſlaves, became the theatre of a civil war, which, with the exception of a few truces, laſted the ſpace of twelve years. All communication was cut off between the different quarters of this unfortunate city; every ſtreet was inundated with blood; every building of any conſequence was converted into a citadel: in ſhort, theſe horrible diſorders did not ſubſide till after a conſiderable portion of the city had been deſtroyed, and the major part of its inhabitants maſſacred, or ſwept away by famine and the plague, which, at that epoch, carried off, in eight years, according to Gibbon's calculation, one half of the human ſpecies in the old hemiſphere.

Egypt, then ſubject to the emperors of Conſtantinople, appears to have eſcaped the invaſions of the barbarians who overran the Roman empire. At the ſame time that the Goths and the Huns were making incurſions into Italy, and that the Vandals were eſtabliſhing themſelves in Africa,

Egypt

Egypt ſtill enjoyed peace, or, at leaſt, was troubled only by pitiful quarrels of religion, which announced the downfall of a government that made them its principal occupation.

It is a thing rather remarkable, that this country, which is juſtly conſidered as the firſt country of the ſciences, was likewiſe that of the monaſtic orders. *St. Anthony*, hurried away by an ardent imagination, abandoned himſelf the firſt to an aſcetic life, and peopled Thebais, Libya, and ſeveral parts of Egypt, with upwards of fifty thouſand of his diſciples. *St. Athanaſius*, during his exile to Rome, carried thither thoſe new inſtitutions, which rapidly ſpread throughout all Chriſtendom.

It is at the epoch of the patriarchate of St. Athanaſius, that aroſe the grand quarrel with Arius, born at Alexandria, and chief of the ſect to which he gave his name; then came thoſe of St. Cyril and Neſtorius, and a multitude of others, which, for near two centuries, occaſioned the ſhedding of ſo much blood. We ſhould omit to mention theſe vain diſputes, had they not had ſo fatal an influence under the deſpicable government of the princes of the lower empire, and had they not, at a ſubſequent period, eſſentially contributed to the conqueſt which Choſroes made of Egypt. It was, in fact, the conſequence of the theological diſſenſions, and the oppoſition which the Egyptians, accuſtomed to ſuperſtition from the time of the Magi, maintained againſt the council of Chalcedon, that drew upon them the perſecutions of the emperors, and diſpoſed them to throw themſelves into the arms of the firſt conqueror who would deliver them from a yoke, which was become altogether inſupportable.

It was under the reign of Heraclius, about the year 611, that Choſroes, king of Perſia, after having conquered Syria, Paleſtine, and the greater part of Aſia, attacked Egypt. He

ſurpriſed

ſurpriſed Peluſium, and advanced without oppoſition as far as Alexandria, which might have been ſuccoured by the fleet that the archbiſhop and the prefect carried away to Cyprus, whither they retired. Choſroes entered as a conqueror into this ſecond city of the empire, which ſtill preſerved the brilliant remains of its ancient opulence, and in which he found immenſe riches.

At this epoch the empire of Conſtantinople ſeemed to be menaced by the moſt immediate deſtruction; for while the Perſians were making themſelves maſters of the provinces of the Eaſt, the barbarians overran thoſe of the North. Heraclius ſolicited peace, but Choſroes would not conſent to grant it, except on ſuch hard conditions, that the emperor accepted it only in order to prepare for war.

War recommenced in 627; the proud Choſroes was defeated by Heraclius, and murdered by order of his own ſon, who made a treaty with the emperor, by which he reſtored all his father's conqueſts: thus Egypt, the loſs of which was ſtarving Conſtantinople, though but for a little while, again became ſubject to the Roman domination.

Mahomet, a man who was to eſtabliſh the empire of his arms and of his opinions over half the world, had already conquered Arabia. His ſucceſſors extended his conqueſts and his religion. Amrou, lieutenant of the caliph Omar, made himſelf maſter of Paleſtine, and marched againſt Egypt; after a ſiege of thirty days, he took poſſeſſion of Peluſium, the key of this province, and advanced to the ruins of Heliopolis, and as far as the very ſpot where now ſtands the city of Cairo. The account which Gibbon gives of this expedition appears to us to merit the attention of our readers for the ſake of the details that he enters into reſpecting the ſtate in which Egypt ſtill was in the middle age.

We ſhall extract from his work the moſt remarkable paſſages.

"On the weſtern ſide of the Nile, at a ſmall diſtance to the eaſt of the Pyramids, and to the ſouth of the Delta, Memphis, one hundred and fifty furlongs in circumference, diſplayed the magnificence of ancient kings. Under the reign of the Ptolemies and Cæſars, the ſeat of government was removed to the ſea-coaſt; the ancient capital was eclipſed by the arts and opulence of Alexandria; the palaces, and at length the temples, were reduced to a deſolate and ruinous condition; yet, in the age of Auguſtus, and even in that of Conſtantine, Memphis was ſtill numbered among the greateſt and moſt populous of the provincial cities. The banks of the Nile, in this place of the breadth of three thouſand feet, were united by two bridges of ſixty and of thirty boats, connected in the middle ſtream by the ſmall iſland of Rouda, which was covered with gardens and habitations. The eaſtern extremity of the bridge was terminated by the town of Babylon and the camp of a Roman legion, which protected the paſſage of the river, and the ſecond capital of Egypt.

"This important fortreſs, which might fairly be deſcribed as a part of Memphis or *Miſrah*, was inveſted by the arms of the lieutenant of Omar: a reinforcement of four thouſand Saracens ſoon arrived in his camp; and the military engines, which battered the walls, may be imputed to the art and labour of his Syrian allies. Yet the ſiege was protracted to ſeven months; and the raſh invaders were encompaſſed and threatened by the inundation of the Nile. Their laſt aſſault was bold and ſucceſsful: they paſſed the ditch, which had been fortified with iron ſpikes, applied their ſcaling-ladders, entered the fortreſs with the ſhout of "God is victorious!" and drove the remnant of the Greeks to their boats and the iſle of Rouda. The ſpot was afterwards recommended to the conqueror by the eaſy communication with

with the gulf and the peninſula of Arabia: the remains of Memphis were deſerted; the tents of the Arabs were converted into permanent habitations, and the firſt moſque was bleſſed by the preſence of fourſcore companions of Mahomet. A new city aroſe in their camp on the eaſtward bank of the Nile; and the contiguous quarters of Babylon and Forſtat are confounded in their preſent decay by the appellation of old Miſrah or Cairo, of which they form an extenſive ſuburb. But the name of Cairo, the Town of Victory, more ſtrictly belongs to the modern capital, which was founded in the tenth century by the Fatimite caliphs. It has gradually receded from the river, but the continuity of buildings may be traced by an attentive eye from the monuments of Seſoſtris to thoſe of Saladin.

"Yet the Arabs, after a glorious and profitable enterpriſe, muſt have retreated to the Deſert, had they not found a powerful alliance in the heart of the country. The rapid conqueſt of Alexandria was aſſiſted by the ſuperſtition and revolt of the natives: they abhorred their Perſian oppreſſors, the diſciples of the Magi, who had burnt the temples of Egypt, and feaſted with ſacrilegious appetite on the fleſh of the god Apis. After a period of ten centuries the ſame revolution was renewed by a ſimilar cauſe; and in ſupport of an incomprehenſible creed, the zeal of the Coptic Chriſtians was equally ardent. I have already explained the origin and progreſs of the Monophyſite controverſy, and the perſecution of the emperors, which converted a ſect into a nation, and alienated Egypt from their religion and government. The Saracens were received as the deliverers of the Jacobite church; and a ſecret and effectual treaty was opened during the ſiege of Memphis between a victorious army and a people of ſlaves. A rich and noble Egyptian, of the name of Mokawkas, had diſſembled his faith to obtain

into the administration of his province: in the disorders of the Persian war he aspired to independence: the embassy of Mahomet ranked him among princes; but he declined, with rich gifts and ambiguous compliments, the proposal of a new religion. The abuse of his trust exposed him to the resentment of Heraclius; his submission was delayed by arrogance and fear; and his conscience was prompted by interest to throw himself on the favour of the nation and the support of the Saracens. In his first conference with Amrou, he heard without indignation the usual option of the Koran, the tribute or the sword. 'The Greeks,' replied Mokawkas, 'are determined to abide the determination of the sword; but with the Greeks I desire no commu-'nion, either in this world or in the next; and I abjure for 'ever the Byzantine tyrant, his synod of Chalcedon, and his 'Melchite slaves. For myself and my brethren, we are re-'solved to live and die in the profession of the Gospel and 'unity of Christ. It is impossible for us to embrace the re-'velations of your prophet; but we are desirous of peace, and 'cheerfully submit to pay tribute and obedience to his tem-'poral successors.' The tribute was ascertained at two pieces of gold for the head of every Christian; but old men, monks, women, and children of both sexes, under sixteen years of age, were exempted from this personal assessment; the Copts above and below Memphis swore allegiance to the Caliph, and promised an hospitable entertainment of three days to every Musulman who should travel through their country. By this charter of security, the ecclesiastical and civil tyranny of the Melchites was destroyed: the anathemas of St. Cyril were thundered from every pulpit; and the sacred edifices, with the patrimony of the church, were restored to the national communion of the Jacobites, who enjoyed without moderation the moment of triumph and revenge.

At the preſſing ſummons of Amrou, their patriarch Benjamin emerged from his deſert; and, after the firſt interview, the courteous Arab affected to declare, that he had never converſed with a Chriſtian prieſt of more innocent manners and a more venerable aſpect. In the march from Memphis to Alexandria, the lieutenant of Omar entruſted his ſafety to the zeal and gratitude of the Egyptians; the roads and bridges were diligently repaired; and, in every ſtep of his progreſs, he could depend on a conſtant ſupply of proviſions and intelligence. The Greeks of Egypt, whoſe numbers could ſcarcely equal a tenth of the natives, were overwhelmed by the univerſal defection; they had ever been hated; they were no longer feared; the magiſtrate fled from his tribunal, the biſhop from his altar; and the diſtant garriſons were ſurpriſed or ſtarved by the ſurrounding multitudes. Had not the Nile afforded a ſafe and ready conveyance to the ſea, not an individual could have eſcaped, who, by birth or language, or office or religion, was connected with their odious name.

"By the retreat of the Greeks from the provinces of Upper Egypt, a conſiderable force was collected in the iſland of Delta; the natural and artificial channels of the Nile afforded a ſucceſſion of ſtrong and defenſible poſts; and the road to Alexandria was laboriouſly cleared by the victory of the Saracens in two and twenty days of general or partial combat. In their annals of conqueſt, the ſiege of Alexandria is, perhaps, the moſt arduous and important enterpriſe. The firſt trading city in the world was abundantly repleniſhed with the means of ſubſiſtence and defence. Her numerous inhabitants fought for the deareſt of human rights, religion and property; and the enmity of the natives ſeemed to exclude them from the common benefit of peace and toleration. The ſea was continually open;

open; and, if Heraclius had been awake to the public diſtreſs, freſh armies of Romans and barbarians might have been poured into the harbour to ſave the ſecond capital of the empire. A circumference of ten miles would have ſcattered the forces of the Greeks, and favoured the ſtratagems of an active enemy; but the two ſides of an oblong ſquare were covered by the ſea and the lake Maræotis, and each of the narrow ends expoſed a front of no more than ten furlongs. The efforts of the Arabs were not inadequate to the difficulty of the attempt and the value of the prize. From the throne of Medina, the eyes of Omar were fixed on the camp and city: his voice excited to arms the Arabian tribes and the veterans of Syria; and the merit of an holy war was recommended by the peculiar fame and fertility of Egypt. Anxious for the ruin or expulſion of their tyrants, the faithful natives devoted their labours to the ſervice of Amrou: ſome ſparks of martial ſpirit were, perhaps, rekindled by the example of their allies; and the ſanguine hopes of Mokawkas had fixed his ſepulchre in the church of St. John of Alexandria. Eutychius, the patriarch, obſerves, that the Saracens fought with the courage of lions. They repulſed the frequent and almoſt daily ſallies of the beſieged, and ſoon aſſailed, in their turn, the walls and towers of the city. In every attack, the ſword, the banner of Amrou, glittered in the van of the Moſlems. On a memorable day, he was betrayed by his imprudent valour: his followers, who had entered the citadel, were driven back; and the general, with a friend and a ſlave, remained a priſoner in the hands of the Chriſtians. When Amrou was conducted before the prefect, he remembered his dignity, and forgot his ſituation: a lofty demeanour, and reſolute language, revealed the lieutenant of the caliph, and the battle-axe of a ſoldier was already

raiſed to ſtrike off the head of the audacious captive. His life was ſaved by the readineſs of his ſlave, who inſtantly gave his maſter a blow on the face, and commanded him with an angry tone, to be ſilent in the preſence of his ſuperiors. The credulous Greek was deceived; he liſtened to the offer of a treaty, and his priſoners were diſmiſſed, in the hope of a more reſpectable embaſſy, till the joyful acclamations of the camp announced the return of their general, and inſulted the folly of the infidels. At length, after a ſiege of fourteen months, and the loſs of three and twenty thouſand men, the Saracens prevailed: the Greeks embarked their diſpirited and diminiſhed numbers, and the ſtandard of Mahomet was planted on the walls of the capital of Egypt. 'I have taken,' ſaid Amrou to the caliph, 'the greateſt city of the Weſt. It is impoſſible for me 'to enumerate the variety of its riches and beauty; and I 'ſhall content myſelf with obſerving, that it contains four 'thouſand palaces, four thouſand baths, four hundred theatres 'or places of amuſement, twelve thouſand ſhops for the ſale 'of vegetable food, and forty thouſand tributary Jews. The 'town has been ſubdued by force of arms, without treaty or 'capitulation, and the Moſlems are impatient to ſeize the 'fruits of their victory.'

"The commander of the faithful rejected with firmneſs the idea of pillage, and directed his lieutenant to reſerve the wealth and revenue of Alexandria for the public ſervice, and the propagation of the faith; the inhabitants were numbered; a tribute was impoſed; the zeal and reſentment of the Jacobites were curbed; and the Melchites, who ſubmitted to the Arabian yoke, were indulged in the obſcure but tranquil exerciſe of their worſhip.

"The intelligence of this diſgraceful and calamitous event afflicted the declining health of the emperor, and

Heraclius

Heraclius died of a dropsy about seven weeks after the loss of Alexandria.

"Under the minority of his grandson, the clamours of a people, deprived of their daily sustenance, compelled the Byzantine court to undertake the recovery of the capital of Egypt. In the space of four years the harbour and fortifications of Alexandria were twice occupied by a fleet and army of Romans. They were twice expelled by the valour of Amrou, who was recalled by the domestic peril from the distant wars of Tripoli and Nubia; but the facility of the attempt, the repetition of the insult, and the obstinacy of the resistance, provoked him to swear, that, if a third time he drove the infidels into the sea, he would render Alexandria as accessible on all sides as the house of a prostitute. Faithful to his promise, he dismantled several parts of the walls and towers; but the people was spared in the chastisement of the city, and the mosque of *Mercy* was erected on the spot where the victorious general had stopped the fury of his troops."

We may judge by this account, that the founders of the empire of the caliphs were not only celebrated warriors, but that they also signalized themselves by a spirit of moderation and justice, which would do honour to the most civilized nations. In general, when a man has created himself by his talents a great name, and more particularly, perhaps, if he has obtained it by military successes, he naturally feels himself inclined to generous sentiments. After having attained the glory of arms, he aspires to give it a new lustre, a more solid foundation, by virtues dearer to humanity; and, if he succeeds in establishing a wise and just legislation, he is sure to fix the attention and the good opinion of posterity.

The laws which Omar's lieutenant gave to the Egyptians,

tians, bore, for the moſt part, this honourable character. He found means at once to curb the intolerant and factious ſpirit of the Copts, and the violence natural to the Arabs. He eſtabliſhed impoſts, which were moderate and juſtly aſſeſſed, and appropriated one third of them to the repair of the highways, dikes, and canals. Under his adminiſtration, the fertility of Egypt was carried to the higheſt pitch; and he did not renounce the junction of the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, by having a canal dug from the Nile to the Red Sea, till the throne of the caliphs was transferred from Medina to Damaſcus.

The conduct of the Caliph Omar, in the rapid courſe of his conqueſts, bears the ſtamp of genius, and of a profound love of juſtice; but it is to be regretted, that fanaticiſm could determine him to order the library of Alexandria to be burnt; every one knows his anſwer to Amrou, who wiſhed to preſerve it: *If theſe writings of the Greeks agree with the book of God, they are uſeleſs, and need not be preſerved; if they diſagree, they are pernicious, and ought to be deſtroyed.*

Gibbon, who relates this fact from the ancient authors, appears to queſtion the loſs which the ſciences ſuſtained on this occaſion. He reminds his readers, that this rich depot of the knowledge of antiquity had already been conſumed in the time of Cæſar, and had ſince experienced frequent ravages from the inconſiderate zeal of the Chriſtians.

It is foreign to the plan of this hiſtorical ſummary to follow the Saracens in the conqueſt which they made of the greater part of Aſia, of Africa, and of a conſiderable portion of Europe: it will be ſufficient for us to mention, that, although defeated by Charles Martel in the plains of Tours in 732, and driven the following year out of Languedoc and Provence, which they laid waſte, the empire of

of the caliphs acquired ſuch an extent, that it was divided into three diſtinct ſovereignties. One of theſe princes reigned at Bagdad; the ſecond at Cordova; and the third, who was maſter of part of Africa, ranked Egypt under his dominion.

During three centuries the Fatimite caliphs enjoyed authority, which, although inferior to that of the ſultans of Bagdad, was nevertheleſs very conſiderable. Like all princes, and particularly thoſe of Aſia, they ſuffered themſelves to be corrupted by the habit of power; and, following the example of the indolent kings, ſhut up at Cairo in their magnificent palaces, theſe inviſible ſovereigns were become the ſlaves of their Viziers, as the former had been of the mayors of the palace. We muſt, however, make an honourable exception in favour of Haroun-al-Raſchild, who lived in the time of Charlemagne, who cultivated and protected the ſciences, and whoſe reign was for the Arabs what that of Auguſtus had been for the Romans.

But, towards the middle of the twelfth century, two great families contending for power, one of them, which had been expelled by its enemies, implored the aſſiſtance of Nuroddin, ſultan of Damaſcus. Several times he ſent formidable armies into Egypt, which were unable to obtain there conſtant ſucceſſes, and which had to fight the troops of the Chriſtian king of Jeruſalem, who had eſtabliſhed himſelf in Paleſtine, at the time of the firſt cruſades; at length, in the year 1171, Amaury, who then reigned in Jeruſalem, having wiſhed to conquer Egypt, the Muſſulmans again invoked the ſuccour of Nuroddin, who drove out the Chriſtians, depoſed the caliph, and made himſelf maſter of Egypt, which he left to his ſon, the great Saladin, who fortified Cairo.

In 1218, the fooliſh and diſaſtrous rage for cruſades again,

again, for the fifth time, brought the Chriſtians into the East. An army of two hundred thouſand men debarked in Egypt, at the eaſt mouth of the Nile, and, after a ſiege of ſixteen months, made itſelf maſter of Damietta; but the inſolence of the legate Pelage, who would take the command of the troops, ſoon made them loſe their firſt advantages, and they were glad to obtain, by the evacuation of Damietta, a peaceable retreat.

The ill ſucceſs of theſe diſtant enterpriſes could not correct the blind fanaticiſm, which the ambition of the court of Rome was inceſſantly exciting; the virtuous Lewis IX. was not exempt from the weakneſs of his age. In 1248 at the head of an army of upwards of one hundred thouſand men, embarked on board eighteen hundred ſhips, he landed in Egypt, and alſo made himſelf maſter of the city of Damietta; but epidemic diſeaſes ſoon ravaged his army, and being defeated at Maſſoura, he was there taken priſoner. The firm and noble conduct which this prince obſerved during his captivity is well known. His conqueror, the grandſon of the brother of Saladin, behaved with generoſity; and Lewis ſoon purchaſed his releaſe by the reſtitution of Damietta, and the payment of 4000 pieces of gold; at this price, he obtained permiſſion to retire into Paleſtine with the remains of his army.

Theſe advantages gained over Lewis IX. were the laſt obtained by Saladin's family, which, at this epoch, was driven from the throne by the Mamalûks, who took poſſeſſion of the government of Egypt, and have preſerved it, with more or leſs power, to our days.

We ſhall not here endeavour to trace the ſingular picture of this ſtrange militia, compoſed of, and recruited with, ſlaves, for upwards of five hundred years; of this government, without a code of laws, without inſtitutions, with-

nal habits even, except thoſe of robbery and rapine. No name known, no expreſſion in uſe, can ſerve to qualify an organization, of which hiſtory affords no other example. Volney, in his Travels in Egypt, has diſcuſſed this article with ſo much knowledge of former times, and has carried into the inquiry of its preſent ſtate ſo much exactneſs and impartiality, and ſo many philoſophical views, that it only remains for us to refer our readers to his intereſting work. We ſhall therefore confine ourſelves to extracting the principal epochs that may ſerve to complete this eſſay reſpecting Egypt, which has ſcarce any other merit than that of uniting in the ſame canvas, what is diſſeminated in the writings of different authors.

It has been ſeen, that it was at the epoch of the ſeventh and laſt cruſade that the Mamalûks, ſlaves purchaſed in the markets of the Eaſt, and become pretorian guards, had ſeized on the government of Egypt. The ſultans whom they elected for their chiefs, at firſt enjoyed a power equal to that of the ſultans and caliphs, who had preceded them; but the Ottomans, who were to retrace the warlike virtues of the Arabs, like them to conquer a part of the world, and like them alſo to become enervated by riches and luxury, invaded Egypt, at the beginning of the ſixteenth century. Selim I. who might have entirely deſtroyed the Mamalûks, thought that it better ſuited the policy of a vaſt empire to give a counterpoiſe to the authority of the provincial governors. He conſiderably weakened this militia, but he left it a degree of conſiſtency, which has ſince ſufficed for its regaining power under the feeble government of his ſucceſſors.

It was not, however, for ſome time, that the Mamalûks ſucceeded in recovering from the checks which they had ſuſtained. Confined to the governments of the provinces,

and to the care of maintaining order, and of protecting t collection of the impoſts, they had no influence in the dete minations of the government, and were held in ſubjectio by the corps of Janizaries, which the Porte habitually ke in Egypt; but the ſame cauſe which had increaſed, a finiſhed by deſtroying the Roman armies, produced the ſa effects on the Ottoman troops. The relaxation of diſc pline, the marriage of the ſoldiers, the permiſſion whi they had of applying themſelves to various profeſſions, time ſoftened theſe proud Janizaries, who ended by tran mitting to their children only a name formerly celebrate and which they were no longer worthy to bear.

For upwards of a century the Ottoman empire has bee loſing in the three quarters of the globe, which it former made tremble, the greater part of its political influence; an it is only to that ſort of *vis inertiæ*, which is peculiar to gre bodies, and ſtill more to the rivality of the powers, and to th equilibrium eſtabliſhed by the peace of Weſtphalia, that th Turkiſh government owed its preſervation, or, at leaſt, th maintenance of its exiſtence in Europe: but, of all th provinces ſubject to the Ottoman Porte, there is none tha has, like Egypt, ſhaken off the yoke of its authority. Fo more than fifty years paſt the Pacha, reſident at Cairo, ha been inveſted only with a title without power; and all hi prerogatives are limited to obtaining, with difficulty, ſom reſpect, and a ſlight tribute.

About the middle of the preſent century, Ibrahim re commenced this new empire of the Mamalûks, which ap peared likely to aſſume a certain degree of conſiſtency unde Ali Bey, who, for ſome years, fixed the attention of Eu rope. The ephemeral ſucceſſes of this ſlave, become chie of a horde of organized banditti, were leſs the reſult of hi talents, than the incapacity of the men with whom he had

to contend. Born in Mount Caucaſus, bought by ſome Jews, and ſold again to Ibrahim, he became his favourite, and was raiſed by him to the rank of Bey, or governor of a province. After the death of his patron, he endeavoured to ſucceed him; but he met with ſuch oppoſition, as forced him to fly towards the Said, the uſual retreat of the malcontents. Recalled to Cairo by the friends that he had contrived to attach to himſelf, he poſſeſſed himſelf of authority, and conceived projects of greater magnitude than his predeceſſor. He drove out the Pacha, refuſed the tribute to the Porte, and, not content with affecting independence, he aſpired to the title of conqueror.

But, notwithſtanding the ſucceſs of his firſt enterpriſes, his fortune was not ſufficiently ſeconded by his conduct to be of long duration. Raiſed by favour, he became the victim of that with which he loaded young Mahommed. In 1769 he had entruſted him with the expedition directed againſt Mecca; that city was taken and abandoned to pillage. The following year Ali Bey carried his views farther, and determined to attack Oſman, Pacha of Damaſcus. He was ſeconded by Daher, commandant at Acre, who had revolted againſt the Porte. Their troops united, defeated thoſe of the Pacha, and took poſſeſſion of Damaſcus. The caſtle alone promiſed a feeble reſiſtance, when Mahommed Bey, who had been ſeduced by the Pacha, ſuddenly ordered a retreat, and retired, in the greateſt diſorder, to Cairo. Ali Bey, who had had the imprudence not to command this expedition in perſon, found himſelf not ſufficiently powerful to puniſh the treaſon of his favourite; but, according to Turkiſh policy, he diſſembled, and waited for a favourable opportunity of being revenged.

Mahommed, who felt the danger of his ſituation, made his eſcape from Cairo, and retired into the Said, where he

collected a powerful party. Ali Bey ſent againſt hi troops, who, inſtead of fighting him, ranged themſelv under his banners, and rendered him ſufficiently ſtrong re-enter Cairo in triumph. Ali Bey had not the courage wait for him there, but fled with his treaſures to his all the Sheick Daher, who received him with that open ho pitality which characteriſes the Arabs. But a little tim after, in the month of April 1773, deceived by falſe hope he endeavoured to return to Cairo, and was defeated a taken by the troops of Mahommed, who, after havi treated him with the perfidious appearance of reſpe made away with him the third day.

Thus ended Ali Bey, the moſt powerful of the chiefs th the Mamalûks have had ſince they have attained authori in Egypt. Although his perſonal qualities were much b low his ſituation, we muſt nevertheleſs do him the juſtice grant him endowments ſuperior to thoſe of his predeceſſor and of the Beys who have ſucceeded him.

Mahommed, who obtained the ſupreme power in t month of April 1773, did not long enjoy the fruits of h treachery. The firſt act of his government was to take oath of obedience to the Porte, which appointed him Pach of Cairo. He immediately commenced the preparatio for an expedition againſt Sheick Daher, whom he could n forgive for his attachment to Ali Bey, and whoſe treaſure which were ſaid to be very conſiderable, he wiſhed carry off.

It was not, however, till the month of February 177 that Mahommed entered Paleſtine, and began the ſiege Jaffa: the moſt complete incapacity, and the moſt abſolu ignorance of the means of attack and defence, prevailed this ſiege, which laſted forty-ſix days. In the mean tim the beſieged, ſuffering greatly, and loſing all hopes of bei

ſuccoure

ſuccoured, commenced a negotiation; while it was under diſcuſſion, ſome Mamalûks who had entered the town, having begun to pillage, the attack was renewed, and terminated by the capture of the town, and the maſſacre of all the inhabitants. Mahommed, equally cowardly and cruel, cauſed a horrible monument to be raiſed of the bones of all the unfortunate inhabitants of Jaffa.

This event, and the circumſtances which had accompanied it, ſpread terror throughout the country. The Sheick Daher abandoned Acre, which his ſon Ali hoped to defend; but finding himſelf too weak, and having endeavoured to treat, Mahommed felt no horror at requiring the head of his father as the firſt condition. The Arab, who, however, has been reproached with rebellion againſt his father, ſhuddered with indignation, and retired. The Mamalûks made themſelves maſters of the town, and plundered it. All the inhabitants of Acre, with fear and trembling, expected the fate of thoſe of Jaffa, when Nature, avenging her rights, in two days carried off the barbarous Mahommed, who died of a malignant fever in the month of June 1776.

As ſoon as the army was appriſed of this event, it retreated in diſorder towards Egypt. Murad Bey, who remained the chief in command, and who aſpired to the firſt place in the government, returned to Cairo, in order to diſpute it with Ibrahim Bey, who, on his ſide, rallied his friends, and took all his meaſures for preſerving it. A bloody war appeared inevitable between theſe two claimants. The equality of force, which ſeemed likely to call the fate of arms as arbiter between them, determined them, on the contrary, to ſhare the ſupreme authority.

From this time, till that of the conqueſt of Buonaparte, in a ſpace of about twenty years, nothing has happened in

Egypt that can deſerve to fix attention: diviſions and quarrels produced by avarice and ambition; negotiations commenced, carried on, and terminated by intrigue, have been the inevitable reſult of the ſyſtematized anarchy which conſtitutes the government of the Mamalûks. The only thing that might excite aſtoniſhment, on the firſt view of the ſubject, is, that effuſion of blood ſhould ſo ſeldom be the conſequence of theſe continual diſſenſions; but ſurpriſe will ceaſe, if we reflect on the neceſſary connexion which naturally exiſts between a ſmall number of oppreſſors, who may probably diſpute with each other the ſpoils of the people; but who have an intereſt in reciprocally favouring one another, and in not deſtroying the force which preſerves their power.

The haſty view that we have juſt taken of the various ſituations which Egypt has experienced, from the moſt remote antiquity till our days, will have ſufficed to make our readers feel all the geographical importance of that country, which was, for ſuch a length of time, the centre of the knowledge, of the commerce, and of the riches of the world. The limits of this journal, and, above all, of the time of which a writer can diſpoſe in the compilation of a periodical work, have compelled us to omit a great number of intereſting details, and particularly all thoſe relative to the trade which the Venetians have ſo long carried on with India, Arabia, and Perſia, by the way of Egypt. It is to the immenſe advantages they thence derived, that they were indebted for the great political preponderancy, which, till the league of Cambray, had been preſerved by that republic, which, after exiſting twelve hundred years, has juſt diſappeared before the ſame arms that are perhaps deſtined to found a new empire in the Eaſt.

There can, in fact, be no doubt that Buonaparte, whoſe fortune

fortune and talents have triumphed over all the obſtacles which ſurrounded his perilous expedition, will ſet the greateſt value on the preſervation of a conqueſt, in many reſpects ſo intereſting. After the glory of reſtoring juſtice and peace to his country, what object more worthy of occupying the thoughts of an enterpriſing genius, than to carry back the arts, induſtry, and the ſciences, to their native land, and, by the improved knowledge of the moderns, to pay the tribute of gratitude, which they owe to the moſt ancient people of the world?

Beſides the various advantages which the French may promiſe themſelves from the poſſeſſion of a country renowned for its fertility, what hopes would not ſettlements on the Arabian Gulf, and communications with Perſia, China, and Hindoſtan, hold out to commerce? However tedious and difficult may be the conveyance of merchandiſe by the caravans; there may be ſeen, in the recent inquiries of Robertſon, the degree of importance which till this moment the ancient commerce by land has preſerved. Beſides, it cannot be diſſembled, the route of the Cape of Good Hope is loſt to all the nations of the European continent. England, as we have already remarked, has not only ſtrengthened but extended her power in the Peninſula of India: her ſquadrons, ſheltered from the monſoons in the road of Trincomale, and taking advantage of the regular and alternate winds which prevail in theſe difficult ſeas, will not henceforth ſuffer any other flag to fly there than the Britiſh. Europe is condemned to the yoke of monopoly; and all thoſe valuable commodities, become of the firſt neceſſity, and thoſe ſtuffs fabricated, at ſo cheap a rate, by a frugal and patient people, will be reſold by the rulers of the ſeas at the price which they ſhall think proper to fix.

It would therefore be rendering a real ſervice to all the inland

inland nations, to conſolidate the eſtabliſhment of the French colony in Egypt, and to give to the commerce of that country, which, in all times, has fixed the attention of enlightened politicians, the full extenſion of which it may be ſuſceptible. The Egyptians, degraded by miſery, and debaſed by deſpotiſm, the enſlaved Greeks, and the wandering Arabs, will become citizens, as ſoon as they ſhall find a country in the exiſtence of a city, which contains near four hundred thouſand ſouls, is alone ſufficient to prove that induſtry has not been entirely deſtroyed on the banks of the Nile; and Cairo, by the vigilant attention of the government, and by that activity ſo peculiar to the French, may yet recall to mind the ſplendid days of Tyre and of Alexandria.

NOTE II.

AT the moment when this ſummary of the campaigns of Buonaparte in Egypt and in Syria was on the point of appearing, we received a particular account of the campaign of General Déſaix in Upper Egypt. We undoubtedly regret that theſe materials were not publiſhed ſooner, and that we have been able only to indicate the epochs and the reſults of the continual movements and battles of the French, of this little army oppoſed to a fanatic and furious multitude, to whole tribes, inceſſantly conquered and diſperſed, but never ſubdued.

However, we could not have interrupted the narrative of the campaign of Egypt, in which, both in a military and politic

political point of view, every thing has appeared to us so connected, that we cannot say at what epoch we might have diverted the attention of our readers from the principal scene.

General Désaix has displayed, in this campaign, the talents which had caused him to be distinguished in Europe, and the character which had gained him the esteem of both armies, and the particular affection of the French soldiery. The difficulties that he had to surmount in Upper Egypt were of a kind entirely new, both from the nature of the country and from the sort of combatants that were opposed to him; for the question was not only to come up with them, to defeat them, to carry off their supplies, but to surround them, and to destroy them in a valley, which, growing gradually narrower, without offering and affording any great transversal position, any support upon the flanks, equally favoured the flight and the rallying of the troops of the Beys. All that escaped the sword of the conqueror reappeared a short time after in fresh attacks, always undertaken with the greatest boldness, and abandoned after the first onset: it was necessary to follow the course of the Nile, the only inhabited part of the country, to deprive the Mamalûks and Arabs of the succours which they there found for recruiting themselves, and to prevent Murad Bey from increasing his army, and from succeeding either in making that of General Désaix fall back, or in rendering himself sufficiently formidable to compel Buonaparte to employ in Upper Egypt, part of the forces that were so necessary to himself.

The corps of Murad Bey's Mamalûks defeated at the affair of Samanhout, again shewed itself on the rear, and was almost entirely cut to pieces in the battle of Souhama. Those who had followed Hassan Jeddaoui and Osman Hassan, driven by General Belliard beyond the Cataracts, rallied at Syene. These hordes, ever penetrating into the Deserts,

re-entered the valley, intercepted the communications, de
ceived the inhabitants, and excited them to revolt: th
ſmalleſt retrograde movement, however neceſſary for mai
taining this long communication, accredited the idea of th
defeat of the French, and the ſmalleſt of its effects was
render it more difficult to obtain and to convey ſupplies.

General Déſaix, after he had conquered Upper Egypt
above the Cataracts, and had there ſtrengthened himſe
by the occupation of Coſſeir, upon the Red Sea, and the co
ſtruction of a fort in the important poſition of Kéné, w
nevertheleſs forced to march and to fight inceſſantly, in ord
to maintain his ground, with his little army, againſt the i
curſions of thoſe almoſt indeſtructible hordes.

Such is the general idea that may be formed of this ki
of war, by peruſing the accounts of General Déſaix, a
thoſe of the officers employed under his command; we ha
not choſen to enter into greater details, or to abridge this i
tereſting narrative, by reducing it to a ſort of geographic
nomenclature. We ſhall, in one of our ſubſequent Numbe
collect every thing relative to this campaign of Gene
Déſaix, and ſhall endeavour to render this ſupplement mo
ſatisfactory, by accompanying it with a particular map
Upper Egypt.

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MAP
of
EGYPT
and of
SYRIA,

Drawn and Engraved for the

EPITOME OF MILITARY EVENTS.

November 1799.

Scale of leagues twenty-five to a degree.

5 10 15 20 25





MEDITERRANEAN SEA

ARABIA PETRÆA

ARABIA DESERTA

ARABIA FELIX

MOUTHS OF THE NILE

DELTA

CHARKIYEH

CHERQYEH

BOHEIYREH

Barrai el Gharbial

DIYZEH

MAREOTIS

ALGICE

VOSRANI or RIFE

RED SEA

Mt LIBANUS

DAMASC

PALESTINE

Jabel Sarcad

Lake Asphaltites or Dead Sea

Mt Horeb

Mt Sinai

JERUSALEM

BOSRA

Balbec

Lubon

Hasria

Kiam-el-Harmel

Hovarein

Buraidge

Malula

Cazama

Cagra

Odomana

Keeifa

Buhairat-el-Marsi or Lake of the Meadow

Sawa

Sel Karouch

Kalaat Nimrud

Daihet-el-Druse

Leja

Karak Schaubak

Moab

Karak

Thamar

Zoara

Susam

Zatap

Tebuc

Acra or Megarv

Madian

Elim

el Tor

Fresh Water

St Catherine & Fathers

Shar of Beni Gatei

Calaat el Acaba

Dar el Hemra

Aqabah

Ailah in ruins

Sat el Acaba

Abiar Alaina

Calaat el Nakal

Rastngara

Fountains of Moses

Navatir

Ain el Hare

Minsieh

Lake Sheih bitter water

Birk el Hadjis

Birket el Kerun

Lake Mareotis

Lake Maadia

Lake Menzaleh

Mouths of Pelusium in ruins

Tineh

Damietta

Rosetta

Alexandria

Canal of Alexandria

Aboukir

Marioutis

Lake Mareotis

Towers of the Arabs

Zaidi el Baramous or Mon. of the Greeks

Mon. of the Syrians

Ambo Bishoi

Mon. of Abbe Paphnutius

Mon. of St Macarius

Pyramids of Gizah

Old Cairo

Aduvieh

Heliopolis

Matarieh

Tombs

Tamieh

Meidon

Nezleh

Zaoie

Schemi

Atfieh

Beled Kerun

Castiabe

Mahoure

Benishouef

Beniad

Bebe

Ptolemais

Mt Carmel

Caiffa

Canteura

Cæsarea

Samaria

Nablousa

Jaffa or Joppa

Lod Diospolis

Ramley

Bethlehem

Beth Gibrun

Ezdod

Gaza

Kan Younes

Lebhem

Zaca

Hebron

Jacob's Bridge

Scytopolis

Bithnia

Sea of Tiberias or Lake of Gennesareth

Safad

Jarone

Tyre

Tiroun

Canatha

Aponum

Hasbeia

Saida

Sidon

Sarepta

Old Tyre

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Mesvadiat

Hasera

Wadadar

Magar

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Ramathim

Seeki

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St John Climax

Mt Colzim

Bede

Ain el Hamra

Ain el Ghamr

Tell el Ibtieh

Tell el Bueit

Kelish

Hank

Dasher

Tehera

Nezleh

Schemi

Atfieh

Mehalie

Pulley

Tebene

Beni Hassan

Ahmunein

Melani

Ensene

Serab

Cussie

Kuseer

Cistern

Mon. of St Pant

Ashmon

Salchieh

Hesiron

Asebbi

Masinae

Varaia

Belbeis

Mit Kamar

Mit Denbais

Basta

Shibbreket

Shabur

Selamun

Amgrous

Semennud

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Selemie

Menuf

Sebadje

Nikious

Alkam

Boulkaoun

Tineh

Tinase

Menzaleh

Mansoura

Armun Tanah

Sau Tanah

Damietta

Lake Menzaleh

Ibeli bury

Jermanat

Berelos

C. Berelos

C. Mastero

Megamieh

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Lt Castle

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Peiziera

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Motubis

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Lake Mareotis

Canal of Alexandria

Towers of the Arabs

Shibbreket

Shabur

Selamun

Amgrous

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Peiziera

Deirut

Fouah

Rahmanie

Gemaine

Motubis

Rosetta

MAP

of part of the Coast of

EGYPT,

Comprehending the CITY *and the* HARBOURS *of* ALEXANDRIA,

together with the Road and the Peninsula of ABOUKIR.

Drawn and Engraved for the

EPITOME of MILITARY EVENTS.

December 1799.

Scale of Leagues.

1 2 3

MEDITERRANEAN

Lighthouse
Old Harbour
Fort
City of the Arabs
ALEXANDRIA
New Harbour
Kasr Kiassera
Well
P. of the Arabs
MARIOUT
SHORE of MARIOUT
Mariout
Towers of the Arabs
SITE OF LAKE MAREOTIS
Karium
CANAL of ALEXANDRIA
Karivi
DAMANHOUR
Menuf
DESERT OF THE DELTA
Lake of Natron
Efrim
PART
Islot
Fort of ABOUKIR
Village
Redoubt
Well
Position of the French Fleet between the Action
Road of Aboukir
Hassan
Otku
Pontoons
Acame
LAKE MAADIE
West branch of the Nile
Boghass
L.e Castle
G.d Castle
ROSETTA

Published by T. Egerton, Military Library, Whitehall March 1, 1800.

Engraved by J. Cooke N.o 50, Newland Street.

A Plan of the Operations of the BRITISH FORCES in EGYPT from the LANDING in ABOUKIR BAY on the 8th of March to the BATTLE of ALEXANDRIA March 21st inclusive.



ORDER of BATTLE of the BRITISH ARMY,

Lieut. Gen.l Sir Ralph Abercromby K.B.
Maj. Gen. Hutchinson.

REFERENCE.

1. Portion of the British after their landing on the 8th March.
2. Portion of the British on the Evening of the 8th
3. Brigade of Guards advanced on the 21st.
4. Reserve under Maj. Gen.l Moore advanced on the 9th
5. Advanced Posts.
6. Portion of the British Army on the 12th.
7. Battle and Position of the British on the 13th March.
8. Pursuit of the French into the Plain after which the Army returned to their position. 7.
9. Battle on the 21st March and position after the Battle.

A. Position of the French to oppose the landing on the 8th March.
B. Retreat of the French after the landing of the British.
C. Position of the French on the Battle of the 13th March.
D. Position of the French after the Battle of the 13th and 21st March.
E. Position of the French in the Battle of the 21st at day break.

Reserve — 25
Moore — 28
Oakes — 40
42
58
Corsicans

ORDER of BATTLE of the FRENCH ARMY,

Abdallah Menou
Commander in Chief.

Taken from Menou's Orders for the Disposition of the Battle on the 21st March.

Published by W. Faden, Geographer to His Majesty & to His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, Charing Cross, May 28th 1801.

EPITOME

OF

MILITARY EVENTS,

January, 1800.

THE events, which, ſince the month of October 799, have decided the fate of this memorable cam-aign, broken the chain of the combined operations f the Allies, and looſened the bonds of the coali-on againſt the French republic, are at this eventful riſis the ſubject of very momentous diſcuſſions; and heir cauſes, as well as their reſults, will, one day, e ſtudied and inveſtigated by ſtateſmen and gene-als. Never, perhaps, did ſo many warlike achieve-ents, but never, above all, did ſuch important ones ccur in ſo ſhort a period, and thus at once preſent hemſelves to the view and to the pen of the iſtorian. Theſe achievements are ſo numerous, hat they ſhun obſervation, as well as eſcape the emory; they lie hidden and become obſcured;

they even ſeem ſometimes to contradict each other; and the more the intereſts of the different powers are modified and divided, the more difficult it is, in the midſt of ſo many errors, for a writer to keep within the pale of hiſtoric truth.

In deſcribing theſe late events, and aſſigning to each its place, we have found, in the conception and in the conduct of the plans of operations combined and depending on each other, the moſt ſimple and the moſt perſpicuous order, as well as the ſole ſatisfactory explanation of the movements of the corps, and of thoſe of the armies themſelves.

We ſhall not depart from this general manner of conſidering objects, nor from the method which it has led us to adopt. Very far from thinking that we are purſuing a chimera, that we are putting a conjectural ſcience in the place of the unforeſeen effects of the neceſſity of circumſtances, and of the caprices of fortune, we ſhall, on the contrary, ſtrive to demonſtrate, in this laſt picture, which will terminate the campaign of the year 1799, that in the aggregate of the offenſive operations againſt France, muſt be ſought the cauſes of the alternate ſucceſſes and reverſes.

We have pointed out in what manner the Allies had been induced to occupy the whole ſpace of the immenſe circumvallation of France; and if we have ſet forth the preciſion and the advantages of theſe vaſt military combinations, as long as the forces employed in their execution were proportionate

tionate to the object, we have alſo pointed out the epoch when the allied armies, weakened by ſuch great loſſes, and not having ſuch ſpeedy means of recruiting their numbers, nor a ſort of men ſo eaſy to form as the French armies, were inſufficient to execute the general plan; and too much involved, too much diſunited, to reduce it to a ſmaller ſcale, make ſmaller efforts, or incur ſmaller riſks.

We ſhall take care not to loſe this clue, in the midſt of the labyrinth; we ſhall obſerve that, with reſpect to the general object of the war, to the end, openly declared by the Emperor of Ruſſia, and tacitly avowed by the Court of Vienna, there could be only one conſequence, namely, good or ill ſucceſs in the attacks, ſimultaneouſly directed againſt the three great frontiers of France; and that in this point of view, the ſucceſs of one alone of the three attacks, the victories of a ſingle army, if the others were defeated, or merely confined to their poſitions, ſerved only to waſte time, and conſume means, without efficaciouſly contributing to the reſult for which the allied powers had made the greateſt ſacrifices, at leaſt the moſt conſiderable ones that their ſtates could bear, without attacking the order, and even the exiſtence of the body politic.

Not only does this obſervation explain to us the preſent ſituation, the diſperſion of the forces of the coalition, at the point, and at the very inſtant, when their ſtrongeſt junction ſeemed likely to

change their fortune, but it ſerves alſo to diſcover to us the views of the cabinet of Vienna, its conſtant ſolicitude for the maintenance of its excellent army, the uniform conduct of the *Archduke*, and the good underſtanding that prevails between the generals of the two Auſtrian armies. We ſhall give an account of what has paſſed in Italy, and on the Lower Rhine, ſince the diſlocations, and the ſucceſſive recompoſitions of the allied armies, without dwelling on a great number of battles, which, although very remarkable, on account of freſh proofs of talents in the art of war, and of freſh examples of daring and courage, are, at preſent, leſs important, as to the general reſult.

We ſhall not, however, ſlightly paſs over the manœuvres of the reſpective armies, relatively to the blockade and the ſiege of *Coni* in Italy, and that of *Philipſburg* on the Lower Rhine. Theſe manœuvres, and the actions they have occaſioned between the armies which were preparing to form the ſieges, and thoſe of obſervation which were ſtriving to prevent or delay them, form a more eſſential part of the hiſtory of this campaign, as theſe two places ſeem to have reſumed, all at once, by the new courſe of events, the importance which they had enjoyed in former wars: not that their influence has extended; but the operations have, as we have before obſerved, become partial and circumſcribed, in proportion as circumſtances have modified the particular intereſts of ſuch or ſuch a power.

It

It ſhould ſeem that, towards the end of this campaign, the force of events was to bring both parties to make overtures of peace, inſtead of exciting the general conflagration of a war of deſtruction, to which armed opinions and paſſions would fix no bounds, till after having effected the ruin of the oppoſite party: alas! we make light of this, no doubt, too diſaſtrous kind of war, in which whatever ſtates take up arms, for their own preſervation, and without attacking the foundations of ſociety, without ſeeking in their mutual overthrow triumphs, ſoon fatal to the conqueror, think only of ſecuring their political independence; and, even in giving way to the flights of ambition, do not ſhut out every means of negotiation, do not make an impious conſpiracy againſt the return of peace.

We have ſaid that the loſs of the battle of *Zurich*, by occaſioning the failure of the new plan of the Allies, for a general attack, had entirely diſconcerted the deſigns of the two Imperial courts. In fact, it was no longer poſſible to fulfil the hopes of the coalition, and the ſort of engagement made with England, to reach, and to force the eaſtern frontier of France, before the end of the campaign; while the operations againſt Holland ſhould detain in the north a part of the forces of the republic: all the activity of General *Suwarrow*, and of his indefatigable army, could not re-eſtabliſh the centre of the line of the combined operations.

We have remarked, on ſeveral occaſions, that the prodigious

prodigious conſumption of the allied armies diminiſhed their numbers and their means of action, below the proportion of ſuperiority neceſſary for the ſucceſs of a general and ſimultaneous attack; we ſhall here add two important obſervations, which ariſe from the nature of the ſubject of which we are now treating, and which belongs to this period of the hiſtory of the campaign.

The firſt is, that in an offenſive war, although at firſt ſight it ſhould ſeem that equal loſſes in the different battles ſhould be to the advantage of the ſtronger, it happens, on the contrary, that the army which acts offenſively, grows proportionably weaker. Its ſucceſſes, while they open before it a more extenſive ſcene, force it to multiply its ſmall detachments, to preſent to every deſtructive cauſe a larger ſurface, to uſe more rapidly its material means. It, in general, finds but few reſources in the countries which the army that is oppoſed to it has defended inch by inch; the latter, on the contrary, concentrating itſelf, compelled, in order to maintain its ground, to be more particular in chooſing, and more ſkilful in taking its poſitions, traverſes leſs ſpace, oppoſes more art than ſtrength to that which muſt continually aſſail its poſts; it therefore conſumes, in proportion, fewer men and fewer materials; and if the army which acts offenſively does not receive reinforcements, calculated on its increaſing and neceſſary progreſſion, as it advances, and the plan is unfolded, it then, not only ſoon finds

finds itſelf too weak for the enterpriſe in which it is engaged, as we have demonſtrated in one of our preceding Numbers, but although its component parts are ſtill ſound, it is threatened with falling, all on a ſudden like an enervated body, into a ſort of diſſolution.

The ſecond obſervation, applicable to this great change of fortune, and of reſpective ſituation, between the armies of the coalition, and thoſe of the republic, is, that in the plans of general operations, as in particular operations or expeditions, as well alſo as in battles or ſieges, the point of attack againſt which the greateſt efforts are intended to be exerted, ſhould be determined beforehand and remain fixed: there is ſeldom a poſſibility of carrying on, with equal ſucceſs, two principal attacks, ſo as to make them keep pace with each other, without claſhing. There is yet more ſeldom a poſſibility of a general changing his plans, in the middle of a campaign, and, owing to the immenſe difficulty of the removal of magazines, of his loſing with impunity, in new preparations, in new diſpoſitions, a valuable portion of time, in the preſence of a concentrated army, which is rendered more active and more vigilant by a ſolicitude for its preſervation in its defenſive poſitions.

If ſuch is the neceſſary effect of the connexion between all the points of the line, or rather between all the faces of the frontiers; if theſe relations are ſo eſtabliſhed, ſo aſſimilated to the centre and to

the flanks of a poſition, to the centre and to the wings of an army, that there cannot be made, on any one of theſe three parts, inſulated combinations in which it is poſſible to forbear from co-operating in the compoſition, the diſpoſition and the movement of the others, are they not ſo many proofs of the progreſs and development, of what we have taken the liberty of calling the new ſyſtem of war*? Why ſhould we not admit, that extraordinary circumſtances, military and political ſituations, ever in the extreme, have, as much as neceſſity, excited a diſplay of genius, and occaſioned a rapid advancement to be made in the ſcience of war? Have not the obſervance and application of the ſimple laws of the weight and equilibrium of bodies, to the invention and uſe of the moſt ſerviceable complicated machines, obtained the honour of being recorded in the page of hiſtory, and of being conſecrated, as ſo many degrees towards the improvement of human knowledge?

It reſults from a compariſon of various documents, publiſhed by General *Suwarrow*, that it was agreed, that at a fixed period, about the 20th of September, he would replace in Switzerland, on the left wing, with his Ruſſian diviſions from Italy, thoſe which the *Archduke* ſhould withdraw, on the right wing, to form the army of Auſtria and of the Empire, on the Lower Rhine. Did the delay

* See Note I. vol. i. page 62.

of

of the arrival of General *Suwarrow*'s corps, which was ſo fatal to the combined army, and of which General *Maſſena* ſo ſkilfully availed himſelf, ariſe ſolely from the want of means of conveyance, and from the negligence of the diſpoſitions for accelerating the march of the Ruſſian troops acroſs Mount *St. Gothard?* Could this preciſion of movements, this punctuality, on which it was wiſhed that the ſucceſs of ſo great an enterpriſe ſhould depend, then alone enſure it; and is it not more reaſonable to attribute the want of ſucceſs to the cauſes which we have juſt brought to the reader's recollection? The opinion of military men who have been attentive to thoſe great movements, which were as the *dénouement* of the offenſive part of the campaign of the Allies, is divided on theſe queſtions, which indirectly involve the conduct of the *Archduke*, at the moment when he marched to the relief of *Philipſburg*. Every thing that has appeared, ſince the ſeparation of the Ruſſian and Auſtrian armies, has ſerved only to confirm us in our firſt ideas on this point. It ſeems to us that the *Archduke* could delay matters no longer; and that, after he had been forced to renounce his plan of operations, becauſe there was made to the left, on the Alps and Apennines, the effort directed againſt the centre, by the heart of Switzerland, it was impoſſible for him, in order to cover Swabia and the rear of the army hemmed in on the left bank of the Rhine, not to ſeize the firſt moment in which the

arrival of General *Korſakow* would permit him o extend his right, and to employ his cavalry, which till then had been almoſt uſeleſs; we ſhall have occaſion to elucidate this queſtion more fully, and to point out all the importance of the fortreſs of *Philipſburg:* we ſhall terminate theſe reflections, which lead us back again to the point of ſight of the general picture, at the epoch of the month of October, repeating, as a concluſion, which appears to us perfectly juſt, and which muſt abſolve us from every reproach of contradiction in the opinions which we have ventured to promulgate, namely:

That General *Suwarrow*'s plan, as a particular operation, was juſt and well conceived, and ſingularly bold; but if we conſider it, as to its connexions with the whole of the general ſituation, it was too hazardous, and even bordering on temerity.

Be this as it may, the allied army was, at the end of October, in the ſame poſition, and within the ſame lines that the Auſtrian army had occupied previous to its entrance into Switzerland by the *Griſons* and the *Thurgau*. Theſe lines, although very extenſive, were however almoſt impregnable, becauſe the moſt conſiderable interval between the ſupports of the wings, the greateſt curtain, was covered by the Lake of *Conſtance*.

The ſecurity which reſulted from this advantage, allowed the *Archduke* to preſerve his poſition, in a line with *Schaffhauſen*, between the Danube and Switzerland.

Switzerland. He had fixed his head-quarters at *Donaueſchingen*; he kept his eye on the re-entering point of *Baſle*, where *Maſſena* was making demonſtrations of attack, in order to favour the paſſage and the new movements of the French on the Lower Rhine. At the ſame time the *Archduke* ſupported, on his right, the corps of General *Sztarray* and of Prince *Charles* of *Lorraine*; and was preparing to fill, on his left, the vacuum left in the *Griſons* and in the *Voralberg*, by the retreat of the Ruſſian army.

General *Suwarrow* aſſembled his army in the environs of *Lindau*, and called in the diviſions of Prince *Korſakow*, between the 20th and the 25th of October. *Suwarrow*'s corps was eſtimated at 20,000 men, and that of *Korſakow* at 15,000; theſe were the remains of the two Ruſſian armies, which, compriſing the reinforcements ſent into Italy, had repreſented an effective force of 70,000 men.

On the 24th of October, the Ruſſians ſtill occupied the important poſt of *Bregentz*, oppoſite to *Rheineck*; but they were ſhortly relieved in it by ſome Bavarian troops, as ſoon as the diviſions of Ruſſian artillery, which were returning from Italy, by the Tyrol, were arrived as high as *Kempten*. General *Suwarrow*, who had already made his cavalry form in his rear, commenced his retreat; he began by transferring his head-quarters, and carrying the line of his firſt cantonments to *Memmingen*, whence he cauſed his army and the Prince *de Conde*'s

corps to file off towards *Augſburg*, in order to take up his winter quarters either in that city or in its environs.

The ſituation of the *Archduke* then became extremely critical. It is proper to remark that, from the good choice of poſitions, on a line of about eighty leagues in extent; from the famous poſt of *Nauders*, at the entrance of *Engadina*, on the frontier of the *Tyrol*, as far as *Philipſburg*, that Prince contrived to maintain, on the whole right bank of the Rhine, a reſpectable defence, with leſs than 60,000 men, againſt forces greatly ſuperior.

The French, after having ſtrengthened themſelves on the left bank of the Lake of *Conſtance*, puſhed their advantages on the ſide of the Griſons, by the valley of *Diſentis*; Generals *Soult*, *Loiſon*, and *Mortier*, diſlodged, ſucceſſively, the corps of rear guard, which ſtood firm at the principal paſſages, and compelled them to retire from the other ſide of the Rhine, by the bridges of *Reichnau* and *Feldſberg*, which were burnt. The Imperial regiment of *Brechainville* ſuffered conſiderably in this retreat. *Coire* was evacuated; General *Linken*, who had ſupplied the place of General *Hotze* in the command of all this frontier of the Voralberg and of the Tyrol, maintained the poſition of *Meyenfeld* and his communications with *Feldkirch*; he transferred his head-quarters to *Pludentz*, in the Voralberg.

The French advanced no farther; *Maſſena* did not attempt to force the Imperialiſts to evacuate the

Griſons

Griſons entirely, by an attack which, in all probability, would have been very bloody, and which, at this particular time, could have anſwered no purpoſe; he employed himſelf in aſſembling the corps of his army, and in concentrating the greater part of them about *Baſle* and *Zurich*, the entrenchments of which he cauſed to be reconſtructed and augmented; he withdrew General *Thureau*'s diviſion from the *Valais*, and left there only an inconſiderable corps under the command of General *Jacopin*.

Already were all the paſſes of Mount *St. Gothard*, and of the *Simplon*, barred by the ſnow; it was no longer poſſible to get to the loftieſt ſummits, to thoſe immenſe *glaciers*, the moſt intereſting object of the curioſity of ſtrangers. Travellers were formerly attracted thither by the contemplation of the wild beauties of nature; they will, at ſome future day, there ſeek for the remains of encampments, and the veſtiges of the numerous battles which have attached too famous a remembrance to the moſt remarkable points of the globe. Then, perhaps, theſe deep vallies will again be inhabited by an independent people, happy in their laws, in their ſimple and agreſtical manners, in their labours and their induſtry. But they will not be the deſcendants of *William Tell*: theſe have almoſt all periſhed; the ſmall number which has ſurvived has fled from this unfortunate country, where the flame of war has conſumed every thing, where innocence

and

and liberty have no longer an aſylum. Thouſands of wandering children, and of deſerted flocks, were found diſperſed in theſe vaſt ſolitudes. The corps of troops which ſubſiſted only by the deſtruction of the feeble reſources collected with difficulty by the inhabitants, could no longer maintain their ground, but by carrying thither, as into a deſert, every article neceſſary for their ſuſtenance, except the too abundant waters, which ceaſing to be directed by the hand of man, and left to their own capricious courſe, throw down and waſh away the lands which they had not long ſince been made to fertilize.

The depopulation and famine, which reigned throughout all Upper Switzerland, the extreme difficulty of conveying ſupplies in any quantity in the fall of the year, and the exhauſted ſtate of the magazines, during the late operations, ſufficiently account for the inaction of the army under General *Maſſena*, whom people were aſtoniſhed at not ſeeing penetrate into Italy, without fully weighing theſe difficulties, and the loſſes he had ſuſtained, in the laſt battles fought with the Ruſſians, and the poſition of the Archduke's army, which was very far advanced in the *Briſgau*.

After the evacuation of Switzerland by the Allies, in theſe circumſtances the more unfavourable, as they diminiſhed between them that confidence which is ſtill more neceſſary in reverſes than in ſucceſſes, the cabinet of Vienna, it is ſaid, en-

lightened by the advice of the *Archduke*, very wiſely reſolved to make all their efforts on the wings, and to remain, with reſpect to Switzerland, in a ſtate of paſſive obſervation. This plan was the better conceived, as, if the French kept longer in Switzerland the moſt numerous of their three armies, they could not but ſuffer greatly from the ſcarcity of ſupplies. They were too ſtrong to remain in obſervation before an inferior army, and yet too much fatigued and too few in number to reſume the offenſive towards Swabia and Bavaria; whereas, on the contrary, if the war carried on vigorouſly in Italy and on the Lower Rhine, forced the French government to withdraw their troops from Switzerland, the great advantage of this advanced ſituation towards the Tyrol was rendered nugatory, and the balance was re-eſtabliſhed.

It was in Italy above all, that the Houſe of Auſtria had an intereſt in following up its firſt ſucceſſes. She had made every thing ſecondary to the wiſh of reconquering the dutchy of *Mantua* and *Lombardy*; General *Suwarrow* had found means to profit by the firſt victories of General *Kray*; but it was matter of aſtoniſhment at Vienna that the advantages which he himſelf gained, previous to his entrance into Piedmont, had not been attended with conſequences more favourable to the Allies; and that General *Moreau* had, in the plains of the *Po*, ſtopped the rapid march of the victorious army. It was perceived, when too late, that the *Archduke's*

plan

plan was more ſolid, and that it would have been better for the Allies not to have entered *Piedmont* till after they had occupied the ſummits of the great Alps, as well as the backs of theſe mountains on the ſide of France, and barred all the outlets towards the heart of Italy.

But if the court of Vienna had failed in its principal object, by being too eager to attain it, if the recollection of the campaign of 1784, and of thoſe of *Buonaparte*, if the fear of ſeeing France again diſplay unexpected and incalculable reſources in the midſt of reverſes, and of her own ruins; if all theſe conſiderations had made it ſeize with ardour this change of fortune, it was a powerful motive to retain, at any price, conqueſts ſo dearly purchaſed. Accordingly, as ſoon as the march of the Ruſſian army was reſolved on, all the reinforcements of the Auſtrian troops that could be collected in Carinthia, in the Tyrol, and in the ſtate of Venice, were directed towards the army under *Melas* and *Kray*. Theſe generals, who had joined at the affair of *Foſſano* and of *Savigliano*, had ſince ſeparated. General *Melas* was endeavouring to form the inveſtment of *Coni*, which the French, who were maſters of the Upper Vallies, rendered extremely difficult, while General *Kray* advanced, with a large corps of infantry, into the valley of *Aoſta*, and forced them to repaſs Mount *Jouvet*.

The ſpirited defence of *Ancona* by General *Meunier*, that of *Rome*, of *Civita Vecchia*, and of ſome other

other points, occupied an Auſtrian diviſion, under the orders of Generals *Ott* and *Frolich*. General *Klenau* continued to cloſe in upon *Genoa*, on the ſide of the *Riviera di Levante*, and puſhed his poſts as far as *Rapallo*.

Such was the poſition and the diſtribution of the forces of the Auſtrian army, which, as it may have been obſerved, appeared to redouble its activity after the departure of the auxiliary Ruſſian army. Beſides the reinforcements which arrived at this epoch, freſh troops were alſo ſent into Italy, as ſoon as the ſucceſſes of *Maſſena* had enforced the neceſſity of ſupporting the corps of *Laudon* and of *Strauch*, which covered the country between the lakes and the paſſes towards Milan. The total ſtrength of the army under the command of General *Melas* was, at the beginning of October, eſtimated at 60,000 men, and at the end of the campaign it ſtill comprehended 136 battalions and 106 ſquadrons, while the *Archduke*'s army, which was ſtronger in cavalry, and which had about 160 ſquadrons, had only 83 battalions of infantry.

The ſole object of General *Melas* was to take *Coni*, and to wreſt from the French this key of *Piedmont*, the beſt ſituated for favouring their offenſive operations at the opening of the campaign: they were likely to make the greater efforts to preſerve it, as it extended and ſtrengthened the baſe of their defence in the country of Genoa.

General *Championnet*, in order to be more at hand

to ward off the blows that were on the point of being ſtruck on his left, had drawn nearer to it, and had transferred his head-quarters from *Cornegliano* to *Finale*. The head-quarters of General *Melas* were at *La Trinità*, between the *Stura* and the *Tanaro*, nearly at an equal diſtance, and four or five leagues from *Ceva* and *Coni*. The Auſtrians, who had puſhed their poſts, on their right, as far as *Buſca*, at the outlet of the valley of the *Maira*, haſtened to forward the inveſtment of *Coni*, on their left, by penetrating into the valley of the *Peſio*, and made themſelves maſters of the poſts of *Villa Nova* and of *La Chiuſa*. The important poſt of *Santa Margarita*, near *Morozzo*, which was in the centre, and on the road from *Mondovi* to *Coni*, was taken and retaken ſeveral times; the Auſtrian general, *Gottſheim*, who commanded in this part of the line, had to ſuſtain ſome very warm attacks. He attacked, in his turn, between the 12th and 14th of October, and was repulſed by General *Victor*. The French alſo continually haraſſed the right flank of the Auſtrian army on the ſide of *Savigliano*.

During this war of poſts, for the inveſtment of *Coni*, the two Generals, *Melas* and *Championnet*, ſtrove reciprocally to divert the attention, and to divide the forces of each other.

General *Klenau*, although he had not forces ſufficiently conſiderable to cauſe a real alarm, was ordered to advance againſt *Genoa*; and, from his entrenched camp on the heights of *Rapallo*, he, by

movements and frequent attacks, gave full employment to the French and the Ligurians who formed the corps of obſervation on the ſide of the river of the Levant.

General *St. Cyr* having arrived at Genoa, with a reinforcement of about 3000 men, directed General *Miolis* to attack General *Klenau*'s poſition in front, between the 12th and 15th of November. He had outflanked *Klenau*'s left wing, while, with a ſmall corps of troops, which he had cauſed to be embarked, and to proceed along the coaſt, he prepared to cut off his retreat. He thus forced him to abandon his poſition, and to fall back upon the poſts of *La Spezzia* and of *Sarzana*.

At the ſame time the French, taking advantage of the ſecurity afforded them, on the northern ſide of the city of Genoa, by the fort of the *Bocchetta*, and their eaſy iſſues by the valley of the *Scrivia*, advanced again towards *Aleſſandria*, and occupied *Novi* and *Bozzolo*; they deſcended from the heights of *Serravalle*, and warmly attacked General *Karaczay*'s corps at *Rivalta*. They appeared to wiſh to penetrate on the ſide of *Piacenza*, and to make theſe movements concur with thoſe which, in South Switzerland, threatened the Milaneſe, and had obliged General *Strauch* to abandon *Bellinzona*.

Serious as were theſe diverſions, they produced no effect. Neither of the two parties loſt ſight of the principal object. General *Melas* completely aſſembled, between the *Stura* and the *Tanaro*, the

army deſtined for the ſiege. He cauſed General *Karaczay* to be ſupported on the *Bormida* by General *Kray*, who went in perſon to take the command of this corps of obſervation. General *Bellegarde* alſo brought a reinforcement to General *Klenau*, who marched to reſume his firſt poſitions. The fortreſs of *Coni* was cloſed in upon by the diviſions of Generals *Ott*, *Nobili*, and *Gottſheim*, who made themſelves maſters of the poſts of *Beinette* and of *Poverano*. The head-quarters of the Auſtrians were transferred to *Montenara*; and the preparations for the ſiege were vigorouſly puſhed on.

Championnet, on his ſide, after having entruſted to General *St. Cyr* the head and the right of his line, the fortreſs of *Genoa*, and the adjacent poſitions, aſſembled at *Coni* all his forces, and proceeded thither in perſon. He had made the greater part of the detached corps re-enter the vallies of *Suza* and of *Aoſta*, he had aſſembled the remains of the army of the Alps; and it appears that, including the garriſon of Coni, he defended the outworks of that fortreſs with an army of 25,000 men.

The ſucceſſes were diverſified in the actions that took place, between the Auſtrian corps which occupied the different points of the line of inveſtment, and the diviſions of Generals *Victor*, *Muller*, *Lemoine*, and *Grenier*, which were oppoſed to them.

General *Championnet* reſolved to give battle, in order to relieve *Coni*; and he formed a project to

ſurround

ſurround the right wing of the Auſtrian army on the ſide of *Foſſano* and *Savigliano*; to cut off its communications with its magazines at *Bra* and *Turin*, and to force General *Melas* to fight in a diſadvantageous poſition, or to recede from *Coni*, by abandoning the entrance of the plain of *Piedmont*. This plan of general attack was combined with the movements which were to be made in the valley of *Suza* by General *Duheſme*, who was to conduct a column againſt *Pignerola* and *Saluzzo*.

The better to conceal his plan, General *Championnet* manœuvred at firſt by his right; he ordered General *Victor* to attack the poſt of *La Chiuſa*, the poſts of *Beinette* and of *Villa Nova*, which were ſucceſſively evacuated by the Auſtrians. This column advanced as far as the intrenchments of *Mondovi*, which was ſummoned, but the commandant of which defended himſelf, made a ſortie, and was ſuccoured by General *Averſberg*. The French blockaded *Ceva*; and took ſome poſts between theſe two places.

The ſame day, and the following days, the French diviſions of the left and centre puſhed forward; that of *Lemoine* was directed againſt *Centallo* and *Magdalena*, on the left bank of the *Stura*. *Championnet* himſelf marched againſt *Ronchi*; *Grenier*'s diviſion entered *Morozzo*, and approached *Foſſano*. At length, on the 1ſt of November, while General *Freſſinet* was making himſelf maſter of the intrenchments of *Caſtelletto*, on the right

bank

bank of the *Stura*, General *Duheſme* attacked and carried the Auſtrian intrenched poſts at *Pignerola*.

Theſe ſimultaneous attacks, on both banks of the *Stura*, gave riſe to ſome very warm onſets between the heads of the French columns, and the corps of the Auſtrian army which were guarding the principal poſts. The advantage was, till now, on the ſide of the French; they ſucceeded in breaking the lines of inveſtment, took a great many priſoners, and prepared to avail themſelves of this firſt ſucceſs.

As ſoon as General *Melas* had penetrated the deſign of General *Championnet*, he carried to his right wing thus threatened the greater part of his forces, which were aſſembled at the camp near *La Trinità*: as he himſelf meditated to ſurround the left wing of the French, he had entirely refuſed his left, and cauſed *Mondovi* to be evacuated.

Championnet, wiſhing to bring back, and to keep in check this left wing, in order to favour the deploying of his columns towards *Savigliano*, gave orders to General *Lemoine* to follow the courſe of the *Peſio*, as far as *Cari*, in order to haraſs the left flank, and even the rear of the Auſtrian army. The brigades of *Chauſel* and of *Gardanne* croſſed the *Peſio* under the fire from the oppoſite bank, and took poſt at *Breolongo*. *Mondovi* was attacked, and was ſurrendered by the inhabitants: *Beinette* was alſo occupied by a French corps on the 3d of November.

Thus,

Thus, without ſuffering himſelf to be confined by theſe movements, and theſe falſe attacks, General *Melas*, on the 3d of November, abandoned his intrenchments between the *Stura* and the *Tanaro*, in front of *La Trinità*, at *Santa Margarita* and *Morozzo*. He completed this retrograde movement on the left bank of the *Stura*, and took an oblique poſition between *Foſſano* and *Maremme*; his left extending to *Foſſano*, and his right to *Maremme*, below *Savigliano*, which the French diviſion under General *Grenier* occupied on the 3d of November, at two o'clock in the afternoon.

Then the two armies were in preſence of each other, between the river of *Grana* and that of the *Stura*, having between them a country interſected by ſome canals. On the ſide of the French there remained on the right bank of the *Stura*, only a ſmall corps of obſervation of about 1500 men, who occupied the poſts of *Caſtelletto* and *Montenara*, and communicated with General *Lemoine*'s diviſion, of which we have ſpoken. General *Melas*, by extending his right, obliged the French to recede from the fortreſs of *Coni*, to ſpread, and conſequently to weaken themſelves; they were going to give battle with inferior forces, eſpecially in cavalry, in a more open country.

On the 3d of November *Championnet*, eager to execute his junction with the column under General *Dukeſme*, which was now at the diſtance of only half a day's march, and who had juſt made himſelf

himſelf maſter of *Saluzzo*, and was preparing to croſs the *Vraita*, ordered General *Victor* to proceed with his diviſion againſt *Foſſano*, and to reconnoitre its outworks; at the ſame time he directed General *Grenier* to march againſt *Valdiggio* and *Savigliano*, which he occupied the ſame day at three o'clock in the afternoon. It was to General *Clement* that this important poſt was entruſted.

Such was the poſition of the French in the night between the 3d and 4th of November: they had orders to move forward at break of day, and attack the Imperialiſts. General *Grenier* was to march againſt *Marenne*, *Genola*, and *Foſſano*.

General *Melas* had alſo made his diſpoſitions for attacking the French at all points, on the 4th of November, and preciſely in the ſame directions. General *Ott* led a column from *Marenne* againſt *Savigliano*; General *Mitrowſky* a ſecond againſt the ſame place; and General *Elnitz* a third from *Foſſano* againſt *Genola*. General *Gottſheim* was charged to make, with the garriſon of *Foſſano*, two falſe attacks on *Morozzo*, in order to occupy and keep in check the right and the centre of the French, during the attacks directed againſt their left at *Savigliano*.

On the 4th, in the morning, the correſponding diviſions of the two armies formed, and began to move at the ſame time. Theſe columns met; the action commenced by an onſet between General *Ott*'s column, which was marching againſt *Savi-*

gliano,

gliano, and that of General *Grenier*, which was marching againſt *Marenne*. Theſe two columns mutually attacked one another with ardour, endeavoured to turn each other, intermingled and fought with fury. The French infantry, and particularly the 3d and 17th demi-brigades, ſuſtained and repelled ſeveral charges of cavalry; at length General *Grenier*, forced to give way, fell back, in good order, upon *Savigliano*. This poſt was ſoon attacked by General *Ott*'s column, and by General *Mitrowſky*'s diviſion, which advanced by *San Lorenzo*, as far as *Savigliano*, without being noticed. Then this part of *Grenier*'s diviſion being almoſt ſurrounded, threw itſelf, by its right flank, towards *Genola*.

The croſs attack, under the fire of the fortreſs of *Foſſano*, between General *Victor*'s diviſion, and thoſe of Generals *Elnitz* and *Gottſheim*, was not leſs warm. Thrice were the Imperialiſts repulſed; thrice did the French columns attack; General *Richepanſe*, at the head of the cavalry, charged the artillery; General *Adrien* was killed.

The loſs of the poſt of *Savigliano*, and the progreſs of the right wing, forced General *Championnet*, in ſpite of ſo obſtinate a reſiſtance, to withdraw this diviſion towards *Valdiggio*, which was the centre of the poſition of the French; General *Melas* attacked them there, about two o'clock in the afternoon, with all his forces; and as *Championnet* could no longer remain in this poſition, without running the riſk of being ſurrounded in it, he fell back, with his

his left wing, upon *Centallo*; he alſo directed a retrograde movement to be made by General *Victor*'s diviſion, which ſtill formed his right, and divided it between the poſts of *Ronchi* and *Morozzo*.

While the French were retiring towards *Centallo*, General *Duheſme*, who had arrived only a few minutes too late, on the *Maira*, after a forced and very fatiguing march, had attacked *Savigliano*, where General *Ott* had left only one battalion and two ſquadrons; he marched againſt *Maremme*, and found himſelf in the rear of the Auſtrian army; but as ſoon as he had aſcertained the poſition of the two armies, and had ſuſtained the attack of a diviſion which General *Sommariva* had orders to lead againſt him, he fell back upon *Saluzzo*.

General *Melas*, meeting with no more obſtacles, completely aſſembled his columns before *Centallo*. Night put an end to theſe different battles, in which both armies experienced great loſſes. The French, being forced to give up the field of battle on their left, always hard preſſed, and outflanked by the Auſtrians, ſuffered conſiderably in the courſe of this day, both from the reiterated charges of their cavalry, and from the fire of their artillery, which, in its ſucceſſive changes of poſition, in concert with the movements and the attacks of the columns of their infantry, they had to ſuſtain.

General *Championnet* availed himſelf of the night to abandon *Centallo*: a part of his left wing threw itſelf into the valley of the *Grana*, towards *Demonte*; *Grenier*'s

Grenier's diviſion, having recroſſed the *Stura* and traverſed *Coni*, encamped at *San Dalmazzo*, behind the fortreſs on the left bank of the torrent of the *Geſſo*. There remained at *Ronchi* only a rear guard, of about 600 men, who were attacked and taken by General *Ott*.

On the 5th, in the morning, General *Melas* ordered an attack to be made, at the ſame time, by General *Elnitz*'s diviſion and General *Gottſheim*'s corps, on the poſt of *Morozzo*, where a conſiderable corps, whoſe retreat upon *Coni* General *Ott*, after having made himſelf maſter of *Ronchi*, had cut off, was forced to lay down their arms. All the French that endeavoured to croſs the *Stura*, were either taken or drowned. The greater part of General *Victor*'s diviſion joined that of *Lemoine*, near *Mondovi*; and a few troops entered the intrenched camp of *Madonna del Olmo*.

Thus General *Championnet*'s army, forced by the loſs of the battle of *Genola* to abandon the fortreſs of *Coni* to its own defence, had loſt in this day, and in the attacks of the next, upwards of 8000 men, a third of its effective force; and was ſeparated into two corps; the one under *Coni*, the other covering its retreat by the *Col di Tenda*; and a third under *Mondovi*, having its retreat ſecured by *Careſio*, through the valley of the *Tanaro*.

The accounts which General *Melas* received on the 5th, of the diſperſion of General *Championnet*'s columns, determined him to cauſe them to be purſue

ſued in the upper vallies, in order to drive them to a greater diſtance from the fortreſs of *Coni*, ſo as to be able to form the inveſtment of it on the weſt ſide, and to begin the ſiege.

On the 6th of November General *Elnitz* advanced againſt the intrenched camp of *Madonna del Olmo*, which the French had evacuated during the preceding night. General *Ott* marched againſt *Tarantaſco*, and *Caraglio*, aſcended the valley of the *Grana*, and puſhed on parties, towards *Vignolo*, as far as the ſmall fortreſs of *Demonte*. General *Lattermann*, who on the 5th had entered *Savigliano*, proceeded, by the left bank of the *Maira*, againſt *Buſca*, and aſcended the valley as far as *Trovero*.

General *Kaim* purſued, into the valley of the *Po*, the rear guard of the diviſion of General *Duheſme*, who was retreating, by *Suza* and *Aulx*, towards *Briançon*.

The following days *Championnet* gradually completed his retreat from *Coni*, in the two directions which we have mentioned. General *Grenier*'s diviſion quitted *San Dalmazzo*; it was purſued as far as *Vernante*, and was unable to take a poſition, till it reached the camp of *Limone*, near the *Col di Tenda*, under the firſt heights of the Apennines.

The little fortreſs of *Demonte*, which was very important, on account of its poſition, at the head of the valley of the *Stura*, and at the entrance of the upper valley of *L'Argentière*, which opens into that

that of *Barcelonnetta*, was occupied by the Imperialiſts on the 9th of November.

However, General *Championnet* ſtill preſerved, with the two diviſions of his right wing, the poſition of *Mondovi*.

General *Melas*, who had eſtabliſhed his head quarters at *Morozzo*, ordered the diviſions of *Lichtenſtein* and *Mitrowſky* to attack the poſts of the French, which were advantageouſly placed on the heights. Prince *Lichtenſtein* ſeparated his diviſion into two columns, which, under the orders of Generals *Gottſheim* and *Bellegarde*, were directed againſt the poſts of *Vaſco* and *Monaſtero*. Prince *Lichtenſtein*, at the head of the ſecond battalion of *Huff*, climbed the principal height of *San Lorenzo*; the French ſuſtained this attack, with the bayonet; but after an obſtinate reſiſtance they were diſlodged, and fell back upon *Vico*. They afterwards rallied on the road of *Pamparato*, in a poſition where the cavalry could not reach them, but where the fire of a battery that the Auſtrians contrived to eſtabliſh on a ſteep mountain, which commanded them, did not permit them to maintain their ground.

During this attack, above *Mondovi*, General *Mitrowſky* drove in below the town the French advanced poſts on the *Ellero*, croſſed that river, and made himſelf maſter of the ſuburbs of *Bréon* and of *Caraſſon*. The battle and the fire of the place, principally directed againſt the ſuburb of *Bréon*, laſted till night, under cover of which the troops

ſhut

ſhut up in *Mondovi*, which was already ſurrounded, ſprang a mine, and opened for themſelves a new outlet between thoſe which were obſerved by the Auſtrian poſts.

General *Championnet*, after having puſhed on a ſmall rear guard to *Leſegno*, entirely fell back upon *Careſio*, by aſcending the *Tanaro*: this rear guard was purſued inch by inch, by General *Bellegarde*, who, on the 15th of November, was at the entrance of the upper valley of the *Tanaro*. That general, having received information, a few days after, that the French had ſent their cavalry into the country of Genoa, and that they were abandoning the poſition of *Ormea*, when the moſt conſiderable corps was aſſembled; he marched thither, occupied *Ormea*, and puſhed his advanced poſts as far as *Ponte di Nave*.

General *Melas*, wiſhing completely to deprive the garriſon of *Coni* of every hope of ſuccour, and to force the French corps which were ſtill on the declivities on the ſide of *Piedmont*, to throw themſelves again on the back of the Alps and Apennines, ordered General *Ott*'s diviſion to attack that of General *Grenier* at the camp of *Limone*. General *Averſberg* was charged with this expedition, and was ſupported by General *Gottſheim*. General *Grenier* retired towards the *Col di Tenda*; at length General *Elligſhauſen*, detached from the diviſion of *Sommariva*, made himſelf maſter of *Les Barricades*, and took poſt at *L'Argentière*.

After

After these successes General *Melas* summoned the fortress of *Coni*, and on the commandant's refusal to surrender, he began the works of the siege. The main body of the army encamped at *Borgo San Dalmazzo*, where General *Melas* established his head-quarters. He placed two corps of observation, the one on the side of the *Col di Tenda*, and the other towards *Mondovi*, and sent detachments to penetrate into the valley of *Santa Anna*, and that of *La Vraita*, in order to bar all the outlets.

Such were the motives, the preparatory movements, the manœuvres, and the result of the battle of *Genola*.

General *Championnet* has been censured for having too much separated the different corps of his army, on both banks of the *Stura*, and for having thus suffered General *Melas* to take the advantage of being collected, with superior forces, against an extensive line which was parcelled out, and which, although it occupied positions very strong and favourable to the development of attacks, could not, however, sustain, in any one of its posts, the efforts of the Austrian columns. And, indeed, these columns being sometimes assembled at one single point, and sometimes separated, in order to outflank the flanks of the different attacks undertaken by General *Championnet*, ought necessarily to occasion their failure.

The attacks of the main army, the harmony of its movements with those of General *Dubesme*'s column,

lumn, the diverſion executed towards *Mondovi*, and, in general, the whole of *Championnet*'s plan might be well conceived, had it been calculated for forces more conſiderable than thoſe which he had to employ. But having embraced too great a front for the number of troops which he had at his diſpoſal, he rendered himſelf too weak on the different points of his line; while, on the contrary, General *Melas*, who wiſhed to ſtrike a deciſive blow, concentrated his forces, and diſpoſed them in ſuch a manner as to advance, with facility, againſt thoſe points which ſhould preſent to him the greateſt chance of ſucceſs. He manœuvred with ſkill, in order to draw the French out of the ſtrong poſitions which they occupied, under the cannon of *Mondovi*; and he then forced them to accept the battle of *Genola*, the ſucceſs of which was neceſſary to enable him to undertake, without danger, the ſiege of *Coni*.

It may be obſerved, that the habit of applying the movements of the different corps to a larger ſcale, to a greater extent of ground, ſeems to have miſled the French on this occaſion. The preciſion of the manœuvres of General *Melas*, who refuſed his right wing in order to concentrate his poſition, and outflank, more ſurely, the left of the French, was not ſufficiently perceived and divined by *Championnet*.

While General *Melas* was by able manœuvres thus preſſing the inveſtment of *Coni*, General *Kray*

was, on the other hand, charged with operations not leſs important. This general advanced, on the 3d of November, towards *Acqui*, of which he made himſelf maſter, after having repulſed the French and taken 300 of them priſoners. He croſſed the *Bormida* on the evening of the ſame day, and attacked the French on the morning of the 4th: the latter, who occupied two camps, the one at *Boſſo*, the other at *Rivalta*, did not think fit to remain in this poſition, but retired towards the *Scrivia*. The Imperialiſts having again advanced on the 5th of November, General *St. Cyr* abandoned the poſts of *Bozzolo*, *Formigaro*, *Gazzo*, and *Fraſſonara*, and aſſembled the greater part of his forces on the backs of the mountains of *Novi*, which he fortified, with an intention of there maintaining his ground. In this poſition General *Kray* undertook to force him. He, in conſequence, drew up his army in three columns, and on the 6th of November attacked with his right diviſion, in a ſhort time reached the heights, and occupying, with this diviſion alone, all the forces of the enemy, afforded the two other columns the means of more eaſily climbing up the mountain. The French made the moſt vigorous reſiſtance; but notwithſtanding the briſkneſs of their fire, they were at length obliged to yield to the ſuperiority of numbers, and forced to effect their retreat. They were haraſſed till night by the right column of the Auſtrians, who partly took them in flank and in the rear, and alſo by the

left column, which puſhed on as far as *Monte Meſſino*. In the evening General *Kray* directed theſe two diviſions to fall back on that of the centre, which had not been able to follow the rapid progreſs of the flank columns; and he confined his operations to driving the French from three of their poſts. General *Kray*, who ſpeaks highly of the conduct of the officers employed under his command, beſtows particular praiſe on the regiment of *Buſſy* light horſe, which, although the ground was by no means favourable to cavalry, kept in check a numerous corps of infantry, which it prevented from acting. This diverſion, which was calculated to retain the French on the territory of Genoa, was of the utmoſt importance to General *Melas*, who, having no longer to fear that *Championnet* would be able to draw reinforcements from the main body of *St. Cyr*'s corps, could, in all ſafety, undertake the ſiege of *Coni*.

In fact, the operations of General *Kray*, who had called in the corps under Generals *Haddick*, *Karaczay*, and *Rohan*, and marched againſt *Gavi*, combined with thoſe of *Klenau*, who had advanced from *La Spezzia* as far as *Rapallo*, kept in check all the forces which the French had in *Liguria*; and forced *Championnet* and *St. Cyr* to concentrate their forces on the Ligurian Apennine, in order to cover the ſtate and city of Genoa. *Kray* ſeemed to be waiting only for the arrival of the reinforcements which were marching towards *Klenau*'s main army,

army, in order to commence a general attack, and diſlodge the French from the poſition of the *Bocchetta*, which was defended by a numerous artillery and formidable intrenchments.

The right flank of the French army was alſo equally threatened, on the ſide of *Ormea*; and it was to be apprehended that *Melas*'s left wing, by moving forward to the principality of *Oneglia*, would cut off its retreat to *Nice*.

It therefore became urgent to ſtop the progreſs of *Klenau*'s corps: General *Arnaud* was charged with this expedition: accordingly he marched towards the eaſtern coaſt of Genoa, and attacked the Auſtrians, whom he forced to fall back as far as *La Spezzia*, and from whom he took two magazines and made 300 priſoners. At the ſame moment General *Clauſel* ſurpriſed them at *Montenero*, and likewiſe made 200 of them priſoners. Theſe ſucceſſes having cleared all the eaſt ſide of *Liguria*, the French eſtabliſhed their head-quarters at *La Pietra*; they had 8000 men at the *Col di Tenda*, and alſo occupied the *Col di Tanarda*, that of *Tanarello*, the bridge of *Nava*, *San Bernardo*, *San Jacomo*, *Montenotte*, *Saſello*, *Campo Freddo*, and the heights of *Gavi*. The poſitions of this line, which are very ſtrong, covered Genoa, and the *Riviera di Ponente*, as far as Nice.

We cannot too much admire the perfect harmony which reigned in the movements of the Imperial troops; and if ſucceſs did not crown Gene-

ral *Klenau*'s manœuvres, againſt the moſt remote point of the defenſive poſition of the French, this muſt be attributed ſolely to the diſproportion of his means for the accompliſhment of ſo great an enterpriſe. General *Kray*'s corps, placed between the *Bormida* and the *Scrivia*, being more within reach of the main army, could, as occaſion required, be alternately reinforced, or itſelf furniſh ſuccours to the beſieging army. *Klenau*, on the contrary, being ſeparated by the whole chain of the Apennines, was neceſſarily left to his own ſtrength; and he muſt have had a more conſiderable force than that which he commanded, to be able to approach Genoa ſufficiently to turn on his right and take in the rear the poſt and the poſition of the *Bocchetta*.

As in former wars the head of this intrenched camp, which defends the entrance of the two rivers of Genoa, had not been ſubjected to the teſt of experience, no notice was taken of this obſtacle; and the alternate ſucceſſes of both parties, on the ſide of the *Riviera di Levante*, excited aſtoniſhment; ſucceſſes which the mere inſpection of the ground is ſufficient to explain.

While theſe movements attracted the attention of the French towards the defence of the territory of Genoa, *Melas* did not loſe ſight of his principal object, the capture of *Coni*. It is impoſſible to diſplay more activity in a ſiege than was exerted in carrying on that of this fortreſs. Upwards of 7000 workmen

workmen were employed in the trenches, and on the batteries. The beſieging army, which was already numerous, daily received freſh reinforcements; the courſe of the waters had been turned, in order to render uſeleſs the mills of the fortreſs: laſtly, it was to be battered by upwards of two hundred pieces of cannon. Prince *Lichtenſtein*, who commanded the ſiege, had his head-quarters at the country-ſeat of *Caſtelmagno*, and, by his animating example, redoubled the zeal of the beſiegers. At length, in the night between the 26th and 27th of November, in ſpite of the terrible fire of the place, the trenches were opened within four hundred yards of the covert way, before *Sant Angelo*, between the *Stura* and the *Geſſo*, as well as on the ſide of *Madonna del Olmo*. On the 29th the French garriſon attempted a ſortie for the purpoſe of deſtroying the works; but their efforts were unavailing. The works were carried on with ſo much vigour, that on the 1ſt of December the firſt parallel and the lines of communication were entirely completed. In the night between the 1ſt and 2d of December the artillery was planted on nineteen batteries, and the next day, at ſeven o'clock, they began to play together on the place. The fire was ſo terrible, that the troops who defended the works were obliged, at the expiration of four hours, to abandon them precipitately. At the ſame time a bomb-ſhell having fallen on a powder-magazine, threw down a redoubt. The Auſtrians occupied it; and in the night

night between the 2d and 3d they opened the ſecond parallel. The bombardment continued the whole morning, and about noon the flames broke out in ſeveral parts of the place. Towards evening the middle redoubt blew up; the fire ſpreading more and more, and the continual fall of bomb and howitzer ſhells, and cannon balls, baniſhing every poſſibility of extinguiſhing it, the inhabitants ſent to beg Prince *Lichtenſtein* to ſpare the town. The prince refuſed, declaring that he would not treat till a flag of truce, charged with full power, ſhould be ſent to his camp. The French commander, who could not hope for any ſuccour, and found no advantage in prolonging a reſiſtance which would only involve the entire deſtruction of the town, at half paſt eight o'clock determined to capitulate. He ſent an officer to agree on the articles of capitulation, which, after ſome diſcuſſion, was ſigned; and the garriſon, conſiſting of 2500 men, ſurrendered priſoners of war.

Thus on the ninth day after the opening of the trenches, *Coni*, juſtly conſidered as the key of *Piedmont* on the ſide of France, was delivered up into the hands of the Auſtrians.

It is well known that in 1740 the French beſieged it, and could not ſucceed in making themſelves maſters of it. In 1796 it had been delivered up to *Buonaparte*, by one of the clauſes of the treaty of peace with the late King of Sardinia.

Our readers will be leſs aſtoniſhed at the ſpeedy reduction

reduction of this fortreſs, if they reflect on the deplorable ſituation in which it was when it was inveſted. The French armies had ſtaid in its environs, had conſumed a great part of its ſupplies; its magazines of every kind were entirely exhauſted; add to this, the retreat which followed the battle of *Genola* had been made with ſo much precipitation, that the majority of the wounded had been left in the place; the caſemates were encumbered by them, and conſequently could not afford any ſhelter to the garriſon, who, inceſſantly expoſed to the continual fire of artillery, had not a moment's reſt.

Beſides, independently of particular circumſtances which weakened the means of defence of *Coni*, it is proper to obſerve, that it would be wrong to pretend to judge of the conduct of a commander of a place, in the preſent war, by comparing it with that of officers who commanded in former wars. We have frequently had occaſion to remark the great changes which have taken place in the field war; and if we have not made the ſame obſervations reſpecting the beſieging war, it is becauſe in general it has been merely acceſſory in the plans, which, from the commencement of the preſent war to this moment, have always been rather objects of invaſions than a regular and progreſſive ſyſtem of attacks.

We might quote twenty battles, in which the greateſt talents have been diſplayed, on both ſides, if not in the conception of the plan, at leaſt in its execution; and there is ſcarcely a ſingle ſiege, the

conduct of which, whether conſidered in regard to the attack or to the defence, has gained a name for thoſe officers to whom it has been entruſted.

The commanders in chief, determined to take advantage of their ſucceſſes, have moſt frequently contented themſelves with blockading the great fortreſſes, and when a place of moderate extent could be an obſtacle to their movements, or give them uneaſineſs in the ſuppoſition of a retreat, they have employed means ſo extraordinary, they have ſurrounded it by ſo formidable an artillery, that military men have been obliged to renounce thoſe calculations, which, formerly, led them to judge that a place ought to ſtand thirty, forty, or fifty days ſiege from the firſt opening of the trenches.

The ſmall fortreſs of *Coni* was perhaps battered by a greater number of pieces of cannon than was ever employed in the moſt famous ſieges of the war of the ſucceſſion, or the war of 1740. How then, after this, can we be aſtoniſhed that a garriſon far from numerous, placed in the middle of a conflagration, ſurrounded by ruins, diſheartened by the conſternation of the inhabitants, and deprived of the hope of a long and honourable defence, ſhould have been diſpoſed to liſten to offers of capitulation?

Notwithſtanding theſe general reflections, which appear to us ſupported by the experience of preceding

ceding campaigns, we do not diſſemble that our readers have a right to be aſtoniſhed that *Coni*, which has the reputation of being a well-fortified place, and the poſition of which is of ſuch ſuperior importance, did not oppoſe a longer reſiſtance.

Prior to this ſurrender, the head-quarters of the French had been moved to a greater diſtance; General *St. Cyr* had transferred his to *Cairo*; and thoſe of *Championnet* were fixed at *Soſpello*, a ſmall town at a ſhort diſtance from *Nice*. As early as the 1ſt of December the heights of the *Col di Tenda* were abandoned by the French, and the general in chief continuing to cover the Ligurian Appennine, from *Finale* to *Gavi*, had reinforced with 4000 men the poſts oppoſed to *Bellegarde*'s corps, towards *Ormea*. On the other hand, a diviſion of the French army, which had advanced in front of *Novi* and *Acqui*, had occupied thoſe two towns, and taken poſſeſſion of ſeveral magazines. This movement, which threatened the flank of the Auſtrians, obliged them to detach forces, in order to retake this point, which it was important to keep: conſequently General *Hohenzollern* was ordered to march againſt *Novi*. On the 6th of December he attacked the 8000 troops who had taken poſt there, and diſlodged them with the loſs of 400 men. The French fell back upon the fortreſs of *Gavi*, and the intrenched poſt of the *Bocchetta*. The forts of *Ceva* and of *Serravalle*, by turns blockaded and

their blockade raiſed for ſome time paſt, had remained in the power of the Imperialiſts.

In the mean time General *Klenau* had not renounced his projects againſt Genoa; on the 13th of December he had approached, at all points, the front of the line of the enemy's right wing; and on the 14th he attacked their poſitions on Mount *Cornua*, and in the environs; the French, forced in their intrenchments, effected their retreat, and in the evening they formed again near *Novi*; but the capture of Mount *Laſchiere* having facilitated to the Auſtrians the means of attacking them in the valley, where they were drawn up in order of battle, General *Arnaud* was obliged to retire to the heights of *San Martino*, abandoning the poſts of *Roſſiglione*, *Scoffera*, *Torrigia*, and *Carpendigo*.

The poſition of Genoa was becoming extremely critical, owing to the facility which the Auſtrians had of concentrating their forces. General *St. Cyr* then formed the bold, but indiſpenſable reſolution, of aſſuming the offenſive in his turn.

Accordingly, after having apprized General *Watrin* of the enemy's projects, on the 15th he marched in perſon againſt General *Klenau*, whoſe left was almoſt in a poſition not to be attacked; it was ſupported by the ſea, and was covered by the fire of two ſhips of the line and of ſeveral ſmall craft. To turn their poſition was a difficult operation, under the double idea of the diſproportion of forces, and of the diſadvantage of the ground,

which was almoſt inacceſſible from its elevation, and the difficulty of the paſſes; but there was no alternative. General *Arnaud* received orders to act on the defenſive againſt the point ſupported by the ſea, while *St. Cyr*, after having detached two battalions againſt *Montefacia*, advanced againſt the centre and the right flank of the enemy's poſitions.

After an obſtinate battle, the French having rendered themſelves maſters of the paſſes, climbed the heights, and drove in the right flank of the Imperialiſts, the defeat of which involved that of the left. It was purſued and haraſſed in its retreat, as far as *Sori*, by General *Arnaud*.

The ſkill of the chief of the engineers *Aident*, who, at the head of a detachment, retook the poſts of *Carpendigo* and *Scoffera*; and the gallantry of the Adjutant *Quatrin*, who made himſelf maſter of *Torrigia*, greatly contributed to the ſucceſs of this day, in which the French troops diſplayed the greateſt intrepidity. The attack near the ſea-ſhore is above all remarkable; the chief of battalion *Selin* there defeated the enemy, although eſtabliſhed in a poſt almoſt impregnable, ſeparated by a deep ravine covered by a wall, extending from the ſea to a mountain.

The Imperial army, continually haraſſed, rallied behind the *Magra*, and there took a poſition from which its advanced poſts extended from *Seſtri* to *Vareſe*, *Barvi*, *Campiano*, and *San Stephano*, and joined thoſe of General *Hohenzollern*.

General *Ott*'s diviſion, conſiſting of 89 battalions and 8 diviſions of cavalry, which were marching to the relief of General *Klenau*, went into cantonments in the dutchies of *Modena* and *Parma*. The blockade of *Gavi* was raiſed, and *Hohenzollern*'s corps took up its winter-quarters near *Aleſſandria*. *Melas* transferred his head-quarters to *Foſſano*.

The Auſtrians occupy all the paſſes which ſeparate France from Italy; that is to ſay, from the *Col di Tenda*, which the French had evacuated, the valley of *Aoſta*, to the foot of the Great and Little *St. Bernard*; the valley of *Suſa* to the gorges of *Mount Cenis*; and the valley of *Oſſola* as far as beyond *Simplon*: thence they extended, by the *Lago Maggiore*, and the lakes of *Lugano* and *Como*, as far as *Bellinzona* and *Chiavenna*, and communicated by *St. Bernard* with the army of Prince *Charles*. On the other hand, the Ligurian republic was, as it were, inveſted by the different Imperial corps, which occupied *Ormea*, *Cairo*, *Novi*, *Serravalle*, and the environs of *Gavi*, to within a little diſtance of the *Bocchetta*. *Klenau*'s corps, on the river of the Levant, puſhed its advanced poſts to within four miles of Genoa, and communicated by *Seſtio*, with the troops ſtationed in Tuſcany.

The French, on their ſide, maintained their ground in their poſitions of *Feſnils* and *Ceſanne*, whence their advanced poſts extended to *Columbie*, *Solemine*, and *Molliere*. At the *Croix de Marbre*, near

near *Nice*, was ſtationed General *Pointot*; at *Finale* were Generals *Lemoine*, *Clauzel*, and *Gardanne*; at *Loano* was General *Feras* with 5000 men; General *Miolis* had his head-quarters at *Savona*, and Generals *Victor* and *Gardanne* theirs at *Porto Maurizio*, and at *La Pieva*. The deſertion, occaſioned by the want of proviſions, had conſiderably weakened the French army.

We ſhall here ſuſpend for a while the epitome of the events of the campaign of 1799. Not that we conſider it as entirely terminated; perhaps at the time that we are now writing, blood ſtill ſtains the ſummit of the Alps or of the Apennines: but ſince the rage of war has taught men to deſpiſe the laws of nature; ſince the rigour of the cold, the fall of the ſnow, the heaps of ice, are no longer able to ſtop the courſe of their revenge; ſince humanity in vain claims a truce, which the horrors of winter ſeem to render neceſſary; ſince, in ſhort, all the elements of deſtruction are, at this day, calculated in the plans of campaign, and are reckoned among the chances and the means of ſucceſs, nothing more is left for the writer who wiſhes to hazard a few reflections on the conduct of the war, than to ſeize the inſtant when wearineſs, exhauſted ſtrength, the want of proviſions, and, to ſum up the whole, the almoſt abſolute annihilation of the reſpective armies, render impoſſible, for the moment, any further operation.

Such was, in fact, the ſituation of the remains of

of the French and Auſtrian armies at the end of a campaign which will long be celebrated in the annals of war. However aſtoniſhing may have been the progreſſes of the Imperial troops, from the *Adige* to the frontiers of France, the ſucceſſes will much leſs arreſt the attention of military men, than the ſkilful manœuvres which, on both ſides, have contributed to accelerate or to check them.

In all times, at leaſt among the moderns, Italy has eaſily been conquered and as eaſily loſt. In 1494, *Charles VIII.* croſſed the Alps; he is received at *Florence* on the 17th of November; enters *Rome* as a conqueror on the 31ſt of December; and makes himſelf maſter of *Naples* on the 21ſt of February of the following year. The rapidity of his ſucceſſes collects his enemies; he is attacked on all ſides, and, notwithſtanding his gaining the battle of *Formonte*, fought on the 6th of July, he can ſcarcely cut his way through, in order to re-enter his dominions.

Lewis XII. follows the example of his predeceſſor; he attacks the *Milaneſe*, and makes a conqueſt of it in twenty days; *Genoa* ſubmits; he divides, with *Ferdinand* the Catholic, the kingdom of *Naples*, conquered in four months; but diſcord, as is generally the caſe, having found her way among the allies, the war is continued, with different degrees of ſucceſs. Thrice is the Milaneſe retaken and thrice loſt. At length *Lewis XII.* after having exhauſted

exhauſted his country, abandons Italy, ſtyled the grave of the French.

Theſe melancholy examples ſtop not a royal knight: *Francis I.* re-enters Italy, gains the battle of *Marignano* on the 14th of September 1515, and renders himſelf maſter of the *Milaneſe*. He remains in peaceable poſſeſſion of it till 1521, when *Charles V.* declares war againſt him, and wreſts from him this dutchy. In 1524 *Francis I.* retakes it; but being defeated and taken priſoner at *Pavia*, on the 24th of February 1525, Italy is loſt to the French.

Theſe alternate ſucceſſes and reverſes confirm what we advance, that, like rapid fortunes, Italy is more difficult to preſerve than to acquire. But what will particularly diſtinguiſh this laſt campaign will be the talent which has been diſplayed in defenſive war. As ſoon as the battle of *Magnano* was loſt by *Scherer*, having weakened his army, by detaching *Championnet* to attack the kingdom of Naples, at the very moment when 45,000 Ruſſians were coming to reinforce the Auſtrian army, it appeared no longer probable that *Moreau*, with a diſorganized army, would be able, not only to defend the Milaneſe, but even to make a ſtand in Piedmont and in the ſtate of Genoa, and, above all, to join the army of which *Macdonald* had aſſumed the command, and which ſeemed likely to be taken or deſtroyed.

The judicious conduct of General *Moreau*, whether

ther in delaying the paſſage of the enemy acroſs the *Adda*, or in the choice of the poſition where he contrived, by deceiving the enemy reſpecting his intentions, to concentrate his forces between *Aleſſandria* and *Tortona*, and not only to keep the Imperial armies in check, but even to obtain an important ſucceſs, againſt forces infinitely ſuperior; in a word, the unhoped-for junction of the army of Naples with the wreck of the army of Italy, will do no leſs honour to the talents of General *Moreau*, than the famous retreat which he executed from *Ratiſbon* to the *Rhine*, when he had inceſſantly to fight the Auſtrian army commanded by the *Archduke Charles*.

In relating the events of this campaign, we took the liberty of aſſerting, that General *Suwarrow* had not derived from his ſucceſſes all the advantage which it was reaſonable to expect; that in wiſhing to undertake too much at once, he had failed in the principal object, which muſt have been, above all, to prevent the junction of *Macdonald* and *Moreau*. This aſſertion has ſince become the opinion of all military men; but, at the ſame time, we felt a pleaſure in doing juſtice to the activity of the Ruſſian general, and to the conſtant intrepidity of the troops which ſerved under his command.

One ſingularity of this campaign which will diſtinguiſh it more particularly from all thoſe which have taken place in former wars, is the importance acquired by the ſtate of Genoa, which is now conſidered

ſidered as a large intrenched camp. We have frequently remarked to what an extent the line of attack had in this war been prolonged; how, on both ſides, ſeparate columns had been made to act, ſimultaneouſly, from right to left, throughout ſpaces of from twenty to five and twenty leagues; but there was hitherto no example of defenſive operations, calculated on ſo large a ſcale, that had been attended with equal ſucceſs.

The Auſtrians, who had adopted this ſyſtem at the beginning of the war, had been obliged to renounce it; and notwithſtanding the natural defences which the chain of the Apennines preſents, it will no doubt excite aſtoniſhment that it ſhould, for upwards of ſix months, have been able to withſtand all the efforts of the Auſtrian troops, commanded by ſuch experienced generals as *Kray*, *Klenau*, and *Melas*.

This aſtoniſhing defence of the country of Genoa has not merely ſerved to protect the frontiers of France; if the reader will take the trouble of caſting his eye on the map, he will ſee what ſupport this poſition affords, particularly Piedmont, at the ſame time that it preſents iſſues towards the Milaneſe and Tuſcany. Let us ſuppoſe the French army carried to an equality of force with that of the allies, by reinforcements received by the county of *Nice*, or by ſea, what will be the ſituation of the Auſtrian corps, placed in the valley of *Aoſta*, in that of *Suſa*, at the *Col di Tenda*, and even in the

fortreſs of *Coni?* One ſingle battle, gained between *Milan* and *Turin*, not only neceſſitates the evacuation of all *Piedmont*, but expoſes, in the higheſt degree, all the troops which are at preſent ſcattered throughout that country.

Suppoſing this battle to be gained, the ſcenes of the old wars of Italy once more open to our view; the French columns re-enter the Milaneſe; and the banks of the *Adda*, of the *Oglio*, and of the *Adige*, may again become the theatre of the war. In this hypotheſis what period can be perceived to the misfortunes which deſolate Europe? And ſuppoſing, on the contrary, that the French were obliged to remain on the defenſive, what probability is there that the approaching campaign can more than the preceding ones realize the projects of the coalition? Has not experience demonſtrated the inſuperable reſiſtance preſented by the frontiers of France; and can it be reaſonably hoped to reduce that country by force of arms, when her troops ſtill occupy, in front of theſe very frontiers, the *Apennines*, the *Alps*, *Switzerland*, the courſe of the *Rhine*, and the very important fortreſſes of *Mentz* and *Ehrenbreitſtein?*

If theſe reflections ſeem to tranſgreſs the limits which we have laid down, and to which we till this moment have confined ourſelves, we truſt that they will find their excuſe in the intention by which they have been dictated. What! have there not been battles enough fought, blood enough ſpilt,

countries

countries enough ravaged? For the laſt nine years every ſpring has witneſſed the departure of the flower of youth, abandoning their homes. All the generations between adoleſcence and old age have been nearly half deſtroyed in France, in Italy, and in the greater part of Germany. The loom, the plough, every profeſſion of ſociety, in ſhort, claims hands which ſhould be employed in promoting its proſperity, inſtead of being engaged in effecting its deſtruction. From one end of Europe to the other there exiſts but one wiſh, that of peace; and we do not heſitate to declare, that thoſe perſons would be highly culpable, who, following the beaten track of Machiavelian policy, would conſole themſelves for the ills which they make their country endure, by the idea that they occaſion to their enemies others ſtill more fatal.

The time is paſſed when war might be conſidered as a mean of ſecurity for civilization; when the ferment which prevailed in the French nation, and the projects which might be attributed to its government, were of a nature to give juſt cauſe of inquietude to all the powers of Europe. No one is ignorant that, for a long time paſt, all the French are united in their wiſh for peace, neither can any one now doubt that the preſent government would make the greateſt ſacrifices to ſecure, by this pledge, the triumph of moderate ideas. The preſent moment affords the greateſt facilities for attaining pacification. The Emperor has accompliſhed his ob-

ject, by the ſucceſſes of his armies in Italy; and France will not have to regret the loſs of a country too far diſtant from her frontiers, if ſhe ſucceeds in eſtabliſhing there a balance of power that ſhall enſure its independence.

The departure of the Ruſſians, which, at firſt ſight, ſeems contrary to the intereſts of the Houſe of Auſtria, and which would be ſo, in fact, ſuppoſing a continuation of the war, is a favourable event for that power, if ſhe profits by it to ſecure uſeful and advantageous compenſations for the loſs of Belgium; and eſcapes the re-eſtabliſhment of the *ſtatus quo*, which would have been the inevitable reſult of the complete ſucceſs of the projects of the coalition.

Without entering into an examination of the motives which may have determined the court of Ruſſia to recall her troops, it will be ſufficient to take a view of the ſtate of her finances, of the inconveniences of a circulation of only copper and paper, and even of the inadequateneſs of her army for the maintenance of the order or the defence of an empire more extenſive than the half of Europe; but *Catherine II.* herſelf decided whether it was to the advantage of Ruſſia to interfere in an active manner in this great quarrel. Warmly preſſed in the name of her authority, which was termed her glory, ſolicited by the ſeductive allurement of ſubſidies, ſhe promiſed fleets and armies; but her demonſtrations had no other object than to engage

her

her neighbours, which, in politics, is almoſt ſynonimous to her rivals, to commence a war that was to enervate their ſtrength, and afford her, at a future period, the means of impoſing laws on them. All thoſe mighty preparations which filled the gazettes of the day exiſted, in reality, only in *ukaſes*. Her fleets were confined to a few cruiſes, and her troops did not leave their cantonments. The conduct of *Catherine* is the ſecret of the true intereſts of Ruſſia.

We ſhall not ſpeak of Pruſſia, who, being a conſtant object of jealouſy to the two Imperial courts, is too much intereſted in the maintenance of the balance of power, and whoſe wiſe circumſpection has preſerved for the belligerent powers an impoſing mediator.

England appears then alone to be averſe to ſhutting at length the gates of the temple of Janus; and yet, if we conſider the immenſity of her debt, the enormous amount of her taxes, the extreme penury of her means of ſubſiſtence, in the midſt of the extreme abundance of her colonial commodities; when we ſee her, like Midas, who changed every thing into gold, in the ſame manner change every thing that ſhe lays her hands on into ſugar and coffee, without being able to put a ſtop to the diſadvantage of her courſe of exchange, we aſk ourſelves how a nation ſo conſiderate, the only one, perhaps, that knows how to conſult her intereſts rather than her paſſions, is not the firſt to court

peace,

peace, which alone can reſtore to her induſtry and to her commerce all the ſcope of which they are ſuſceptible.

We repeat the obſervation; the preſent moment is favourable; but if the parties concerned neglect to embrace it, who can foreſee where will ſtop the evils and the ſcourge of war? Whichever way fortune inclines, ſhe will increaſe the pretenſions of the conqueror; animoſity will revive, both ſides will be mutually forced to recur to extraordinary means, too fatal to the maintenance or re-eſtabliſhment of internal order not to be in direct oppoſition to the true intereſts of the different powers, and to the object which they have in view.

What a ſubject of meditation for the men charged with the deſtiny of empires! On their determination will depend the fate of the preſent generation, and, perhaps, of thoſe which are to ſucceed it; ſo much are we inclined to believe that peace would at length terminate this great criſis which has ſhaken the foundations of all ſociety, ſo much are we terrified at the fatal conſequences that will inevitably reſult from the continuation of the war. The flame, far from limiting its ravages, is on the point of extending them; the fire lies dormant in the north of Europe, and waits, perhaps, only for a ſpark to ſpread with an activity that will henceforth render every effort to extinguiſh it unavailing.

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